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A Theory on Abstraction in St. Thomas 249
Francis A. Cunningham, S.J.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

Being and Metaphysics 271
Melvin A. Glutz, C.P.

The Logical Foundations of the Four Causes 287
John B. Noone, Jr.

American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Annual Meeting . 295
Desmond J. Fitzgerald.

Chronicle . . . . . 286.

BOOKS REVIEWS

WM. OLIVER MARTIN. *The Order and Integration of Knowledge* . . 297
Maurice Holloway, S.J.

D. W. HAMLYN. *The Psychology of Perception* 301

PETER GEACH. *Mental Acts*
George P. Klubertanz, S.J.

NOTES ON FOREIGN BOOKS 307

INDEX TO VOLUME XXXV 317

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Francis A. Cunningham, S.J.

A THEORY ON ABSTRACTION IN ST. THOMAS

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"The text itself would not have been particularly difficult, were it not for the commentators." That was Maldonatus's observation on a passage in St. John.[1] And I suspect this may be also true of the classic passage on abstraction in St. Thomas.[2] We have been brought up on a watered-down version of the commentators. They do not seem to have made any distinction between abstraction and precision. And we have insisted on trying to read their total *vs.* formal abstraction into St. Thomas's own *abstractio totius* vs. *formae*. This had led to an imbroglio in two dimensions.

	1st intention	*2nd intention*
accidental form	— "white"	
whole nature	— "man" (body and soul)	
whole supposit	— "man" (with individuating notes)	⟷ "humanity"

As I see it, the commentators' total *vs.* formal abstraction is nothing else but a first intention *vs.* a second, man *vs.* humanity. And these differ as St. Thomas's *abstractio* vs. *precisio*. "Man" can signify an essence considered as a whole supposit, but "humanity" is the formal (logical) part of that essence only.[3] St. Thomas's own *abstractio totius* vs. *formae* is the consideration of a whole (physical) nature including matter as well as form (for example, the body and soul of man) *vs.* the consideration of a mere accidental form which could not exist as such apart from a suitable subject (for example, white, snub). St. Thomas's abstractions seem to be all first intentions (for example, man, white, snub), whereas his

precisions are all seconds (for example, humanity, whiteness, snubness).

These are ungainly expressions admittedly. And we cannot blame the commentators for wanting to shorten them. They might have introduced their total *vs.* formal abstraction as a substitute for either contrast between a whole and a form, but they should not have tried to make it do service for both. There are two different kinds of wholes here which must be respected, and two different kinds of forms.

An essence considered as a whole supposit includes individual sensible matter in some sort of confused way at least (for example, "man" in "Socrates is a man"). An essence considered as a whole physical nature includes common sensible matter (for example,



[1]*In Joan.*, I, 5.
[2]*In Boeth. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3.
[3]*De Ente*, cap. 3; ed. C. Boyer, S.J. (Rome: Gregorian Univ., 1946), pp. 19-20.
[4]L.-M. Régis, O.P., "Un livre . . . La philosophie de la nature. Quelques apories," *Etudes et Recherches. Philosophie* (College of Ottawa), Cahier I (1936), pp. 127-56, particularly pp. 132-35.

"man" or "humanity") so long as it contains a human body as well as a soul. The individuating notes of the supposit suppressed at best have been lost utterly in this shuffle from "man" to "humanity." The first intention accidental forms of *abstractio formae* (for example, white, snub) are real beings. The second intention logical form of humanity in formal abstraction is a mere being of reason. We have tried to line up the progression of St. Thomas's thought on a horizontal plane with that of the commentators on a vertical which cuts up and clear across the other.

There are two different principles of division here, each equipped to touch all the bases. That is what makes it so confusing. But once grant this shift in perspective, both terminology and examples straightway fall into a consistent pattern. For instance, St. Thomas never calls humanity an abstraction. For that matter, he never seems to have called the content of these *rationes* or formalities—neither man nor humanity—an "abstraction." His *abstractio* was reserved for the operation itself, not for the fruit of that operation.[4] But he never uses "humanity" as the fruit of an abstraction either. He describes that notion as the fruit of a prescinding process rather than that of any abstraction. He never confuses these two processes. And he had no reason to suppose anyone else would either. It was not until well after his death, when the Dark Ages of nominalism had begun to close down on his commentators, that the usage of *abstractio* was transferred imperceptibly from that of a first intention, "man," to that of our second intention, "humanity." Notice, this usage is three steps removed from that of St. Thomas himself.

We should like to proceed in the following order: (1) the agent intellect abstracts first intention, it prescinds seconds; (2) the possible intellect classifies these species into sciences; (3) the real sciences are divided according to first intentions in St. Thomas; (4) the three degrees are divided according to second intentions in the commentators; (5) "abstraction" comes from Aristotle's addition and subtraction of forms; (6) the intellect abstracts from within, the senses from without; (7) metaphysical objects are really distinct from matter as in the second operation; (8) mathematical objects are logically distinct from matter as in the first operation; (9) physical objects are not distinct from matter; (10) the commentators' total

vs. formal abstraction is a first *vs.* second intention; (11) the Port Royal "extension" *vs.* "comprehension" is a first *vs.* second intention; (12) *Quelques apories* of Father L.-M. Régis, O.P., and the response; (13) St. Thomas used first-intention language, not second; (14) a conclusion consisting of contrasts and comparisons.

1. The Agent Intellect

It is the function of the agent intellect to prepare the intelligible species. It can do this in either of two ways. It can disengage an immaterial essence from the signate matter of the phantasm in such a way that the intelligible species is an essence considered as a whole supposit, substance plus accidents in a confused indeterminate sort of way; for example, man. Or it can dematerialize the object in such a way that the intelligible species positively prescinds from all further individuating notes; for example, humanity. That is the difference between St. Thomas's *abstractio* vs. *precisio*.[5]

Thus, in the example, "Socrates is a man," the essence "man" includes the whole supposit of Socrates, substance plus accidents in an implicit manner. Otherwise we could not predicate this "man" of Socrates. It differs from the essence of Socrates as undesignated matter differs from designated.[6] It is an open concept, *une notion ouverte*, since it includes the individuating notes of Socrates in a vague sort of way. It is a first intention inasmuch as it has a

[5]*De Ente*, cap. 3; Boyer, pp. 19-20.

[6]"Sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et essentia Socratis non differunt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum" (*ibid.*, p.18). See *CG*, IV, cap. 81.

[7]*De Ente*, cap. 3; Boyer, pp. 23-24. See *On Being and Essence*, transl. Armand Maurer, C.S.B. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), p. 34, n. 12. "Praecisio. . . . By precision, the intellect formally excludes something from a notion. It is important to notice that precision differs from abstraction, which is the simple consideration of one thing without either including or excluding from its notion other things with which it may be joined in reality. Precision is a cutting off; abstraction is a simple non-consideration."

[8]*In I sent.*, d. 2, a. 3; d. 19, q. 5, a. 1. *ST*, I, q. 12, a. 4 ad 3. *CG*, IV, cap. 81. *De Ver.*, q. 23, a. 1c.

[9]*The Division and Methods of the Sciences, QQ. 5 and 6 of St. Thomas's Commentary on the* De Trinitate *of Boethius*, transl. Armand Maurer, C.S.B. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1953), p. 29, n. 13. "The matter which is the subject of mathematics is called 'intelligible' because it is not perceived by the external senses, like 'sensible matter', but by the imagination, which was sometimes called 'intellect' by the mediaevals. See St Thomas, *In VII Meta.*, lect. 10, nn. 1494-1496; *In III De Anima*, lect. 10, n. 745; Eng. trans. p. 432."

[10]*In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3.

proximate foundation in reality. It is "concrete" in the sense that it subsists in signate matter. This is what I understand as the commentators' total abstraction. And this is what I believe also came to be called a *totum universale*, the extension of a term, the extensive visualization proper to the descending analysis of a perinoetic intellection. If these do not coincide with St. Thomas's essence considered as a whole, then the next question is, just how do they differ?

In its precision of humanity on the other hand, the agent intellect explicitly prescinds from everything which is not the formal part of this concrete physical nature.[7] It trims the corners, so to speak. That is why "humanity" cannot be predicated of Socrates. No part can be predicated of its whole. This "humanity" differs from "man" as a whole nature differs from a whole supposit. It is a closed concept, *une notion fermée*, since it positively excludes all further perfections. It is a second intention because it has no more than a remote foundation in reality. It is a second substance, a mental construct, the personification of a "man" who is not a person. It is abstract inasmuch as it is the consideration of only a formal part which could not exist as such.[8] And this is what I understand as the commentators' formal abstraction. It is also what I believe came to be called a *totum diffinibile*, the comprehension of a term, the eidetic intuition of the ascending analysis implied in a dianoetical intellection. And again, if not, why not?

2. The Possible Intellect

It is the function of the possible intellect to receive these intelligible species and conceive the corresponding *verbum*. The possible intellect classifies these species according to the knowability of their objects; for example, their immateriality. Some contain common sensible matter in their very definition; such are the objects of physics. Some contain intelligible matter only; such are the objects of mathematics.[9] Some contain no matter at all; such are the objects of metaphysics.[10]

Now the point is this. Theoretically, the possible intellect could

distinguish these three grades in either first or second intentions, man *vs.* humanity, snub *vs.* snubness, being *vs.* entity *sub ratione entitatis.*[11] Practically, St. Thomas seems to have made his distinction according to first intention processes, the first operation abstraction of a whole nature or of an accidental form, and the second operation separation of immaterial being.[12] The commentators seem to have made theirs according to their representative content exclusively and not the content of the first intention "man," "snub," "being," but that of the seconds, "humanity," "snubness," entity *sub ratione entitatis.*

3. Real Sciences

St. Thomas professed to follow Aristotle in dividing his sciences according to their objects.[13] Plato was concerned with abstract second intention forms which dwelled apart in some heavenly place, but Aristotle was assiduous in his direct recourse to the thing itself. His examples, even as those of St. Thomas, are first intention essences, not seconds.

St. Thomas never seems to have recognized any such sciences as cosmology or psychology. These are mere bundles of second intention formalities which he would have probably called a dialectic. The Thomistic concept of science starts with a real habit inhering in the possible intellect. These qualities of the speculative intellect

[11] *Ibid.*, a. 1.

[12] "Sunt autem scientiae de rebus, non autem de speciebus, vel intentionibus intelligibilibus, nisi sola scienta rationalis" (*In III de Anima*, lect. 8).

[13] "Et ideo praeter librum *de Anima* Aristoteles non fecit librum de intellectu et intelligibili; vel si fecisset, non pertineret ad scientiam naturalem, sed magis ad metaphysicam, cujus est considerare de substantiis separatis" (*De Sensu et Sensato*, lect. 1).

[14] "Eandem enim conclusionem demonstrat astrologus et naturalis, puta quod terra est rotunda: sed astrologus per medium mathematicum, idest a materia abstractum: naturalis autem per medium circa materiam consideratum" (*ST*, I, q. 1, a. 1 ad 2).

[15] "Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine *homo*; et talis conceptus intellectus habet fundamentum in re immediate, inquantum res ipsa ex sua conformitate ad intellectum facit quod intellectus sit verus . . ." (*In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3c).

[16] *In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3.

[17] "In all probability the question never occurred to Cajetan because: (a) he seems to have taken no cognizance of what St. Thomas had to say about *separation*; (b) he misunderstood his master on the subsistence and immortality of the human soul" (Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, *Man's Knowledge of Reality*, [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1956], p. 195, n. 3).

are made up of first-intention species, whereas those of the practical intellect—for example, the art of logic—are made up of seconds. He divided these first-intention species of the speculative intellect not according to their subject matter but according to their formal objects; that is, their knowability or remoteness from matter. He wrote treatises *In De Mundo et Coelo* and *De Anima* even as Aristotle had done before him and Baron Christian von Wolf was to do after him. But he was never betrayed into calling second substances "sciences" or the second-intention nature of matter, the world or the soul itself, a "science." He never mistook a living habit of the speculative intellect for any abstract body of doctrine. Indeed, he tells us over and over again how the different sciences may be employed to reach the same conclusion. His favorite example is the roundness of the earth as proved by both physical and mathematical means.[14] Real sciences are concerned with real objects. And what is that object as it exists outside the mind but a first-intention essence considered as a whole with a proximate foundation in reality? [15]

4. Abstract Science

St. Thomas made one distinctive contribution to this traditional division of the sciences. And that was his analysis of the different abstractive processes involved. He devotes three articles to this analysis where he devotes only one to the objects themselves.[16] Yet the commentators have kept a discreet silence about this *abstractio totius*, *abstractio formae*, and *separatio*.[17] And the reason for this is, I believe, that all second-intention notions belong to the same genus. All precisions are alike entitatively. Hence the commentators simply had no room for any variety of first-intention processes in their system.

The three degrees of their one abstract science could not differ in anything but a representative content. Entitatively, they all belong to the same genus. And the prescinding process is alike for all. It is simply the distillation of a first intention concept positively excluding signate matter. It cannot give us any more than a truncated shadow of a real image, the echo of an echo. That is all that

comes through. A live dog may differ from a dead lion in a safari, but in pictures they are both just paper and ink. A second-intention notion of humanity may differ from a second-intention notion of snubness and that of being as such, but not generally or in the prescinding process where the cutting off is the same for all. The commentators could not recognize three different kinds of procedure here. Hence, they transferred the term "abstraction" from the operation to the fruit of an operation which St. Thomas called precision. A second operation required for the apprehension of an entity *sub ratione entitatis* could scarcely make sense.

Every first intention in physics, of course, can be turned into a second intention by the simple expedient of trimming off the individual sensible matter implicit in an essence considered as a whole. That is what provides the protective coloring for their abstract science. Moreover, it must be conceded that the distinction between first- and second-intention mathematical forms is an exceedingly tenuous one; yet it does exist—for example, two *vs.* duality, a sphere *vs.* sphericity. And the distinction between first and second intentions in metaphysics is complicated by the factor that they can both be thought apart and exist apart from all matter. Still, God is not my idea of God. And your soul, I presume, will go on existing even after I have given up thinking about it. The commentators settled for three degrees of one abstract science which differ only in representative content. St. Thomas divided his real sciences entitatively according to the abstractive processes themselves.

[18]Régis, "La philosophie de la nature," pp. 129-31. See also Augustin Mansion, *Introduction à la physique aristotélicienne* (Paris: Vrin, 1946), pp. 147-48; M.-D. Philippe, "Abstraction, addition, séparation dans la philosophie d'Aristote," *Revue Thomiste*, XLVIII (1948), 461-79, particularly p. 468.

[19]". . . sive etiam sint secundum rem separata, sicut pater non potest intelligi sine intellectu filii, quamvis illae relationes inveniantur in diversis rebus. Si vero unum ab altero non dependeat secundum id quod constituit rationem naturae, tunc unum non (*sic*) potest ab altero abstrahi per intellectum, ut sine eo intelligatur; non solum si sint separata secundum rem, ut homo et lapis, sed etiam si secundum rem conjuncta sint, sive ea conjunctione . . ." (*In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3). The *non* in the Parma edition is an interpolation. See Paul Wyser, O.P., "Die wissenchaftstheoretischen Quaest. V u. VI *in Boethium de Trinitate* des hl. Thomas von Aquin," *Divus Thomas*, XXV (1947), Ser. III, 437-85.

[20]*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 1 ad 1. *De Ente*, cap. 3; Boyer, pp. 19-20.

5. The Abstractive Process

Aristotle's addition and subtraction of forms seems to have been the matrix for St. Thomas's theory of abstraction.[18] Forms are much like numbers. Give or take an extra note in their comprehension and you have a new form just as you would get another number. $4+3=7$ as a sum in addition, τὰ ἐκ προσθέσεως; $7-4=3$ as a remainder in subtraction, τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως. Animal plus rational equals man as a whole in composition; the minuend "man," *le tout dont on abstrait*, minus the subtrahend "rational," *ce qu'on abstrait*, leaves a remainder of individuating notes, *ce que l'on fait abstraction*.

There is one principle dominant in this theory. We can always abstract that which is prior and independent in the logical order of our thoughts—for example, the number 4, "rational"—from that which is posterior or greater—for example, the number 7, "man"; but we can never abstract that which comes after—for example, 7, "man"—from that which comes before—for example, 4, "animal" —not in this real order of first-intention speculation where St. Thomas's abstractions take place. This principle, of course, would be utterly meaningless in that never-never land of Platonic forms where surds such as $\sqrt{-2}$ are just as valid as humanity or any other second intention formality. This principle postulates a first-intention real science.

And St. Thomas is faithful to this principle whether the minuend and the subtrahend are really distinct or not. A "father" cannot be abstracted from his child because the father would cease to be a "father" without his child. A man, however, can be abstracted from a stone because a man can be thought apart from a stone.[19] And this is all St. Thomas means by abstraction in a cognitive faculty: the simple consideration of one element apart from others. His essence considered as a whole carries no implication whatsoever about any other further perfections which may or may not be associated with that essence in reality.[20]

6. Intellectual *vs.* Sense Abstraction

There is an ontological order in the structure of being which must be respected in the logical order of our thoughts. This would not be necessary in the precision of second-intention formalities since they are only logical forms anyhow, considered apart from reality; but it is necessary in the abstraction of first-intention forms and the subjects in which they inhere.

Thus, the senses abstract sensible qualities from without because that is the approach of sense knowledge, whereas the intellect abstracts from within. First, the intellect conceives being, then substance, then quantity, qualities, relations, *actio*, *passio*, movement through space and time. Gradually it thinks itself out. With his sense of sight St. Thomas abstracted color as a subtrahend and left the surface of the body as a remainder. With his intellect he abstracted the body with its surface as a subtrahend and left the sensible qualities such as color as a remainder.



[21]"Quia secundum illam qua componit et dividit, distinguit unum ab alio per hoc quod intelligit unum alii non inesse" (*In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3).

[22]*Ibid.* See also *In III de Anima*, lect. 8.

We need not throw our noose out its full distance with every case. We may toss it only so far as to include being, first substance, and so on. Being is the first object of our intellect, and hence we can abstract being from anything but nothing else from being.

The objects of metaphysics can exist apart from all matter. And we can express this real independence *in esse* with a real distinction, abstraction, or separation in the second operation dividing concepts; being is not something which is dependent upon matter. We cannot employ this second operation further east because this second operation implies truth in the real objective order. And it would not be true to say that a "circle" could exist apart from matter or that a "man" could be so conceived. This is all that *respicit ipsum esse rei* need imply in this context. Truth belongs to the second operation of the intellect because it is the second operation which has regard for objective reality outside the mind.[21]

8. *Abstractio Formae*

We may cast our loop just a little bit further east and rope in a first-intention mathematical form. Quantity is intelligible apart from that matter which is perceived by the external senses. Thus we can abstract a curve from a nose or a circle from a ring. But we cannot abstract a curve or a circle from substance or from intelligible matter without which a curve or a circle could not be understood.

We may cast our loop still further to the right and liberate "white" or "snub" from the particular white flesh of Socrates's most un-Grecian nose. Thus, we can abstract common sensible matter from individual, just as we abstracted intelligible matter from sensible, and being from all matter. St. Thomas's *abstractio formae* always includes substance and every accident prior or west of the particular form named, nothing to the right or east of it.[22]

Accordingly, we cannot abstract time from space or local motion from an *actio* and *passio* based on the sensible qualities of "hard"

and "soft" inhering in the quantity of a material body. No accident can be abstracted from substance or from any other accident on which it depends essentially. We cannot conceive of a "snub" which does not bear an essential relation to a nose or of any accident without its exigency for substance or of a substantial form without its transcendental relation to prime matter any more than we could conceive of a father without his child, or of any matter or potency except in the terms of its form or act. That which is posterior presupposes all that has gone before.

St. Thomas seems to have recognized only one major objection to this *abstractio formae.* And that was the comparison of the forms with the unreal Platonic forms. For his circle and his triangle could not exist as such either. But he thought he solved this difficulty by restricting his mathematical forms to the first operation, where the truth concerning their actual existence was not involved. There cannot be any logical falsity where nothing is affirmed or denied. And this is the point of his whole article.[23]

9. *Abstractio Totius*

St. Thomas called the full case of our intellect an *abstractio totius* because it includes a whole nature complete with common sensible matter in the case of physical objects. Thus, we can abstract the universal whole "man" from its subjective parts such as Socrates because this potential whole "man" does not depend essentially upon the signate matter of *this individual* flesh and *these* determinate bones as this potential whole is actuated in Socrates. Similarly, we

[23]"Et quia quidam non intellexerunt differentiam duorum ultimorum a primo, inciderunt in errorem, ut ponerent mathematica et universalia a sensibilibus separata, ut Pythagorici et Platonici" (*In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3).

[24]George P. Klubertanz, S.J., *Introduction to the Philosophy of Being* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 37: "The very name, 'total abstraction,' is a kind of misnomer." Georges Van Riet, "La théorie thomiste de l'abstraction," *Revue philosophique de Louvain,* L (1952), 359: "nous reprendrons à Cajetan le nom d'abstraction 'totale', qui n'est pas fort heureux mais est commode par sa brièveté." Edward D. Simmons, "In Defense of Total and Formal Abstraction," *New Scholasticism,* XXIX (1955), 434, n. 17: "Inasmuch as our present problem is partially terminological (occasioned by the verbal similarity between *abstractio totalis* and *abstractio totius*) I suggest that we might use different terms to speak of Cajetan's total and formal abstractions. We could in line with the point just made, substitute the term logical abstraction for total abstraction and ontological abstraction for formal abstraction." I like the terminology but I should prefer them reversed.

can abstract "man" apart from such integral parts as his finger or his hand or an "animal" from its foot or a "circle" apart from a semicircle or any other particular division of itself. This *abstractio totius* is a perfectly good name; it means just what it says.[24] St. Thomas did not restrict this "whole" to a universal whole from its subjective parts, the commentators to the contrary notwithstanding. Indeed, most of his examples are those of a whole abstracted from its integral parts.

On the other hand, we cannot abstract "man" from a rational soul and a body made up of flesh and blood because we cannot conceive of a man without these parts. Neither can we abstract a "triangle" apart from three lines or a "foot" apart from an animal or a "syllable" apart from a letter or a "compound" apart from its elements.

In other words, we can always abstract a whole from a part when that whole can be thought apart from that part, but we can never abstract a whole from a part when that part is included in the very definition of that whole. Conversely, we cannot abstract any part from a whole when that part contains the notion of the whole in its own definition; for example, the paw of an animal, the arc of a circle. But we can abstract a part from a whole when that part can be thought apart from that whole; for example, one line from a triangle. St. Thomas prefers to call this kind of abstraction a separation in one context, since it is really distinct and can be expressed in a second operation in all truth. One line is not a triangle.

St. Thomas made use of a clever pedagogical dodge in his classic article on abstraction. He exhausted the subject with a series of complete disjunctions. Either the object is really distinct from matter or it is not. If it is, a second operation is in order, to which he gave the name *separatio*. If the object is not really distinct from matter, it stands in relation to matter either as a whole to a part or as one part to another part. If it is the abstraction of a whole from its parts he calls it an *abstractio totius*. If it is the abstraction of a part from the whole, he disposes of that as another *separatio*. If it is the abstraction of a formal part from a material part he calls it an *abstractio formae*. No material part can be

abstracted from its formal part, since matter is unintelligible except in the terms of its form.[25]

I would not look for any particular doctrinal subtlety in St. Thomas's usage of *separatio*. Elsewhere he speaks of an *abstractio* in the second operation, even in this same article. The introduction of *separatio* here can be explained as a neat pedagogical device, and that, I think, is enough to account for it.

Knowledge can grow with this *abstractio totius* even as with the *abstractio formae*. Only now it grows from one whole to another, from the more potential to the more actual, from the more universal to the more particular, from the more confused to the more distinct. Thus, we can successively abstract the whole nature of a living body and then that of an animal and then that of a man from Socrates.[26] This, however, is the proper object of the human intellect, and beyond this we cannot go with our intellect directly. Indirectly, of course, we may proceed by means of a prolongation through our phantasm. Or we may relegate individual sensible matter to the sense knowledge whose direct object it is, entering as it does from the outside, the right or the east. After all, that is the field of sense in specifically human knowledge.[27]

10. The Commentators

The commentators were very explicit about shifting the meaning of *abstractio* from the abstractive process to the *ratio* abstracted.[28] They defined their total abstraction in the terms of predication even

[25]*In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3.

[26]*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 3.

[27]*Ibid.*, q. 86, a. 1.

[28]"Et notandum est, quod non sumimus hic abstractionem pro actu intellectus abstrahente neque . . . Sed sumitur abstractio pro abstrahibilitate objectiva, quatenus in objecto est fundamentum . . ." (John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Phil.*, Ars Log., II, Q. XXVII, a. 1; ed. B. Reiser [Turin, 1930], I, 822).

[29]"Et non loquimur de abstractione totali, quae abstrahit aliquid ut praedicabile ab inferioribus; sic enim ista abstractio est communis conditio scientiarum, quae non agunt de singularibus, sed de universalibus. Sed loquimur de abstractione *formali*, quae abstrahit rationes formales a materialibus seu potentialibus, et sic constituit seu fundat intelligibilitatem" (*ibid.*).

[30]Thomae De Vio, Caietani, O.P., *In De Ente et Essentia*, Prooemium, Q. I, n. 5; ed. Laurent (Turin, 1934), pp. 5-7.

[31]*Ibid.*

[32]Jacques Maritain, *Philosophy of Nature* (New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951), p. 18.

[33]John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Phil.*, I, ed. Reiser, I, 819.

[34]*Ibid.*, p. 796.

[35]*De Ente*, cap. 3; ed. Boyer, pp. 19-20, 23.

[36]*In De Ente*, ed. Laurent, pp. 5-7.

as St. Thomas's first-intention essence considered as a whole; that is, as something which could be thought apart from its subjective parts and predicated of its inferiors as a universal whole. And they defined their formal abstraction even as St. Thomas's second-intention essence considered as only a formal part; that is, as a *ratio objectiva in ratione seu formalitate objecti* which could not be so predicated.[29]

It scarcely needs pointing out that this contrast between first and second intentions has nothing to do with any division of the sciences. This contrast is a function of the agent intellect abstracting and prescinding; that division is a function of the possible intellect classifying these species among themselves. Theoretically, of course, there is no reason why these two distinctions could not run side by side, roughly parallel in content, the second intention just one step further removed from the real thing; for example, man *vs.* humanity, round *vs.* roundness, being *vs.* entity as such. But it was the commentators themselves who ruled out total abstraction on the score that it was prescientific. And it was they, too, who insisted on making formal abstraction common to all the sciences.

All of the commentators' examples of total abstraction are first-intention essences considered as a whole; for example, animal, man, cow, lion.[30] And all of their examples of formal abstraction, when they are not repeating St. Thomas verbatim, may be understood as second-intention essences considered as a part; for example, animality, *linea formalis*, metaphysical being as such,[31] duality.[32] The main trouble here, of course, stems from their chronic choice of ambiguous examples; for example, body, color, line,[33] number, motion.[34] St. Thomas warned us that such words as "body" and "man" may be taken as the object of either an abstraction or a precision.[35] It is noteworthy that he himself foregoes the use of that favorite example "humanity" in his division of the sciences. And he does not make use of any other second substance in this context either.

Cajetan noted four points of contrast between total *vs.* formal abstraction which are no less true of first *vs.* second intentions.[36] (i) Total abstractions end up in one complete concept—for example, animal from man; and so do essences considered as a whole. Formal abstractions end up with two complete concepts—for example,

animality and rationality; and so do essences considered as a part likewise.[37] (ii) An object is intelligible inasmuch as it is immaterial. But total abstractions, even as concrete first-intention essences considered as a whole supposit, contain individual sensible matter in a confused way, whereas second-intention formal abstractions prescind in the sense of positively excluding signate matter explicitly. (iii) The more distilled second-intention formal abstractions become, the more they resemble the spiritual infused species of angelic knowledge, *notius naturae*.[38] The more that total abstractions approach the first-intention concrete essence of a material thing, the more they come home to the primary object of our human knowledge, *notius nobis*. (iv) Total abstractions are a prerequisite to all sciences precisely because they are first intentions. And here I really mean "first," first in the sense of more real with a more proximate foundation in reality. The commentators divided their abstract science into three degrees of their one formal abstraction or precision, which, in my opinion, is altogether un-Thomistic.

If neither total nor formal abstraction is involved in any division of the sciences, why link it up with St. Thomas's *abstractio totius* vs. *formae*, which was? If all total abstractions are prescientific, then St. Thomas must have divided his sciences in a most unscientific manner. And that I think is a most ungracious position to take on the part of those who claim to be his commentators.

11. Comprehension *vs.* Extension

Cajetan also called his first-intention total abstraction a *totum universale*, and his second-intention formal abstraction a *totum dif-*

[37]The abstraction of first-intention accidental forms also ends up with two distinct concepts; for example, that of a circle and that of the particular sensible matter called brass. See *ST*, I, q 40, a. 3c. It would be the fallacy of the consequent, however, to conclude that just because *abstractio formae* and the precision of a logical form each ends up with two distinct concepts, therefore they are the same operation.

[38]It was Avempace who pressed this argument to its logical conclusion. See *ST*, I, q. 88, a. 2.

[39]*In De Ente*, ed. Laurent, pp. 2-3.

[40]"It received a prominence in logic which it hardly merits in the Port Royal *Logic*" (J. M. Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* [New York: Peter Smith, 1940], under *comprehension*).

[41]*Philosophy of Nature*, pp. 19-20.

[42]*Ibid.* See Chap. III, pp. 74 sqq.

[43]"La philosophie de la nature," pp. 140-41.

[44]"Maritain's Philosophy of the Sciences," VI (1943), 85-102; reprinted in *The Philosophy of Nature*, pp. 157-82.

finibile.[39] He pointed out how this *totum universale* implies a virtual cognition of a quiddity which is necessary for predication, but it does not imply the actual cognition of the *totum diffinibile* which is required in order to know that quiddity quidditatively. Descartes's Port Royal school of logic exploited these two dimensions in the measurement of a notion and expressed them with the term "extension" and "comprehension." [40]

12. Extensive *vs.* Typological Visualization

Jacques Maritain, it seems to me, has been rethinking this same as opposed to the typological visualization of "humanity" or "Catholicity." [41] Second-intention formal abstractions are much more suitable for this typological visualization of a comprehension for the rather obvious reason that once they are no longer concrete essences, these essences have forfeited all claim to any extension anyhow which they would have had otherwise. Hence, with no extension to be concerned about, there is nothing to disturb our study of the comprehension; that is, the eidetic intuition of the ascending analysis implicit in a dianoetical intellection. In total abstraction, on the other hand, we are more apt to consider the sensible features involved in the extension of a universal whole; that is, the extensive visualization of the descending analysis proper to perinoetic intellection.[42]

13. Father L.-M. Régis, O.P.

In a review of one of M. Maritain's books, *La philosophie de la nature*, Father Louis-Marie Régis, O.P., challenged the authentic character of these three degrees of abstraction.[43] This was the first time to my knowledge that this question was ever raised. Yves R. Simon countered with an article in the Maritain volume of the *Thomist*.[44] Father M.-V. Leroy, O.P., wrote another defense in the

1948 volume of the *Revue Thomiste* dedicated to Madame Raïssa Maritain.[45]

Father L. B. Geiger, O.P., made an appeal to the redactions made by St. Thomas himself in the autograph.[46] Father Georges Van Riet recognized a usage of formal abstraction which corresponds to St. Thomas's precision.[47] And Father William H. Kane, O.P., made a list of the differences between St. Thomas's distinction and those of his commentators.[48] Altogether, there has been more solid scholarly work written on this question, I suppose, than there was

[45]"Le savoir spéculatif," and "Annexe: *Abstractio* et *separatio* d'après un texte controversé de saint Thomas (*In Lib. Boeth. de Trin.*, V. 3 and 4)," *Revue Thomiste*, XLVIII, 236-327, and 328-39.

[46]"Abstraction et Séparation d'après St Thomas," *Revue des Sciences Philosophique et Théologique*, XXXII (1947), 3-40.

[47]"Mais le terme 'abstraction formelle' est employé très fréquemment de nos jours, dans une tout autre acception, que nous avons d'ailleurs déjà rencontrée plus d'une fois. Il sert en effet à désigner ce que saint Thomas appelait une *praecisio*, et s'exprime en des termes qu'on dit 'abstraits', tels que humanité ou blancheur, par opposition aux termes dits 'concrets' tels que homme ou blanc. Ces notions sont 'fermées', elles 'préscindent' de ce qu'elles ne signifient pas explicitement: l'humanité exclut de sa signification la matière individuelle, la blancheur exclut l'inhérence dans un sujet" ("La théorie thomiste de l'abstraction," p. 383).

[48]"What they call total and formal abstraction are objects which can be known by different mental processes. These objects do not exactly correspond to those attained by the abstraction of the whole and of the form of which St. Thomas speaks. . Every abstraction of the whole attains an object which may be called a total abstraction, but not every total abstraction is simply a whole, because things which are not primarily wholes, for instance, the hot or the colored, the round or the square, may be taken as examples of total abstraction. Moreover. the abstraction of the form attains an object which is really distinct from other forms or parts in the whole, whereas a formal abstraction is an object of mental precising, and is a formality which is not really but only virtually distinct from other formalities which are distinguishable in the whole" ("Abstraction and Distinction of the Sciences," *Thomist*, XVII [1954], 65).

[49]J. D. Robert, "La métaphysique science distincte de toute autre discipline philosophique selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Divus Thomas*, XXV (1947), 206-22. V. Smith, "Abstraction and the Empirical Method," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XXVI (1952), 35-50. P. Merlan, "Abstraction and Metaphysics in St. Thomas's *Summa*," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XIV (1953), 284-91. Anthony A Nemetz, "Logic and the Division of the Sciences in Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXXIII (1956), 91-109. Joseph Owens, C.SS.R., "Our Knowledge of Nature," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XXIX (1955), 63-86.

[50]"In each of these three orders—in which there is an increasingly deeper penetration of sensible being—is the intellect able to grasp an act (accident, substantial form, esse) apart from this or that potency (substance, prime matter, essence). And thus we have three ascending orders of abstraction from matter, each of which has an objective basis in sensible reality, as the doctrine of moderate realism demands" (F. G. Connolly, "Abstraction and Moderate Realism," *New Scholasticism*, XXVII [1953], 72-90.

[51]*In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3.

[52]"Est communis omnibus scientiis" (*ibid.*, 3 ad finem.)

in the seven hundred years gone before.[49] Yet it is significant that while all have admitted a difference in terminology, none have even attempted a reconciliation.

In many of these recent studies the focus has shifted from St. Thomas's abstraction to our modern catalogue of sciences. There is an assumption here that St. Thomas divided his abstractions according to their objects, even as he did the sciences themselves.[50] Thus, once we determined just what the proper object of each science was, then we could extrapolate and discover just what the abstractive process itself was, reading back those abstracted formalities into the corresponding operation. And we could do this, too, were we dealing with second-intention formalities which are all the fruit of the same one precision and differ in nothing but a logical representative content.

St. Thomas, however, never set up any such correspondence between the operations and the objects. No one would pretend that he restricted the second operation to metaphysics in such a way that we could not use a second operation in the other sciences or in everyday speech. The very first example he gives us of an *abstractio formae* is that of the "white" taken from a white man, which is scarcely a problem in mathematics.[51] He tells us explicitly his *abstractio totius* ranges through all the sciences.[52] It merely runs into a particular difficulty in physics, where it must include sensible matter in its definitions as well as a substantial form. If St. Thomas divided his abstractions according to their objects, he would not have been able to make different kinds of abstraction in dealing with the same one object, as he does. No; St. Thomas divided his abstractions according to the process involved, the first operation or the second, the apprehension of a whole nature or that of a mere part.

Competit is a tricky word which need not be translated in a univocal sense. *Separatio* "is attributable to" the objects of metaphysics. An *abstractio totius* "is required for" the objects of metaphysics just as well as for the objects of physics. The only difference is that the whole nature of a metaphysical object is really distinct from matter, whereas the whole nature of a physical object could not

even be conceived in such a way. An *abstractio formae* "is suitable" to save truth with regard to mathematical forms and other forms also—for example, white—which can be conceived apart from some kind of matter in the first operation but cannot exist as such, as a second operation would imply.[53]

14. Second-Intention Language

St. Thomas seems to have made use of only one example of a second-intention accidental form; namely, *albedo*.[54] And that was merely because we cannot reduce accidents to their proper genera and species until we logicize them, as he also points out.[55] It was not he who introduced second-intention thought into mathematics and metaphysics. The most cursory reading of his text would reveal that. He kept his feet on the ground. He thought in first intentions. He stayed close to the proper object of the human intellect, where he was infallible.

It was his commentators in their reaction to nominalism who began to hypostatize these notions of duality, sphericity, and so on. St. Thomas was incapable of such phrases as *ratio objectiva in ratione seu formalitate objecti*,[56] *sub ratione entitatis*.[57] I do not think he could have written gobbledygook if he tried. That is the language of the professional logician. And that is precisely what the commentators were. It is not the language of St. Thomas. And that ought to count for something.

15. Conclusion

Abstractio totius corresponds with total abstraction inasmuch as they are both concerned with real first-intention concepts; for example, man. They both range through all the sciences and they both end up with only one concept instead of two. *Abstractio totius*, however, differs from total abstraction inasmuch as it is an operation rather than a content or *ratio*; it is the function of the possible

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] "Unde nomina accidentalia concretiva dicta non ponuntur in predicamento sicut species vel genera, ut album vel musicum nisi per reductionem; sed solum secundum quod in abstracto significantur, ut albedo et musica" (*De Ente*, cap. 7; ed. Boyer, p. 54).

[56] John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Phil.*, I; ed. Reiser, I, 818.

[57] Jacques Maritain, *Philosophy of Nature*, p. 126.

intellect rather that that of the agent; it is concerned with a whole nature rather than a whole supposit; and in physics it is primarily concerned with the explicit abstraction from individuating notes rather than the implicit inclusion of the same as is necessary for predication.

Abstractio formae agrees with formal abstraction inasmuch as they both withdraw from some kind of matter; they both deal with an object which could not exist as such; and they both end up with two complete concepts—for example, brass-ring *vs.* animality-rationality. *Abstractio formae* differs from formal abstraction inasmuch as it is an operation rather than a formality which is the fruit of an operation; it is the work of an abstractive process rather than that of a precision; it is the function of the possible intellect rather than that of the agent; it is concerned with a first-intention accidental form—for example, white, snub—rather than a second-intention logical essence—for example, humanity. It includes real intelligible matter—for example, a triangle; it is not a mere unreal notion of matter which takes the place of matter itself—for example, triangularity.

Abstractio totius agrees with *abstractio formae* inasmuch as they are both first-intention operations dealing with a single real unit, *unum re*. They differ inasmuch as *abstractio totius* is concerned with the relationship of a whole nature to an integral or subjective part, whereas *abstractio formae* is concerned with the relationship of one accidental part to another. *Abstractio totius* ends up with one complete concept because it is a first-intention essence considered as a whole supposit as well as a whole physical nature. *Abstractio formae* ends ups with two complete concepts—for example, brass-ring—but not for the same reason that humanity can be broken up into animality and rationality. Rather it is because the first-intention real quantity, circle or ring, cannot exist apart from some sensible matter such as brass. The accidental form concerned cannot exist as such, not because it is not real, which it is, but merely because it does not have all the sensible qualities which the author of its nature demands to give it being.

Total *vs.* formal abstraction is not *abstractio totius* vs. *formae*.

Such a derivation in terminology is a philological monstrosity. Father Armand Maurer, C.S.B., has pointed out: "*Total* and *formal* qualify the act of abstraction; *of a whole* and *of a form* designate the object of the abstraction." [58] It throws the whole Thomistic doctrine out of focus. It confuses the operation of the abstracting intellect with the *ratio* or formality abstracted. It confuses the function of the agent intellect preparing species with that of the possible intellect classifying them. It confuses a whole supposit with a whole nature, a first-intention accidental from with a second-intention logical form. It confuses the explicit inclusion of common sensible matter with the implicit inclusion of individual sensible matter. It confuses a second-intention notion of matter with a real material form. It confuses abstraction with precision, and sense abstraction from without with intellectual abstraction from within.

It distorts the Thomistic concept of science from a real habit inhering in the intellect and made up of first-intention species with an abstract body of doctrine made up of second-intention figments with no more than a remote foundation in reality. St. Thomas divided his real sciences according to their real objects, his abstractions according to the different processes involved. His commentators divided their one abstract science according to their three degrees of formal abstraction, which differ in nothing save their representative content with the same one precision common to all.

Such an offspring is unworthy of St. Thomas. And yet, total *vs.* formal abstraction must stand for something in the Thomistic synthesis. It is our theory that it stands for first *vs.* second intentions. And his commentators never should have linked it up with references to *abstractio totius* vs. *formae.*[59] There is a certain irony in the realization that while all of St. Thomas's own examples of a real science were snubbed by his commentators as prescientific, their own three degrees of formal abstraction turn out to be nothing else but that same one dialectical process which their own followers were later to condemn so vigorously in Descartes's reaction to nominalism.

[58] *The Division and Methods of the Sciences*, Introduction, p. xxv, n. 30.

[59] John of St.Thomas, *Curs. Phil.*, I; ed. Reiser, I, 822.

Being and Metaphysics

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For the last few years philosophers have been giving special attention to the starting point of metaphysics. This is a supremely important question, for it determines to a great extent the nature and development of the whole science. Moreover, in this question particularly the adage applies, "A small mistake in the beginning is a great one in the end." [1] The writer of this article recently essayed a study of the question; other articles have since appeared in American Catholic philosophical periodicals.[2] The May, 1957, issue of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN (XXXIV, 247-63) published a paper read by Leonard J. Eslick at the colloquium on Thomism and contemporary philosophy at St. Louis University, June 12-15, 1956: "What is the Starting Point of Metaphysics?" There is a fundamental opposition between the position of Dr. Eslick and that which we upheld. Since all of us are humbly in search of true wisdom and are, moreover, sincerely devoted to the task of reconstructing the philosophy of St. Thomas, it is imperative for us candidly to discuss our differences of approach to this problem. Only in this way can we arrive at mutual understanding and perhaps make some contribution to the progress of philosophy. It is in this spirit that we here submit certain clarifications and distinctions with regard to our position and point out what seem to be inadequacies of other positions. We presume here an acquaintance with the problem and with our previous article.

The question is fundamentally one concerning the nature of the concept of being. We must therefore make precise the meaning of metaphysical abstraction, or separation; but first it will be necessary to preface a few words about the other two degrees, especially the first.

Physical and Mathematical Abstraction

Natural science, at the first degree of abstraction, studies objects that have common sensible matter in their definition and must exist in sensible matter.[3] These objects are natures abstracted from the contingent individuals in which they have real existence, individuals that are subject to change and are, as such, scientifically unknowable.[4] Thus, by what St. Thomas calls an *abtractio totius*, we form universal concepts such as man, dog, cat, tree, rose, carrot, and so on. These natures now have a

universality that is given them by the mind. Yet the mind has drawn these notions from existing realities, and so it would be incorrect to say that the mind knows only abstractions; it knows *things* by means of universal concepts: "per huiusmodi rationes immobiles et sine materia particulari consideratas habetur cognitio in scientia naturali de rebus mobilibus et materialibus extra animam existentibus." [5] This fact must be emphasized.

Yet natural things are so rich and varied in their many facets that the mind must perform other abstractive operations, or objective precisions, in order to set up subjects of sciences. It must make broader generalizations, in order first to know what things have in common before proceeding to their particular characteristics.[6] Therefore, from man, dog, cat, tree, rose, carrot, the mind can abstract, by objective precision or cutting away of differences, a number of increasingly broader concepts predicable of the lesser universals and of the singulars. We can, for instance, abstract the concept of living being, body, substance. These more general universals are not *really* distinct from one another, for they are all united in each concrete existing reality. Yet there is a virtual distinction among them. Only by making these virtual distinctions [7] can we examine a real object in all those essential predicates or metaphysical grades that it possesses in common with other realities in the world. Therefore, in order to set up a natural science we first choose some virtual aspect, objectively prescinding from all specific aspects of natural things, an aspect wherein all material things are united and according to which

[1]*De Ente et Essentia*, Proemium, transl. A. Maurer (Toronto, 1949) p. 25.

[2]M. Glutz, "The Formal Subject of Metaphysics," *Thomist*, XIX (1956), 59-74. We here gave adequate documentation and bibliography, which we will not repeat in the present article. Since the time we submitted the above to the publisher, the following articles have also appeared: Wm. Baumgaertner, "Metaphysics and the Second Analytics," *New Scholasticism*, XXIX (1955), 403-26; J. Beach, "Separate Entity as the Subject of Metaphysics," *Thomist*, XX (1957), 75-95; W. Kane, "The Subject of Metaphysics," *Thomist*, XVIII (1955), 503-21; R. McInerny, "The Prime Mover and the Order of Learning," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XXX (1956), 129-37; H. Renard, "What is St. Thomas' Approach to Metaphysics?" *New Scholasticism*, XXX (1956), 64-83.

[3]*In Boeth. de Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 1.

[4]*Ibid.*, a. 2.

[5]*Ibid.* Cf. resp. ad 4.

[6]Cf. *In I Phys.*, lect. 1, nos. 6-11; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 85, a. 3.

[7]That is, "distinctio rationis ratiocinatae maior."

[8]That is, according to which they have commensurate properties that are demonstrable by *propter quid* demonstration. We have made a thorough study of this matter in our doctoral dissertation, *The Manner of Demonstrating in Natural Philosophy* (Des Moines, 1956).

[9]"Naturalis et philosophus primus considerant essentias secundum quod habent esse in rebus" (*In de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 3).

[10]*Ibid.*, q. 5, a. 1.

[11]*Ibid.*, a. 3. *ST*, I, q. 85, a. 1 ad 2.

[12]Cf. *In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 4, nos. 1352-54.

[13]*In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3 ad finem.

[14]Cf. *De Ente*, cap. 2 ad finem. *In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 5, nos. 1378-79.

they are scientifically knowable.[8] The subject of natural science, or physics, is thus mobile being. The concept of mobile being is an abstraction. Yet we cannot say that natural philosophy studies abstractions. It studies *existing realities* under the aspect of what they all have in common.[9] The science is in that sense existentialist and not merely conceptualist. The universal concepts, no matter what their degree of generality, are *means* for knowing existing *things*.

The second degree of abstraction is that in which we consider objects which can be defined without common sensible matter, even though they have real existence only in sensible individuals. This is the case of lines and numbers, the subjects of mathematics.[10] These concepts are produced by an *abstractio formae*, in which the form of quantity is abstracted from common sensible matter, although not from material substance, without which quantity cannot be conceived.[11] It is to be emphasized that material substance, or common intelligible matter, is included in the concept of the subject of mathematics. However, the interest of the mathematician is in the form of quantity and its principles and properties. Therefore, his concepts directly focus on the form of quantity and signify the accompanying substance only obliquely.[12]

The first and second degrees of abstract objects do not correspond exclusively to *abstractio totius* and *abstractio formae*. Abstraction of a whole "est communis omnibus scientiis." [13] Moreover, even at the first degree of abstraction there can be abstractions of form; for instance, humanity from man, whiteness from white man.[14] A concrete concept is produced by *abstractio totius*; an abstract one, by *abstractio formae*. Thus, there can be *abstractio totius* and *abstractio formae* at the third degree of abstract objects—for example, *ens* and *entitas*; *causa* and *causalitas*; *actus* and *actualitas*; and so on. St. Thomas says that these two *competit* to physics and mathematics, but he obviously does not use the word in an exclusive sense.

The Concept of Being

Within the first degree of abstract objects a considerable amount of generalization is possible. All material things may be unified under the concept of substance, expressed by the vague term "something." The various accidental perfections of things can be categorized in nine supreme genera, to form with substance ten genera, which can all be united in the concept of being. These concepts, obtained by abstraction of the whole, are universals, which exist as universal in the mind only but really in things as identified with them in their singular existence. The concept of being is predicable of all the ten predicaments. It is a strange type of

concept, but it does express some aspect that the predicaments have in common. This concept of being, it should be noted, is not the metaphysician's being but rather the *ens primum cognitum*, the first intellectual achievement, in the light of which all else is known and all definitions made. This most universal of concepts in the realm of sensible objects is effected by an abstraction to the whole. It pertains, as St. Thomas explicitly notes, to the process of simple apprehension.[15]

Since the metaphysical concept of being will be, *mutatis mutandis*, all that this first concept is and more, it will be profitable to dwell on the latter briefly. First, this being is divided into the ten categories: "Hoc nomen 'ens' secundum quod importet *rem cui competit huiusmodi esse*, sic significat essentiam rei, et dividitur per decem genera." [16] It is thus a loose kind of concept, for the particulars to which it is predicable are different in nature, the first—substance—having *esse per se*, the others various types of accidental *esse*.[17] Moreover, it is not a genus and, for that reason also, not univocal, because none of its differences are extrinsic to it. Yet it is a notion common to all the ten supreme genera, and the descriptive definitions of each contain the notion of being, of which they are modes.

Secondly, let it be noted that these ten genera and the notion of being

[15]"In prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum, quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens; nec aliquid hac operatione potest mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens" (*In IV Metaphys.*, lect. 6, no. 605).

[16]*Quodlibet.*, II, q. 2, a. 3 (italics ours). Cf. *In V Metaphys.*, lect. 9, no. 890; *ST*, I, q. 48, a. 2 ad 2.

[17] ". . . non tamen univoce, quia non eadem ratione competit omnibus esse; sed substantiae quidem per se, aliis autem aliter" (*Quodlibet.*, II, q. 2, a. 3).

[18]*De Ente*, cap. 1. Cf. *In IX Metaphys.*, lect. 1, no. 1769.

[19]Essence can be signified as *quod est* or as *quo est*. Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1.

[20]Cf. *ibid.*

[21]Really identical with the concrete sensible realities but virtually distinct.

[22]"*Ens* nihil est aliud quam *quod est*. Et sic videtur et *rem* significare, per hoc quod dico QUOD et *esse*, per hoc quod dico EST. Et si quidem haec dictio *ens* significaret *esse* principaliter, sicut significat *rem* quae habet esse, procul dubio significaret aliquid esse. Sed ipsam compositionem, quae importatur in hoc quod dico EST, non principaliter significat, sed consignificat eam in quantum significat *rem* habentem esse." (*In I Periherm.*, lect. 5, no. 20).

[23]"Id enim est de substantia rei quod cadit in ejus definitione. Ens [esse?] autem non ponitur in definitione creaturae, quia nec est genus nec differentia; unde participatur sicut aliquid non existens de essentia rei; et ideo alia quaestio est *an est* et *quid est*. Unde cum omne quod est praeter essentiam rei, dicatur accidens; esse quod pertinet ad quaestionem *an est*, est accidens; et ideo Commentator dicit in V Metaphysic., quod ista propositio, *Socrates est*, est de accidentali praedicato, secundum quod importat entitatem rei, vel veritatem propositionis. Sed verum est quod hoc nomen *ens*, secundum quod importat rem cui competit hujusmodi esse, sic significat essentiam rei" (*Quodlibet.*, II, q. 2, a. 3). Note that the use of "accidental" in this text is the broad sense of "quod est praeter essentiam rei."

[24]*In IV Metaphys.*, lect. 2, nos. 550-58.

itself are *essence* beings. In the *De Ente et Essentia* St. Thomas clearly states that

> being in the first sense of the word is that which signifies the essence of a thing. . . . And because being in this sense is divided into the ten categories, *essence must signify something common to all natures*. . . . Philosophers have taken to using the word *quiddity* for the word *essence*. The philosopher frequently calls this the *what a thing was to be*; in other words, that by which a thing is a *what*.[18]

Let us not recoil from this fact that being primarily signifies essence: it signifies a thing, a *quod*;[19] it is a noun. Since the concept of being can be predicated of creatures, it cannot contain *actual esse* in its formal notion, but rather only a transcendental relation to *esse*. The word "essence" is taken from existence, as every potency is known by reason of its correlative act. Essence is that whose act is to exist.[20] In the first act of the mind, a being is known in relation to the act of existing, as *that which* exists; in the second act of the mind the act of existing can be asserted of any being and assented to. A further qualification, however, must be made. For a concept to be realistic, the existence of its object is grasped prior to the formation of the concept, usually in sensory experience, from which the concept is abstracted. Thus, the concept of being is the broadest concept that can be abstracted in the physical order from sensible realities and signifies that formality[21] in them that is immediately ordained to existence.[22] It does not contain actual existence, but only an essential relatedness to existence; otherwise there would be no need to assert existence in a subsequent judgment. The concept of being simply abstracts from actual existence and, like other concepts, attains what is essential to things. The accidental predicate of existence is predicated in a judgment.[23]

St. Thomas explicitly takes up and rejects the opinion of Avicenna that the word "being" signifies *esse*.[24] He establishes first that the names *res*, *ens*, and *unum* signify the very same thing but according to different aspects (*rationes*). *Res* is imposed from the quiddity alone; *ens* is imposed from the act of existing; *unum*, from order or indivision. Their real identity is clear from the fact that these can be predicated *per se* of the substance of anything. Avicenna, however, thought differently. He said that *unum* and *ens* do not signify the substance of a thing but something added to the substance. His reason for saying this about *ens* is that, acording to him, "hoc nomen ens significat ipsum esse." Since essence and existence are distinct, the concept of being cannot be predicated of substance but rather of something added to substance. St. Thom-

as replies: "Sed in primo quidem non videtur dixisse recte." We could wish that he had enlarged upon his answer. He merely says:

> Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab ejus essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen Ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia.[25]

The Formal Subject of Metaphysics

We can now take up the question of the being that is the formal subject of metaphysics. Metaphysics treats objects of speculation—that is, formalities or perfections—that do not depend on matter either with respect to their concept or with respect to their existence, because they can exist without matter. Some such things never exist in matter, such as God and the angels; these we can call positively immaterial. Other things—that is, natures, formalities, or perfections—exist sometimes in matter and sometimes in immaterial things; for example, substance, quality, potency and act, one and many, and being itself.[26] These we call negatively immaterial. So in the *Summa Theologiae* St. Thomas says that such concepts can be abstracted from common intelligible matter because *they can also be without any matter.*[27] In the *De Trinitate* [28] he says, "Substantia autem, quae est materia intelligibilis quantitatis, potest esse sine quantitate." But how do we know that such concepts can be without matter; that is, can be realized in beings that are not material, sensory, and mobile? What justification do we have of making these concepts predicable of immaterial beings unless somehow we have proved that such beings exist? We cannot abstract from material things universal concepts representing immaterial things, because every universal concept is identical in reality with the concrete things from which, by induction, it has been abstracted. But if we prove the existence of immaterial beings, then we are able to abstract universal concepts from both types of beings; our induction will be broader, and thus a richer concept will result.

[25] *Ibid.*, no. 558. Cf. *Contra Gentiles*, II, cap. 54.

[26] *In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 1.

[27] "Quaedam vero sunt quae possunt abstrahi etiam a materia intelligibili communi, sicut ens, unum, potentia et actus, et alia hiusmodi, quae etiam esse possunt absque omni materia, ut patet in substantis immaterialibus" (*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 1 ad 2). The use of the word *abstrahi* is a generic meaning, in no way opposed to the *separatio* of the *In De Trin.*

[28] *In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3.

[29] *Ibid.*, a. 2 ad 3.

[30] *Ibid.*, a. 3.

[31] *Ibid.*, a. 4 ad finem; transl. A. Maurer, *The Division and Methods of the Sciences* (Toronto, 1953).

As a matter of fact, before the beginning of the science of metaphysics, in the order of learning, we discover the existence of immaterial beings. The science of psychology shows that human souls exist and can operate independently of matter. But the main proof and the first discovered is that of the Unmoved Mover, whose existence is demonstrated *a posteriori* at the end of general physics. It is necessary to understand what we claim to prove by this demonstration. It proceeds from *sensory* motion and leads to a Mover unmoved in the way that sensory mobile beings are moved. It cannot strictly lead to Pure Act but only to some Mover above the order of sensory motion, which may, for all that the physicist knows, be a World Soul in the Platonic sense. Although this Mover is materially identified with God, yet the existence of God as such cannot be demonstrated in physics but must issue from broader principles, such as potency and act in their full extent, not as limited to sensory things. So the Prime Mover is known as only relatively immobile; whether It is absolutely immobile or Pure Act we cannot demonstrate in natural philosophy. Our knowledge of the Prime Mover is restricted at this stage to what physics can tell us of It. We know that It exists and that It is of a different nature from mobile being. Therefore, we deny of It the properties of mobile being. It is not only immobile, but also inextended, immaterial, and not in time or place in the way that mobile beings are.[29] But now that we know of the existence of immaterial things, our abstraction of the concept of being has a broader inductive basis and therefore yields a concept that is no longer merely physical but metaphysical.

The process for obtaining this metaphysical concept of being is called not abstraction, but separation. "In the case of those things which can exist separately, separation rather than abstraction obtains." [30] Once we have discovered the existence of immaterial realities, we can separate the concept of being from material beings, for we see that it is more extensive. We say:

> It is not of the nature of that which is separate to exist in matter and motion, but it can exist without them, although we sometimes find it in them. In this sense, being, substance, potency and act are separate from matter and motion, because they do not depend on them with respect to existence.[31]

The concept of being in physics was seen to transcend the ten categories of the modes of material being. Now the concept of being is seen to transcend even the differences of material and immaterial. The concept applies indifferently to either and thus opens out upon all of reality. This is the formal subject of metaphysics, the formality of being that

is common to the ten predicaments and to material and immaterial beings; namely, that which exists, whether it be material or immaterial. But what is the material subject or the known realities which we study from the aspects of being? Dr. Eslick says "*all* being" (p. 248), "everything which is, without exception" (p. 249). But this cannot be. The things that a human science studies cannot be things that a human intellect does not know. We cannot have a philosophical science in which God or the angels or any number of unknown possible beings are the subject.[32] At most we can study the realities that fall within the range of our proper knowledge and note formalities in them that can be extended by *a-posteriori* reasoning to immaterial beings. We are not thereby studying material things "precisely *as material*" (p. 249) in metaphysics but material things precisely as beings, as having a formality that is realized even in immaterial things. God and other positively immaterial beings cannot be the subject of metaphysics but enter the science as causes of the subject; and only insofar as they are causes of the subject can they be known in metaphysics. God, the cause of being as being,[33] is the highest and most universal cause as well as the most intelligible of beings. The first cause is included in the science but not as its subject.

> Quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria [that is, first causes, most universal principles, things most separated from matter] consideret, non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subjectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune. . . . Quamvis autem subjectum hujus scientiae sit ens commune, dicitur tamen tota de his quae sunt separata a materia secundum esse et rationem.[34]

It is by the analysis of material beings as being and by determining the nature of being as such and the causes and properties of being that we end up with concepts that are applicable to whatever is or can be. But such knowledge is not possessed at the beginning of metaphysics.

Reply to difficulties

The above exposition, taken in conjunction with the doctrine and the documentation contained in our previous article, will suffice for the

[32] *In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 4; cf. *ibid.*, q. 6, a. 3 and a. 4; *In I Post. Analyt.*, lect. 41, no. 8; lect. 30, no. 7.

[33] "Ens commune est proprius effectus causae altissimae, scilicet Dei" (*ST*, I-II, q. 66, a. 5 ad 4).

[34] *In Metaphys.*, Proemium. Cf. *In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 4.

[35] "Non est autem necessarium quod ea quae distinguuntur secundum intellectum, sint distincta in rebus; quia intellectus non apprehendit res secundum modum rerum, sed secundum modum suum" (*ST*, I, q. 50, a. 2).

[36] Cf. *ST*, I, q. 3, a. 4, ad 1; *CG*, I, cap. 26; *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 2 ad 6. Dr. Eslick finds difficulty with this text; cf. p. 257-58.

positive part of our position. It also answers many of the difficulties raised in Dr. Eslick's article. But it will be necessary to treat specifically a few points that he has raised.

On page 253 Dr. Eslick says:

> If *ens commune* is most universal because most abstract, it seems to be the emptiest and most barren of all concepts, a veritable "night in which all cows are black." Metaphysics founded upon the analysis of such a concept appears doomed to be the most sterile of all enterprises. It would become, as the contemporary positivists and analysts have been maintaining, "sound and fury signifying nothing," a game played with pseudoconcepts devoid of any meaning or intelligibility founded upon and derived from experience and hence verifiable in it.

Later (p. 257) he repeats the same idea and says that a generic notion, prescinding from every specifying or individuating difference, puts us on the horn of a dilemma "in which the notion of being is indistinguishable from nothingness." We believe that precisely here is the core of Dr. Eslick's difficulty. He admits that the *ens primum cognitum* is a general notion, obtained by a process of total abstraction. Yet, there is "no formal perfection which is the being *qua* being of everything which is" (p. 256). Let it be remembered that every generic concept in the ascending metaphysical grades signifies a formality that is identified with the whole individual from which it is abstracted. It signifies the whole, but not wholly. So there is no *really* distinct formality of living being or of body or of substance. Each is really identical with the individuals from which the concepts are drawn. The formalities are made distinct only in and by the mind.[35] Therefore, the concept of being is the most general concept, although not a genus. It is identical with the whole of individuals from which it is abstracted. It signifies the whole not in some of its lesser aspects, such as living, body, or mobile, but in its aspect of *that which is ordained to exist.* It is not, to answer Dr. Eslick directly, a *really* distinct formal perfection but a *virtually* distinct perfection. Only such a concept can be without addition, yet not exclude the possibility of addition.[36] Therefore, this is not a concept utterly empty of content and meaning, for it means "things as ordained to existence." It is a concept deeply founded on experience, for unless the mind knew individual things actually existing, it could form no concepts at all; much less could it make its concepts progressively more universal by stripping away the differences and concentrating upon what things have in common until it considers them all as *res cui competit hujusmodi esse.*

Next we must make certain precisions relative to Dr. Eslick's criticism of the approach to metaphysics from the philosophy of nature. He says on page 259:

> Obviously such a theory, in supposing that a lower science can establish the formal object of a higher science, is expecting the philosophy of nature to transcend itself and the limitations of its own formality. This is, I think, to expect the impossible.

In this we fully agree with Dr. Eslick. Natural philosophy in no ways constitutes the subject of metaphysics. It merely attains to the fact that there is some being beyond the scope of its vision. This truth is discovered a posteriori, from the consideration of the proper matter of physics. Nothing is known of the Prime Mover by natural philosophy except that It is not mobile being; certainly, there is no proper knowledge of the Prime Mover in physics. It must be emphasized that when it is said that no science can go beyond the power of its principles, we refer to *propter quid* demonstration, which depends upon a definition of the subject of the science; therefore, the whole science is said to be virtually contained in the principles of the subject, whereby it is defined. As regards a-posteriori demonstration, there is no reason why a science, investigating its own formal subject and noting effects that it is perfectly capable of seeing, should judge that its own subject is inadequate to explain those effects and that therefore some other cause must exist, transcending its own subject. This discovery gives objective basis for the negative judgment that not all being is mobile being.

Another problem brought up by Dr. Eslick is: Is metaphysics self-caused? Can metaphysics establish its own subject? The old adage is that no science can prove the existence or nature of its subject. This is to be understood of *propter quid* demonstration, the middle term of which presupposes the existence and definition of the subject. But this does not apply to other processes of establishing a subject. In fact, every science must have a prescientific—that is, predemonstrative—stage in which it makes its subject precise as well as the formality under which it will study its subject. This may be merely a process of observation and experience or even a-posteriori demonstration, as in natural philosophy.[37] Or it may be experience plus the utilization of validly demonstrated data from a lower science which has preceded in the order of learning. This is the way in which metaphysics establishes its own subject. There is no possibility of metaphysics metaphysically proving its own starting

[37]The proof from prime matter and substantial form, the principles whereby natural things are defined, can be said to be demonstrated a posteriori; that is, from effect (substantial change) to cause (the intrinsic principles).

point; that is, by *propter quid* demonstration of the metaphysical order.

The last point brought up by Dr. Eslick is his own solution, that the subject of metaphysics is constituted by separating *esse* from "finite modes of existing," or from "to be material." What valid justification might there be for such a separation, except the intuition that *esse* is distinct from all the essences of our experience? Therefore, *esse* itself is a reality perfectly corresponding to our concept of being as common to all things that are. This, we have shown, is not St. Thomas's concept of being. Nor does such a seperation seem to be valid, since the *esse* of material things is limited to the mode of the essences from which it is separated; by reason of its transcendental relation to material essence, such *esse* would remain material *esse*.

This brings us to attempt a classification that will also be an evaluation. It seems to us that there are three opinions on the subject of metaphysics. The first, common for a long time in Thomistic circles, is that metaphysics studies whatever is or can be. It is easy to acquire a concept of what is or can be, including God, angels, and any other realities that are or that can be, although we do not know them. The only trouble with this approach is that metaphysics would be a study of a *concept* rather than of realities that we know and from which we have abstracted the concept. There would seem to be a tinge of conceptualism in this approach.

Another approach is the exact opposite and seems to be an ultrarealism. The Owens version of Aristotle would be the extreme instance of this. Since the objects of knowledge must exist in the same mode outside knowledge as in knowledge, therefore *ens commune* is identified with subsistent realities. A more modified form of ultrarealism seems to us to be present in the doctrine of Dr. Eslick and others who follow the same approach. There must be some really distinct formality or perfection to correspond to the concept of being. Such a formality is *esse*, which is really distinct and common to all beings. The doctrine that we have proposed seems to be intermediate, and we beg leave to call it moderate realism. There is reality corresponding to our concept of being; namely, all the sensible bodies known in our experience and a nonsensible, nonmaterial reality discovered through our analysis of sensible things. From these singular instances, the mind fashions for itself a concept that is predicable of all the singulars, yet which has a broad mode of universality given by the mind. The formality corresponding to the concept of being is not really but virtually distinct from the singulars. With this notion of being, we personally feel that we can reconcile all the pertinent texts of St. Thomas and moreover build up a coherent and realistic science of metaphysics.

As a conclusion, we should like to present a tentative outline of what we think a reconstructed Thomistic metaphysics would be like. It follows in general the plan of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, although not slavishly.[38] It adheres strictly to the order of learning, so that no concept is introduced before it can be rigorously established in the light of knowledge already acquired by the student. It is constructed according to the requirements of the method of *propter quid* demonstration, particularly according to the need of commensurate universality between subjects and attributes.[39] We hope that this outline will further clarify our doctrine on the subject of metaphysics and perhaps stimulate research and discussion toward perfecting the outline.

No better introduction to metaphysics could be found than the fundamental matter contained in the first four books of St. Thomas's commentary on the *Metaphysics*. It first considers the nominal definition of wisdom. It shows the necessity, utility, and dignity of metaphysics, as well as its difficulty. It introduces the problems and doubts that arise at the beginning of the science; namely, questions of a most universal nature that cannot be treated adequately in a particular science, to which should be added a number of unanswered questions which the particular sciences were unable to solve.[40]

The next preliminary step is to establish the formal subject and the formal object of the science. The formal subject is ordinary material, sensible being under the formal aspect of *that to which existence is due*, which formality is common to both material and immaterial being. This subject is set up by a double negative judgment, "Not all being is material." This is the result of the discovery in physics and psychology of immaterial beings. "Therefore, being itself is neither material nor

[38]We recognize the nature of the *Metaphysics* as a compilation, but think that the general order is valid.

[39]On the commensurate universal, cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* i. 4, 73b27 sq., and St. Thomas's commentary, lect. 11-12.

[40]For example, the origin and purpose of the world, the source of animal instincts, the reason for the finality observed in nature, the immortality of the human soul, the nature of the Prime Mover, and so on.

[41]To make known the causes and properties of a subject is the basic purpose and outline of a science. "Hoc enim est subjectum in scientia, cujus causas et passiones quaerimus" (*In Metaphys.*, Proemium). "Scientia non solum debet speculari subjectum, sed etiam subjecto per se accidentia" (*In IV Metaphys.*, lect. 1, no. 530).

[42]Cf. St. Thomas, *In IV Metaphys.*, lect. 5, nos. 588 sq.

[43]The author is undecided when the study of the causes should be made. A rather thorough treatment is required in natural philosophy, according to the order of learning. If taught there, they may be given only incidental treatment throughout metaphysics, such as suffices to extend their applicability to immaterial being. Aristotle treats them in metaphysics in the lexicon, Book V.

immaterial." The formal object of a science is the definition of the formal subject, a definition that is the middle term of *propter quid* demonstration and serves to give full scientific knowledge of the causes and properties of the subject.[41] Strictly speaking, we cannot give a definition of being, but we can assign the constituent principles that will be scientifically valuable as giving the *propter quid* reason for the attributes of being. We show that all actual beings are composed of essence and existence, as of really distinct principles. Things are called beings by reason of their reference to existence; yet existence, their full actuality and complement, is something distinct from them. Thus understood, we can say that the formal object of metaphysics is that which is composed of essence and existence.

In the introductory, or prescientific stage, a word should be said about the methodology of metaphysics. This concerns the process of definition and of demonstration. Definitions in metaphysics are attained by an inductive process or *venatio*, such as the other sciences use; that is, universal concepts are formed through noting the common elements in many particular instances. These particular instances are found first in the science of physics; for example, cause, substance, quality, potency, act, and so on. Metaphysics refines these concepts by extending the induction to instances of these concepts realized immaterially. It is to be noted that there is as much in our metaphysical concepts as we put into them and no more. For instance, potency and act include essence and existence, but these latter two concepts cannot be deduced from the notions of potency and act.

Metaphysics uses both *quia* and *propter quid* demonstrations. The science as such is built around *propter quid* demonstrations, for only these yield science absolutely. Metaphysics is able to some extent to deduce metaphysical facts; but a-posteriori demonstrations are very necessary, especially to lead to knowledge of the First Cause of being. This knowledge of the First Cause can be called the objective of metaphysics.

At this stage, following Aristotle,[42] we include epistemology, the defense of our power to know and of the self-evident principles. The defense of the principle of causality must be made here.[43]

We are now ready for the scientific phase of metaphysics, the demonstration of the attributes of being. Because being is composed of essence and existence, it is *contingent.* For the same reason it is *efficiently caused*, hence is *ab alio.* Immediately, the mind rises to the existence of a necessary being, whose essence is existence. The above developments of the science might well be incorporated from the *De Ente et Essentia. Ens commune* can now be shown as being by *participation*, hence *imperfect*, *limited*, and *plural.* It can be further shown as being which is *ab alio* in the order of exemplary cause and of final cause. At this stage we

are in a situation similar to that of general physics after the proof of the Prime Mover. We have now discovered a First Being, a kind of being different from the being that is the subject of our science, a being that is infinite, whose essence is identified with Its existence. So we could at this stage deny of the First Being all the properties of finite being, its composition, imperfection, limitation, mutability, plurality, and thus treat here the entitative attributes of God. This would have the advantage of showing how our knowledge of God really flows from our knowledge of finite being. This complete integration of natural theology into ontology would make the structure of metaphysics follow in general the structure of natural philosophy. Yet the writer sees no reason why we could not postpone all this to a special section about the First Cause, as is traditionally done.

In natural philosophy, after the treatment of mobile being in general, we divide the science into three sections corresponding to the specific kinds of mobile being; so in metaphysics, after treating of being in general, we divide being into its ten modes, the ten predicaments,[43] and study each of them separately. The predicaments of quality and action come in for special consideration by the metaphysician, for operation and operative potencies in finite beings are really distinct from the substance of finite beings and call for the influence of the First Cause. Here the question of premotion could be treated, unless one wishes to save it for natural theology.

We now come to the section on the First Cause. If we have elected to treat much of the matter about God in the previous parts of metaphysics, we need only summarize, synthesize, and complete the doctrine here. If we prefer a natural theology in the traditional sense, we may develop it here, making sure, however, that it is not proposed as a distinct science or as an a-priori science. We believe that the study of possible being should be postponed until natural theology, when, in the order of learning, all the principles for discussing it have been made available to the student. The concept of possible being will further enrich the initial concept of being.

Once we have finished the study of the First Cause, we come to the supreme moment of metaphysics, in which all our knowledge is ultimately unified and the concept of being is extended to its absolute transcendentality so as to embrace even God and possible being. This new concept is separated by two further negative judgments. "Not all being is finite, for there exists an infinite being." This judgment is the result of all that has preceded in the science. "Therefore, being itself is neither finite nor infinite." This being that transcends finite and infinite, that

[44]Cf. *In XI Metaphys.*, lect. 1, no. 2146.

abstracts from and is predicable of all in its analogical unity, is the most extensive concept that we can attain. It is absolutely universal. Immediately, we assign the absolutely transcendental principles of all being. Being is either Pure Act or composed of potency and act. We have reserved the study of potency and act to the end of metaphysics. These concepts have first been discovered through the analysis of motion in physics. They have been progressively extended through finding new instances of them. Metaphysics shows them to apply to essence and existence and to immaterial beings. At the end of the science they are grasped in their absolute transcendentality as commensurate with all being and dividing all being. Following the transcendental principles of being, we treat the transcendental properties. Being is one, true, good, and beautiful.

So the metaphysician concludes his science by constructing a concept commensurate with all of reality—whatever is or can be, a concept wide enough to embrace God and creatures in its analogical unity. By means of this concept, predicable of all being, the wise man sees the unity, truth, goodness, and beauty of all being. Not the least of the beauties he contemplates is that of his own science. He sees it resplendent in the richness of its multiplicity. He rejoices in its ordered, integrated, hierarchized movement spiralling to the peak of transcendental being and its principles and properties.

The Aquinas Lecture for 1958, annual philosophy lecture sponsored by the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University, was delivered on March 2, 1958, by Professor Henry Margenau of Yale University. The title of his lecture was "Thomas and the Physics of 1958: A Confrontation."

The Metaphysical Society of America held its ninth annual meeting at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, on March 28 and 29, 1958. On Friday afternoon, Professor William Ernest Hocking (Professor Emeritus, Harvard University), delivered his presidential address, entitled "Fact, Field and Destiny: The Inductive Element in Metaphysics"; the commentator was Brand Blanshard (Yale University). In the evening, Professor John Wild (Harvard University) read his paper, "Man and His Life-World"; the commentator was Professor John E. Smith (Yale University). Saturday morning a symposium on being in current metaphysics was held, with papers by Aron Gurwitsch (Brandeis University), Quentin Lauer, s.j. (Fordham University), and Ivor LeClerc (University of Glasgow); the commentators were Paul Weiss (Yale University) and Edward Pols (Bowdoin University); in the afternoon, there was another symposium on the ontology of history, with papers by Emil Fackenheim (University of Toronto), Milic Capek (Carleton College), and William Dray (University of Toronto); the commentator was Geoffrey Clive (Clark University).

The American Catholic Philisophical Association held its thirty-second annual meeting in Detroit, April 8 and 9, 1958. The general theme of the program was "The Role of the Christian Philosopher." The four morning papers were: "The Place and Function of the Catholic Philosopher in the World Today," by Pacific L. Hug, o.f.m., Quincy College (comment by Geron Fournelle, o.f.m., Quincy College); "The Need for a Christian Reappraisal of the History of Philosophy," by Balduin V. Schwarz, Fordham University (comment by Owen Bennet, o.f.m., St.-Anthony-on-Hudson); "Philosophic Difference and Personal Development," by Bernard Lonergan, s.j., Gregorian University (comment by Luke Burke, o.f.m., St. Bonaventure University); and "The Role of Affectivity in Morality" by Dietrich von Hildebrand, Fordham University (comment by Alice Jourdain, Hunter College). In the afternoons there were a number of round-table discussions.

In the evening session of the first day, the Cardinal Spellman-Aquinas Medal was conferred upon Yves R. Simon; the citation was read by Vincent E. Smith, and Dr. Simon responded with an address, "The Philosopher's Calling." After this, the retiring president, the Reverend Allan Wolter, o.f.m., St. Bonaventure University, read his presidential address, "Causality."

The Logical Foundations of the Four Causes

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Introduction

One of the characteristics of philosophical systems which have survived the judgments of succeeding centuries is their capacity to withstand the critical scrutiny of new modes of philosophical analysis. Such re-evaluations not only strengthen our respect for those doctrines that meet the test but deepen our understanding of them. In response to the contemporary preoccupation with logical analysis this article proposes to investigate the logical structure implicit in Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes. By viewing the causes as logical principles it is possible to gain an insight into the main outlines of what might be termed the logical cosmos of Aristotle. Inasmuch as a logical cosmos is but a partial aspect of a fully developed cosmology, logical analysis as a method and its fruits as an interpretation claim no privileged position relative to other modes of analysis and other interpretations. On the contrary, logical analysis finds fruition only to the extent that it provides a focus for renewed metaphysical speculation.

While the primary purpose of this article is to present the logical cosmos that provides an ultimate framework for Aristotelian physics, certain corollaries of this purpose are worthy of note. (a) The four causes, whatever else their merit, pass the test of Ockham's razor; that is, they represent the most economical explanation of the cosmos Aristotle sets out to explore. (*b*) There is a possibility of testing the *consistency* of distinctively Aristotelian positions by relating them to the exigencies of this logical structure.

It would be an anachronism to burden Aristotle with the contemporary distinction between semantical and syntactical analysis. Accordingly, what follows is not a historical interpretation of his doctrine but a structural evaluation, sole responsibility for which rests with the author. A final word of warning is in order. It may be objected that there is an unwarranted intrusion of semantical considerations in an analysis which in principle is purely syntactical. Only one defense is possible: If the idea proves fruitful, its final expression would rest far more comfortably in the hands of a specialist in syntactical systems than in my own.

I

As a kind of intellectual experiment one can abstract from the temporal processes of the cosmos and view the plurality of elements that constitute the cosmos statically. Let us call the results of this abstraction the spatio-

static dimension of the cosmos. The problem of distinguishing and relating the elements of this dimension reduces to the problem of constructing a system of interrelated classes wherein all elements find membership. To this end the relations of similarity and difference are essential. Given this man, that man, and any tree, absolute difference obtains between any two of them. However, the difference between this man and that is different from the difference between either man and the tree. Thus arises the relation of similarity which grounds the possibility of classifying this and that man as against the tree.[1] Reflexively applying the principles of difference and similariy to similarities and differences, a multitude of classes can be generated and ordered both vertically and horizontally. And if one believes in natural classes and what—for want of a better term—might be called a classificatory cosmos, then an all-encompassing hierarchy of classes is *in principle* possible. Aristotle's attitude toward this possibility is to my mind ambiguous. But whatever his attitude on the total system of classes, there is little doubt that he held all elements of the cosmos to be intelligible only to the extent that they could be classified.[2]

In Aristotelian terminology the principle of plurality, the principle that absolutely differentiates any two spatially coexistent elements, is called matter. The principle of similarity which grounds the classification of elements is called form. Class status, the only intelligible status an element possesses in this abstract dimension of the cosmos, is dependent on these two principles, for they are the ultimate explanation of why any element is at once distinct from all other elements and at the same time *statically* related to all.[3] Apart from any physical or metaphysical interpretations that may and have been assigned to these principles, their logical function is, I believe, clear. Matter, in *this dimension*, is exclusively a principle of difference; form, whether accidental or sub-

[1]A more detailed analysis would reveal that similarity and difference are interdefinable and correlative. Because this issue is not especially relevant here, I have gratuitously derived similarity from difference.

[2]The nonclassifiability of monsters which is a possible exception is paralleled by an extremely low order of intelligibility.

[3]Aristotle's form is, of course, differentiated into substantial and accidental. But this duality of form does not involve a duality of logical principles, for it can be generated out of the reflexive application of difference to similarities. Thus, of three men classified as similar in opposition to a horse, the similarity of the two black-haired men in some respect differs from their similarity to their blonde-headed companion.

[4]Since there is no imaginable geometrical model of a spatio-temporal continuum, the dimension we shall consider in the next section, the points of the lines representing the spatio-static and aspatio-temporal, must be conceived as three-dimensional.

[5]It is not necessary to extend the representational device of lines to the point of inquiring whether the *order* of plurality is or is not the same in the two dimensions. Again, the dynamic

stantial, doubles both as a principle of similarity and of difference. For example, it is matter that differentiates either this man from that man, or this man from that tree. It is substantial form that both unites on the basis of similarity this and that man, and at the same time differentiates both from the tree. In a parallel fashion, accidental form unites two black-haired men while differentiating both from a blond-haired man.

II

By a second intellectual experiment we may focus attention on a single element of the spatio-static continuum, annihilate all other elements, and introduce a new dimension; namely, the temporal. This is the aspatio-temporal dimension of the cosmos, and it embodies the history of a single element changing in time. The geometrical representation of this can be imaged as follows. If the spatio-static dimension is represented by a line whose innumerable points signify spatially distinct elements, the temporal extension of any element can be represented by a second line drawn at right angles to the first, with its origin in one of the points of the first line. The points of this temporal line represent the successive and temporally distinct manifestations of the changing being.[4]

Inasmuch as Aristotle denies both an origin and an end of time, this temporal dimension, being infinite, embodies an infinite number of formal manifestations. But since space and, thus, the number of *different* forms are finite, the infinity of the second dimension must be viewed as generated from repetitions of a limited set of forms. Starting the aspatio-temporal level of the cosmos with an object of sufficient quantity of matter, one can imagine without contradiction the plurality of successive forms to duplicate the plurality of the spatial coexistents of the first dimension. The pure potentiality of prime matter, with its ability to support all the forms of the sublunary world, might be interpreted as responding to this conceptual possibility. However, since Aristotle employed substantial form in the first dimension to establish relative discontinuity of species, consistency demanded that he deny evolutionism in the second dimension. Thus, from a formal point of view, the succession of aspatio-temporal differences, *when held together by memory*, presents to the classificatory mind different differences; namely, the relative continuity of forms in accidental change and the relative discontinuity in substantial change.

Once it is admitted that the plurality of the second dimension may be conceived as duplicating the plurality of the first, it becomes possible to identify the two dimensions with respect to the problem of intelligibility.[5] Paralleling the first dimension, the only intelligibility the

aspatio-temporal continuum possesses is its openness to classification. Rather than labor the obvious, suffice it to say that if the pluralities are the same and if the two ultimate principles of similarity and differences and their reflexive applications are sufficient to order the first dimension, they are sufficient to order the second. The only remaining problem is to consider whether the two principles necessary for *each* dimension are the same or different; that is, whether in total we require two, three, or four principles.

Because the plurality of the second dimension is by hypothesis a plurality of the *manifestations* of a permanently identical material substratum, it follows that the *ultimate* principle of plurification is the same in both dimensions; namely, matter.[6] As to the manifestations themselves, the problem of classification is wholly formal. There is no manifestation that cannot be subsumed within the substantial-accidental structure of the spatio-static continuum. Accordingly, it is concluded that the principles of intelligibility proper to the first dimension are sufficient for the ordering of the second.

III

If the measure of material existence is the possibility of physics, then the above dimensions considered in themselves have no existential status. A space without time or a time without space being physically meaningless, a spatio-temporal continuum must be generated as an essential condition of grounding a physics. From a structural point of view the generation of this new continuum is equivalent to the synthesis of the logical components previously discussed. Once again it must be emphasized that the *total* involvement of this synthesis is not in question, only the logical aspect of the synthesis. Thus, for example, no attempt

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aspect of the aspatio-temporal dimension can be dismissed in this context for, as will appear in the next section, it cannot be explained without recourse to a principle whose intelligibility is grounded in a new dimension.

[6]This is by no means incompatible with the dual character of matter in the real cosmos, where matter both differentiates spatial coexistents and underlies the ultimate continuity of a being throughout a change. Whereas—assuming with Aristotle a constancy of quantity—plurification in space is interpreted as differentiation; plurification in time is interpreted as continuity.

[7]The Scholastics' concern with creation occasioned a rethinking as to what can and cannot be considered incorrigible in this context. Cosmic evolutionism, whether associated with creationism or not, similarly demands a re-evaluation of what constitutes incorrigible data.

[8]This, strictly speaking, is true only if the plane is considered infinite, or finite but boundless. If a finite and bounded continuum were desired and causality thought of as moving from right to left and down, the points constituting the lower base line would have to represent objects that can be moved but not move either themselves or others, and the extreme right line would have to represent an object or objects that

is made to discuss Aristotle's explanations of the empirically intuited character of dynamics.

The simplest type of synthesis that suggests itself is that of elementary combination. The physical reality of any element consists in its spatio-static classification *and* its aspatio-temporal classification, without the addition of an internal principle unifying these two co-ordinates. Unfortunately, this synthesis cannot reproduce an *intelligible* cosmos. Aristotle is willing to accept a plurality of spatio-static existents as incorrigible data. If this plurality were assumed to have had a temporal origin such acceptance would have been impossible.[7] As it was, by extending time infinitely into the past and by denying any type of radical evolutionism, Aristotle could dismiss all questions on the absolute origins of classes as physically meaningless or irrelevant. To take this position with respect to the first dimension is immediately to preclude the possibility of assuming the same position with respect to the second dimension. For there, even granting staticity of classes, a constant ceasing to be and coming into being is experienced with regard to individuals. A man may classify this procession of forms as incorrigible, but its incorrigibility is of a different order than that proper to the first dimension. If both orders are held to be incorrigible, it is difficult to assign a meaning to the phrase "an intelligible cosmos."

A second type of synthesis is possible with the addition of a new principle. In order to facilitate presentation let us represent this third dimension, the spatio-temporal, as follows. Recalling that the second dimension is generated by projecting a point of the base line, the spatio-static dimension, and thus forming a new line at right angles to that base, a third dimension may be generated by projecting *both* lines as a whole. Graphically the result is a plane. However, since the co-ordinates are space *and* time, this plane serves to represent not a spatial continuum or a temporal continuum but a spatio-temporal continuum. Each point or element of the plane, accordingly, must be envisioned as simultaneously related to some spatio-static element and to some aspatio-temporal element.

Empirically, the principle that bridges the discontinuity implicit in a simple compounding of space and time is a dynamic principle. The logical status of this principle, however, is sufficiently indicated by characterizing the triadic relation that underlies it. The terms of this triadic relation are two spatio-static coexistents and an aspatio-temporal successor of one of the coexistents. By pluralizing this relation to the number of elements comprising the spatio-temporal continuum, complete internal continuity is secured. For every element of the plane representing this third dimension is linked to points to the right and below it.[8]

In an Aristotelian universe this triadic relation corresponds to the dynamic principle known as efficient causality and is formulated in the axiom, "Whatever is moved is moved by another." The phrase, "whatever is moved," implies a succession of aspatio-temporal elements; the phrase, "is moved by another," implies the coexistent relationship of a spatio-static element and the first element of the temporal succession; the combination of phrases implies the triadic character of the relation. Risking monotony, it must be stated again that the *physical* interpretation of this relation is independent of its logical analysis. What combination of real objects can or can not enter into this relationship, whether causality is limited to similars or not, these and allied problems are soluble only with recourse to extra-logical considerations.[9] The logical function of efficient causality is limited to securing the internal relatedness of all elements of the spatio-temporal continuum of experience.

IV

Perhaps the most troublesome of the Aristotelian causes is the final cause. In the context of voluntary human behavior it is sometimes interpreted as substantially equivalent to the modern notion of motive. In other contexts, especially the biological, it manifests itself as a form's anticipation of its future, and so on. With respect to the higher intelligences finality grounds a regularity of motion which in turn grounds further regularities. But aside from the interpretation of specific instances of finality, the problem of the over-all logical function of finality remains. Is there any aspect of the real cosmos which does not have its correlate in the logical cosmos thus far constructed or which is not explainable in terms of some combination of matter, form, and efficiency?

In answer to this question, let us once again consider the notion of a cosmos. A cosmos is not only a spatio-temporal continuum, the elements of which are interrelated; more specifically, it is the interrelation of elements *in a particular way*. Ultimately, the ordering of spatio-temporal elements constitutes the defining characteristic of a cosmos.

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move but are unmoved. Since determination of the precise character of the Aristotelian spatio-temporal continuum would take us too far afield, it is passed by with a mere statement of the problem.

[9]When empirically dominated problems are at issue logical analysis is at best a partial analysis. Some problems within the Aristotelian tradition, thought to be exclusively metaphysical, are probably logical with an admixture of verbal. Thus, the distinction between the essence and the nature of a being is perhaps no more than the distinction between a being insofar as it is dyadically related to other beings of the first and second dimensions, and insofar as it is triadically related in the third dimension.

[10]Cartesian dualism and its subsequent history are unintelligible without this assumption.

When given a literal geometrical interpretation, the representation of the spatio-temporal dimension as a plane enclosing an infinite number of interrelated elements breaks down if the problem of finality is raised, for the triadic relations which link each point of the plane seem to be all of one kind. In reality, the empirically distinctive character of any assumed cosmos depends upon the classification of a *diversity* of efficient (triadic) relations. Granting that all efficient relations are similar insofar as they are triadic, they are subject to classification according to the combination and order of terms that may support the relations. For example, fire, wood, and smoke might be a membered class, whereas fire, water, and lead might not. Since a relation as a relation cannot determine the conditions of its application, a further principle is required. This, I believe, is the logical function of Aristotle's principle of finality. It is the ultimate principle of the cosmos insofar as it is the principle of the classification of all instances of efficient causality.

Efficient causality provides the universal linkage of elements in the cosmos; but finality, by providing the principle of ordination of links, gives to any element its specific cosmic character. A plurality ordered exclusively by matter and form is a plurality of isolated objects. Efficiency breaks down this isolation, but it is finality which underlies the distinctive character of the cosmic community. Finality, thus, is the ultimate principle of cosmic determination, for without it any variety of element groupings is logically conceivable. And plurality, lacking predictability in its dynamic aspects, ceases to be cosmic.

As with the other causes, the problem of "locating" the final cause and of giving it an empirical interpretation is beyond the scope of this article. It may, however, be appropriate to point out the correspondence between this logical analysis of finality and Aristotle's dictum that the final cause is the cause of the other causes to the extent that it is the cause of their causality. The final cause specifies a given efficient cause, which, in turn, by relating a trinity of elements, assigns these elements, definable in terms of matter and form, their appropriate spatio-temporal significance.

To my knowledge the closest Aristotle comes to characterizing finality as a cosmic principle is in his belief that efficient causality is limited to "similars." Apart from the possible ambiguity of the term "similars," this formula does not provide a perfect classification of efficient relations. It does, however, furnish a first big step toward classification by ruling out innumerable triadic combinations. Be that as it may, the recognition that "causality between similars" is a statement which primarily pertains to finality and only secondarily to efficiency may be of interest to historians of philosophical systems. Much of early modern philosophy, while attacking the Aristotelian notion of final cause, insists on the principle that causality is a relation between similars.[10] Granting that

many of the physical and metaphysical aspects of the doctrine of causes were superseded, the logical cosmos underlying this doctrine was by no means overthrown. The new physics retained efficient causality; and, if it itself did not emphasize classification, it certainly did not deny the legitimacy of the static classifications of the biological sciences, classifications whose logical foundations were equivalent to the logical functions of the material and formal causes. The countless controversies over the meaning and status of the principle of the uniformity of nature locate the principle to which philosopher and scientist appealed as the bedrock support of the ideal science they projected. Strip from any particular interpretation of this principle its physical and metaphysical flesh, and the logical skeleton of Aristotle's principle of finality stands revealed. Uniformity or finality, each is the ultimate principle of the cosmos under investigation; each is called upon to account for the spatio-temporal regularities which as a matter of fact are observed and which distinguish the cosmos of experience from any other imaginable combination of spatio-temporal elements. Modern philosophy may have killed the physical and metaphysical body of the Aristotelian cosmos, but it inherited its logical soul.

Summary

The reality of experience is presumably an intelligible plurality of spatio-temporal elements. The human mind, unable to grasp this cosmic order in a single, intuitive act of comprehension, analyzes it into its logical components and then attempts to synthesize them. The first component is the spatio-static dimension of the cosmos wherein intelligibility is limited to static classifications of elements of that dimension. Two principles suffice to ground these classifications. The second component is the aspatio-temporal dimension which involves the successive coming into being of new forms in isolation from spatial coexistents. The plurality of these forms, held together by memory and duplicating the plurality of the first dimension, is in principle subject to classification in the same manner. Since neither of these dimensions by itself grounds the possibility of a physics, a synthesis must be achieved. The resultant third dimension, the unordered spatio-temporal dimension of experience, demands the postulation of a principle which grounds a triadic relation or relations, the elements of which are two spatio-static coexistents and a temporal successor of one of these coexistents. The *intelligible* or orderly aspect of this spatio-temporal continuum necessitates a final principle grounding the classification of triadic relations, a principle which provides the ultimate support of the cosmos as cosmos.

American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division
Thirty-first Annual Meeting, Stanford University, December, 1957

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With few exceptions the contents of some fifteen papers or addresses read in this convention required no knowledge of what took place in the history of philosophy prior to 1900 in order to be understood. The concentration on analysis, ordinary language, and contemporary Anglo-American issues has a refreshing aspect; but the fault of provincialism can be chronological as well as in relation to particular schools or traditions.

Barton Cooper in his "The Alleged Indefinability of Good" asserted that G. E. Moore gave a rather restricted view of what we could consider an acceptable definition and then claimed that *good* cannot be defined on that basis. Herbert Kamins, in "Intrinsic Goodness," examined C.I. Lewis's notion that "that which is for its own sake" is equivalent to "useful for producing satisfaction" and found it wanting on the premise that "useful" is a notion that involves comparison of means. Now, an aesthetic experience, for example, does not admit of such comparison and hence can be "good for its own sake" without being "useful." Professor C. I. Lewis, attending the convention, stated in the question period that he could not identify in the paper anything that he had said which was being objected to, though he apologized that his difficulty in hearing precluded his following everything. One advantage of choosing the history of philosophy for one's subject is that Descartes or Kant is not likely to stand up in the question period and suggest that you have not understood him.

Leonard Miller, in "Ultimate Principles and Moral Scepticism," gave a remarkably good exposition of knowledge by way of connaturality without using such terms or seeming to be aware of the tradition behind his position. He defended the knowledge of ultimate moral principles by way of *intuition* against the charge of scepticism, arguing that not to give a logical discursive justification of a fundamental moral principle was not to be sceptical about it. He supported his position with evidence derived from the analysis of his own moral attitudes. Sidney Zink, in his "Reasons for Choice," reflected on the common experience of the fact that people distinguish between the psychological explanation they would give for having made a certain choice and the moral justification of it. In criticizing Nowell-Smith on this point, Zink effectively developed accounts of situations wherein a person tries to give a psychological explanation of how he came to do something which he does not now judge to be worthy or for the best.

Donald Kalish and R. Montague collaborated on a paper intriguingly

entitled "That." They suggested symbolic notation whereby logical fallacies could be avoided in arguments involving "that" clauses in propositions such as: "The number of planets is 9; Kepler was unaware that the number of planets was greater than 6; therefore, Kepler was unaware that 9 is greater than 6."

Professors Benson Mates and Stanley Cavell, University of California, Berkeley, took opposed sides about Ryle and "ordinary language" in a symposium "On Verifying Statements about Ordinary Language." Mates took a statement of Ryle's about *Voluntary* and, in criticizing his "ordinary language" analysis of it, generally raised some questions as to the value and limitations of the Oxford procedure. Cavell defended the O. L. approach and passed off Mate's point of attack on *Voluntary* as an ordinary human slip of no significance in view of the vast resources of the language approach as an effective method. Unfortunately the limitation of time frustrated the kind of clarifying and quick exchange which comes in discussion.

A stimulating and friendly exchange between C. I. Lewis and Charles Stevenson following the latter's "Poetry and the Aesthetic Attitude" was one of the more rewarding moments of the conference. While confessing that he was now attracted to an "intentional" view of knowledge such as Bretanno suggested, and as has been depicted more recently by Roderick Chisholm in his *Perceiving*, Stevenson based his analysis upon a "dispositional" view of knowledge. His reflections pertained to the relationship between the aesthetic experience or enjoyment of a poem and the cognitive understanding of the truth content. Lewis Feuer did turn to the history of philosophy for the evidence to document his "The Sociology of Philosophic Ideas," in which he exposed some fallacies in the association by historians of certain metaphysical positions with certain political attitudes; and he indicated some sociological hypotheses as to the genesis of philosophical ideas in a particular social context. Henry Alexander examined "Arguments ad Hominem" and concluded that while generally inconclusive from a strict logical point of view, some arguments which the authors have termed "ad hominem" are really logically cogent.

Professor John Goheen, in his presidential address, "On a Certain Tendency in French Ethical Thought," spoke on the contrasting traits of contemporary work being done by the Anglo-Americans and the French. Whereas the English-speaking philosophers have tended to concentrate on a logical and analytical treatment of key ethical notions, the French ethicians have taken psychology and sociology more into account in their reflections. A blending of the two tendencies was recommended by Goheen, and hence he called for a better knowledge of the work of our French contemporaries on our part.

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The Order and Integration of Knowledge. **By Wm. Oliver Martin. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1957. Pp. viii + 355. $6.50.**

The main purpose of his book is to determine the different kinds of knowledge that are had in the various sciences, both philosophical and positive. This the author does by showing what the formal object of each science is, the kind of evidence that arises from each formal object, and the method of procedure in each science that is a consequence of its formal object and proper evidence. As the author writes:

> The problem of the order of knowledge is to account for each and every kind of knowledge without, in the very process of doing so, eliminating any kind. Since a method is instrumental only, and since a fundamental kind of knowledge must be defined in terms of subject matter, the order of knowledge can be understood only by means of metaphysics. The problem of the order of knowledge is part of the general problem of the metaphysics of knowledge (p. 9).

The key, then, to the ordering of knowledge and the differentiation of the sciences is the distinction between "the existential or material object and the aspect or formal object" (p. 7).

The general distinction between philosophy and positive science is that the former grasps what is "of being" in the object, while the latter grasps some *mode* of being as separated from the being of which it is the mode.

> Now, whenever a science is considered from the standpoint of the mode studied, and not from the standpoint of the being that the mode is of, then that science is considered in its *positive* sense. A positive science is one which is defined in abstraction from the metaphysical because it is concerned with a mode *qua* mode and not with a mode of being. Thus experimental science is positive in this sense. This does not mean that it is antimetaphysical; it is simply nonmetaphysical (p. 175).

Thus, for example, the experimental scientist studies change *qua* change, and the positive mathematician studies quantity *qua* quantity, both modes of being. The metaphysician studies the object *qua* being. But the

different knowledges we have of the object can and should be integrated. Such integration or synthesis of knowledge gives rise to a third kind of science. Thus, for example, the philosopher of nature studies neither changing being *qua* being nor change *qua* change, but rather changing being; and so the philosophy of nature becomes a synthesis of metaphysics and experimental science. In like manner, the philosophy of mathematics studies neither quantified being as being nor quantity as quantity, but rather quantified being. "When we study being *qua* being it is called 'metaphysics.' When we study motion or change without considering being at all, it is called the 'experimental science.' When we study them both together it is called the 'philosophy of nature' " (p. 174). What properly defines and distinguishes these sciences, then, is their proper objects.

> Properly speaking, then, quantitative being is the formal object of the philosophy of mathematics, a discipline made possible by the second order of abstraction. Quantity is the formal object of mathematics as positive, and is made possible by the first order of abstraction. Motion is the formal object of the phenomenological discipline of experimental science, and is made possible by abstracting motion from being (p. 182).

The author insists that to define the sciences in any other way than through their proper objects is to invite that confusion which is so prevalent today in discussion concerning the distinctions of the sciences. It creates only confusion, for example, to distinguish the sciences by way of their methodology or their different "techniques." For this is either to put the cart before the horse or to fail to see what is essential in the distinction of the sciences. For example, he writes:

> Most contemporary statements of what mathematics is, go into some detail describing method and technique. Thus far we have said nothing of these matters, and have seemingly overstressed one particular notion, that of quantity. But it will now be better understood why we have done so. In the definition of a kind of knowledge subject matter is prior to method. The denial of this had produced the chaos which it is the purpose of the order of knowledge to eliminate (p. 166).

And again:

> To define mathematics so that it is indistinguishable from logic is to distort both disciplines. It is likewise arbitrary to make a metaphysics or a methodology out of mathematics. In abstraction from

any formal object why should mathematics be identified with the method of formal deduction? Why not identify it with the method of induction and make mathematics an experimental science? But, again, why not identify it with "dialectical method"? This answer, too, can be found historically. And so on. These modes of defining a discipline do not solve the problem; rather they create the chaos that makes a solution urgent (p. 159).

Because of its formal subject, each science, whether purely metaphysical, synthetic, or positive, has an evidence proper to itself; that is to say, an evidence that enters into the very constitution of the demonstrations it uses. In fact, in relation to a given science, knowledge can be of three kinds—constitutive, instrumental, or regulative. The difference between knowledge that is "constitutive of" and "intrumental to" a science can easily be grasped by a simple example as regards mathematics. The evidence used by the mathematician in formulating his definitions and judgments about his object arises from that object *as in intelligible matter*. Such evidence is constitutive of mathematical truth. But unless some of his objects *de facto* had existence in sensible matter, the intuition and hence the evidence proper to mathematics would be impossible. Thus propositions concerning the sensible or "phenomenological context" are instrumental to mathematical truth. The generalizations of experimental science are instrumental to mathematics. The knowledge of one science is "regulative" of the knowledge of another science if its truth is "presupposed" in the latter science. Thus metaphysics through its principles, such as that of "contradiction" and "identity," is regulative of mathematics. For mathematical truth must be at least formally consistent; and such consistency requires that a form means what it means and does not mean nothing or does not mean contradictories. The author writes:

> What is the relation of mathematics to metaphysics as a relatively autonomous positive discipline? It is that of being "regulative." But since mathematics is essentially a formal discipline, in the sense already defined, metaphysics exerts a minimum of regulation. Through logic, which rests upon metaphysics, the latter is regulative of mathematics essentially through such principles as those of "contradiction" and "identity." There is a reason for this. The pure mathematician *qua* mathematician deals with only one of the four causes, the formal. The material, efficient, and final causes are irrelevant. Hence, metaphysics is regulative only in its most formal aspect (p. 172).

What about the science of logic?

> We can now state the nature of the kind of knowledge which logic is. As purely formal, logic is the science of the mutual relations which intentional forms have. Concepts, propositions, and syllogisms are studied chiefly in relation to their mutual relations and in abstraction from content and from the application of concepts. "Material logic" is concerned with the same intentions, not as such and in their mutual relations, but in relation to their content. In purely formal logic one is dealing merely with second intentions as such, while in material logic one is concerned with intentions in relation to *what* they intend (p. 33).

The formal subject of logic, then, is intentional being. As regards epistemology, the author has this to say:

> The term "epistemology," and the "subject" it refers to, are both rather recent notions. Historically the term can almost be identified with the attempt to explain how knowledge is possible on a nonmetaphysical basis. It is modern subjectivism's substitute for metaphysics. Since this is actually impossible, the realist would say that such epistemology is simply bad metaphysics. If "epistemology" means anything more than this, then it would seem to be the same thing as "material logic" (p. 33).

Each science grasps its proper object by an intellectual act peculiar to it because of the status of the object that it knows. Here the author merely repeats the usual Scholastic doctrine of the three degrees of abstraction without any discussion of the various structures within being that make such abstractions possible (pp. 102-3). He considers as metaphysics not only the treatment of being as being but also the treatment of being as becoming. This latter constitutes special metaphysics or cosmology. For the author, then, cosmology is not the same as the philosophy of nature, whose definition we have already considered.

A science becomes a *positivism*, and hence arbitrary, subjective, and all-inclusive, when it denies the existence of that from which it has made its abstraction and treats the abstracted mode of being as though it were the whole of being. If being is identified with motion, or if motion "forgets about being," then, for example, experimental science becomes a doctrine about being, philosophy is denied in the name of science, and the scientific method is equated with the acquirement of any and all truth.

This book contains many more valuable observations than those pointed out in this review. In its own way it takes its stand beside St. Thomas's *Commentary on the Trinity of Boethius* and Maritain's *Three Degrees of*

Knowledge as a truly profound, and it times quite original, contribution to the order and integration of human knowledge. It is a book that deserves to be read, and read carefully. Unfortunately, it is without a detailed table of contents and, what is even worse, lacks an index. This is all the more unfortunate as the treatment is not always orderly and organic, and some of the most important things said about one science will be in a chapter that *ex professo* is devoted to quite another. Some of the author's positions will not go unchallenged, as for example his statement that the philosophy of nature "is composed essentially of equal mixtures of metaphysics and experimental science" (p. 54), and the statement that theology is in no sense regulative of metaphysics (p. 336). But these statements need to be read and weighed in their context.

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The Psychology of Perception. **By D. W. Hamlyn. New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1957. Pp. vii + 120. $2.50.**

Mental Acts. **By Peter Geach. New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1957. Pp. x + 136. $2.50.**

These are the first two books to appear in a new series, "Studies in Philosophical Psychology," edited by R. F. Holland and published in Great Britain by Routledge and Kegan Paul. Although the general editor says that no single philosophical point of view will be adopted throughout, both of these volumes employ the method of philosophical analysis.

Hamlyn's analysis bears on theories of perception: mainly on Gestalt theory but also on the atomistic theory, against which it was a reaction, and also on functionalism, which in turn is a reaction against Gestalt theory. In his remarks on the nature of explanation in psychology, Hamlyn signalizes the necessity for fixing on special conditions (in contrast to a "metaphysical" explanation which fixes on the absolutely general conditions of all perception, all activity, and so on—the author seems to imply that this is not properly an explanation at all). He then shows that Gestalt theory confuses general and special conditions. Moreover, he shows that the "laws" of perception are not laws in the same sense as physical laws, that they involve a judgment about correctness or success, and that there is no scientific need to explain how it is that we perceive what is. He argues that illusion and normal perception cannot be considered as instances of some more general experience and that normal perception cannot logically be considered as a limiting case of illusion. As

a result of this, there cannot be a single question, "Why do things look the way they do?" Furthermore, Hamlyn argues that the question about normal perception is epistemological (philosophical) and the question about illusion a psychological one. When the Gestaltists go straightway to brain processes interpreted as the result of field-forces, he argues that this ought to be considered as an empirical hypothesis needing verification and that it supposes that the laws of perception are universal, which is empirically false. On the other hand, some investigations of the Gestaltists, particularly those into illusions; have been scientifically valuable.

In a final chapter, Hamlyn considers functionalism, a reaction to Gestalt theory which takes perception as an active function. Many functionalists explain the activity of the knower as "classification"; he points out that this cannot be simply true; perception involves classification, but the identification of the two activities will destroy all knowledge of an object distinct from the knower. Hamlyn points out that "transactionalism" has similar implications; its use of learning and interpretation could explain illusions, but when the object is explained away, there is no longer any environment left with which to have a transaction.

Hamlyn's work is thus an illustration of one of the tasks which analysis sets itself: to show that certain paradoxes and puzzles are due to a confusion between (at least) two types of problems and questions which are treated as one. The analysis is not only successful but also very readable.

Geach's work, *Mental Acts*, undertakes a more fascinating task. In his study of ordinary language about mental acts he analyzes both the neobehaviorist method of reducing psychological descriptions to hypothetical physical statements and the doctrine of the origin of concepts by abstraction (his meaning of this term will be discussed later). He disposes of neobehaviorism briefly but effectively, showing that statements about beliefs and feelings (for example) have a direct meaning, and pointing out that the reduction of these statements to counterfactual conditionals is not only contrary to this meaning but, in addition, logically dubious. He chooses some of Ryle's reductions as examples of such neobehaviorism and incidentally states that Wittgenstein did not want to deny obvious truths. When Geach turns to the doctrine of abstractionism, he begins with a simple question, "From what do we abstract concepts like 'or' or 'not'?" From this he passes to the concepts of number; to what common feature in sense experience does "power" or "division" correspond? He then takes up the concept of "color"; by contrasting the specific instances like "red" with the genus of "chromatic color" he shows that a doctrine about the isolation of common or repeated

features is not applicable even in its own field. Geach understands by the term "concept" "the mental capacity to perform a mental operation of a given sort, for example, the intelligent use of a word for so-and-so in a given language" (gathered from pp. 11-17).

Next, Geach turns to the analysis of Russell's account of judgment. Russell's theory, he holds, has, in addition to several peripheral difficulties, two essential defects: It holds that proper names are shorthand for descriptions, and it has several kinds of difficulties with relations. After suggesting that these defects could be overcome by the use of a non-extensional operator and the admission of ideas, Geach takes up his own analysis of judgment. He argues, first, that proper names are not descriptions but names whose right use consists in their being applied to the same individual. He argues also that the content of every judgment is always intelligible and conceptual, and that singular judgments about sensible things have in addition a reference to the context of sense-perception.

There follow four sections on the analysis of quotation, as an analogue of the nature of judgment. Here Mr. Geach tries to show that indirect quotation can be completely substituted for by direct quotation, and that this substitution makes a lot of logical puzzles much easier to handle (for example, the quantification of indirect discourse). A digression on the meaning of the predicate "true" serves to bolster this analysis. After this, Mr. Geach returns to the theory of judgment, which he now presents as analogous to that of direct discourse. Admitting the dangers of an analogical interpretation (particularly in some historical theories about a natural inner language), he argues that judgments as such have no direct temporal existence but only a loose relation to physical time. Finally, he attacks the doctrine of "inner sense" as that from which "judgments of reflection" arise (this seems to refer to doctrines such as those of Locke and Hume).

There follow several sections dealing with associated problems: Can sensation be found apart from an organism? What is the fallacy of the Cartesian *cogito*? Can we talk about sensations? The book closes with a historical note, in which Mr. Geach establishes that the doctrine of abstractionism is not the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Mr. Geach's book has indeed a rather loose organization and at times deals rather bluntly with positions he rejects. But his style is light, often breezy, and always interesting, so that the lack of closely-knit organization appears as suitable to the kind of essay he has given us. Like Socrates, Mr. Geach often makes his point unforgettable by his concrete translations of abstract logical problems.

Psychologists, for whom the series is explicitly intended, can profit a great deal from this book, though they will doubtless squirm under

some of the analyses. It seems to this reviewer that philosophers can derive even greater profit, especially in the field of epistemology and the philosophy of man. For both of these, Geach's discussion of the origin of concepts cannot but be stimulating.

L'Anti-masse. Critique scientifique de l'idéologie de masse. **By Ernest Huant. Tournai: Desclée et Cie., 1956. Pp. 115. Paper.**

After a short exposition of the notions of "the masses" and of "economic man," the author, a biologist with broad speculative interests, presents his views on evolution and differentiation, both individual and specific. Comparing the macroscopic nonliving world to the living, he maintains that they are governed respectively by entropy and liberty. He also maintains that evolution and culture tend of themselves to aristocracy. But he also points out that civilization can go in the direction of uniformity and that therefore the "mass man" is a possibility; he insists, however, that there is no historical necessity that such a development take place.

Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia Antonio Rosmini. **(Stresa-Rovereto, July 20-26, 1955). Ed. Michele F. Sciacca. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni, 1957. Vol. I, pp. xxxiii + 653; Vol. II, pp. 655-1253.**

The *Acts* of this congress are published in two parts. The first part (pp. 1-306) contains the papers which were publicly read and discussed. The order in which they were given is the following: Ugo Spirito, on the idealistic interpretation of Rosmini's thought; M. F. Sciacca, on the principles of Rosmini's metaphysics; Jules Chaix-Ruy on his personalism; Adolfo Muñoz-Alonso, on the role of intellect and will in the determination of moral good; Augusto Guzzo, on natural light and truth; Adolfo Ravà, on his philosophy of right; Alois Dempf on his social philosophy; Giacomo Perticone on his philosophy of the state; and Dante Morando on his educational theory. Printed after each paper are the discussions of the various participants, frequently fairly lengthy and sometimes not very closely related to the paper.

The second part (pp. 309-1169) contains the text of the communications (with an occasional discussion) arranged in alphabetical order. There are eighty of these papers, covering almost every conceivable aspect of Rosmini's thought as well as his relation to movements like idealism, Kantianism, and so on. The volumes contain, in addition, the text of the several welcoming addresses, the greetings at the formal banquet, three papers read at Rovereto, and an index of names.

Many contemporary Italian philosophers find in Rosmini a kind of

patron for their personal varieties of Christian personalism, as well as a patrimony which serves as a bridge for communication. Rosmini's own awareness of the manifold currents of philosophical thought in his own time makes him all the more useful for such a purpose.

Essence et existence. Essai sur la philosophie de Nicolai Hartmann et Roman Ingarden. **By Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. Paris: Aubier, 1957. Pp. 249. Paper.**

The two philosophers studied in this book are alike in that both of them are concerned with the intelligible structure of being and both find similar principles; Ingarden uses the classical terms, essence and existence; Hartmann wishes to replace them with new terms, *Sosein* and *Dasein*. For Ingarden, essence and existence are to be taken concretely as principles of concrete being; for Hartmann, *Sosein* and *Dasein*, though they are principles of concrete being, nevertheless are abstract and undifferentiated. The author also studies the distinction drawn by both her subjects between metaphysics and ontology.

The second part of the work undertakes a critique of both philosophers, and stresses the epistemological foundations of their theories, as well as the importance of their view of the very nature of philosophy. The conclusion points out that in some sense every philisopher uses the concepts of essence and existence, and that the concepts cannot be gotten rid of except by a complete relativism.

La Filosofia Morale di Antonio Rosmini. **By Michele Federico Sciacca. Rome: Fratelli Bocca, 1957. Pp. 235. Paper, 1,200 lire.**

First published in 1938, this work is now reprinted as Volume V of the complete works of Professor Sciacca. Himself a proponent of "Christian spiritualism," the author is in sympathy with Rosmini's thought; and the present volume is not only an exposition of that thought but a personal application to contemporary problems.

The work has two parts. In the first, the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of Rosmini's moral philosophy are briefly discussed, with some emphasis on the difference between Rosmini's position and that of Kant and the empiricists. In the second part, the theory of morals is presented: the nature of a deontological science, the types of being, the principles of morality, the theory of the will and moral conscience, the relation between duty and the happiness of man.

La Filosofia Sociale dell'Equilibrio. **By Giorgio Poidomani. Siena: Maia, 1955. Pp. 116. Paper, 500 lire.**

The author is an Italian teacher and poet who has written a number of books on educational theory expounding her "natural method," which is developed from that of Montessori. The present book explains how "balance" is at the basis of social theory—balance between desire and ability, between the "I" and the "we"—and how this balance is to be achieved in the teacher-student relationship.

John Henry Newman: Our Way to Certitude. **By Dr. Zeno, O.F.M.Cap. Introd. by Dr. P. A. Kasteel. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957. Pp. xiv + 279. Paper, 19 guilders.**

This book is a study of Newman's doctrine of the illative sense and its function in the acquisition of certitude. As the author remarks, Newman's terminology is a very real obstacle, particularly to one trained in traditional Catholic philosophy, since he uses a great number of terms which have a definite traditional meaning in a sense that is sufficiently different to cause confusion. Hence, the author engages in the very necessary task of clarifying the meanings of the psychological and epistemological terms used by Newman, and the background of these terms in his doctrine of the nature of man and his powers of knowledge and appetite.

In the light of these careful investigations, two statements emerge as the basic ones about the illative sense. First, it can correctly be identified with one of the functions of the Thomistic *intellectus*; and, second, informal reasoning (ratiocination) is used much more commonly than formal reasoning, is more important, and cannot be reduced to strict logical form. In addition, it could be said that Newman's distinctions between real and notional assent, and assent and inference, are perfectly coherent with an adequately understood Thomistic theory of knowledge, though they would need expression in slightly altered terms.

This is a very worth-while study, and if it succeeds in making Newman an object of further investigation by Catholic philosophers, it will have performed a great service. It does not seem to be the ultimate book on the subject, for the author's Thomism (which is the other term of the comparison) is excessively rigid and formal (see for instance his treatment of the *universale in re*, his treatment of the relation between intellect and sense, which sounds like a doctrine of the co-operation between separate powers).

Der Kampf um Gott. **By Georg Siegmund. Berlin: Morus-Verlag, 1957. Pp. 261. DM13.80.**

The first three chapters of this study concerning belief and unbelief locate the problem in its contemporary form and give a brief history of its past forms. The modern world begins, according to the author, with the French revolution, considered as the metaphysical revolution. The "illumination" is treated as that form of unbelief which lies in the pride of human intellect. Kant's effort to re-establish faith on the basis of moral activity is considered by the author as a tragic failure. German idealism is, in a post-Kantian way, the offspring of the age of illumination; it is, the author says, a revolution of basic outlook. This is followed by the dialectical philosophy of Hegel and Marx, and the gloomy prophecies of Nietzsche. The remaining chapters take up the difference between East and West in the loss of faith and make a critical judgment that a new return to faith is in the making.

Though the treatment in this look is primarily theological, the problem of the existence and nature of God is undoubtedly one of the basic themes of modern philosophy. Hence, this study is an important one.

Kleinere Schriften, II. Abhundlungen zur Philosophie-Geschichte. **By Nicolai Hartmann. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1957. Pp. 364.**

This volume continues the collection of the minor writings of Hartmann and deals with problems of the history of philosophy. There are twelve papers, all previously published. The problems dealt with are: philosophy and its history, apriorism in Platonic philosophy, the Megarian and Aristotelian concepts of possibility, Aristotle and the problem of the concept, *Eidos* in Plato and Aristotle, the beginning of the concept of chance in ancient philosophy, the place of value in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle and Hegel, Leibniz as a metaphysician, beyond idealism and realism, Hegel and the problem of a real dialectic, and the work of Heinrich Maier on the problem of the categories.

Moral para Intelectuales. **By Carlos Vaz Ferreira. La Plata, Argentina: Universidad Nacional, 1957. Pp. 263. Paper.**

This is a third edition (with very few changes) of a set of lecture notes written in 1908. The work is directed to preprofessional students, and so the central part of the book has considerations devoted to the various professions.

The author makes the point that advanced intellectual training in any field should be accompanied by an educated understanding of morality, and he makes a vivid distinction between studying to pass examinations and studying to learn. It is the latter that he wishes to have his students do, and his technique is that of assigning readings that will cause an intellectual ferment. On the other hand, his scholarly standards seem to be very low and his notion of an educated approach to morality seems to be merely that of a polished skepticism.

The Order of the Universe in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. **By John J. Wright, S.J. Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. vii + 223. Paper. $3.50.**

Though this is a theological study, it is theological in St. Thomas's sense, in that it does not exclude but rather includes and is broader than philosophy. And the author also points out that the question of order is able to be treated better in theology, since order is existential and includes the actual supernatural elevation.

The author begins his treatment by setting up the problem in the terms of the *Commentary on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard.* This text distinguishes a twofold order: one of the universe to its end, the other of the parts of the universe among themselves. The author then examines the treatment of each of these elements of order in the later texts. In the order of the universe to God as end, the author considers the major problem to be the relation between assimilation and intellectual activity; and he concludes that the latter is the basic and final relation to God. In the order of the parts of the universe among themselves, the author first considers the texts which deal with these relations in general, and then those which take up detailed points such as beatitude, angels, men, nonrational creatures and their various activities, evil, predestination, and Christ's position in this order. In the course of these considerations, he takes up the question "whether God is first a common good or a private good" and argues that the greatest good cannot be found in any concatenation of cosmic material agents but only in the interiority of knowledge and love.

There is an index to all the texts studied, and a bibliography of pertinent books and articles.

This is an excellent study and should be read by all who are concerned with the problems raised.

Le Origini del Neotomismo nell'Ambiente di Studio del Collegio Alberoni. **By Giovanni Felice Rossi, C.M. Piacenza: Collegio Alberoni, 1957. Pp. 50. Paper.**

This history of the philosophy taught in the Collegio Alberoni was first printed in the *Divus Thomas* (1957). The present reprint adds a critical review of a book by A. Fermi on Antonio Ranza. The author maintains against Fermi that Thomism was influential from the beginning.

Die Pädagogik Friedrich Wilhelm Foersters. **By Franz Pöggeler. Freiburg: Herder, 1957. Pp. xiv + 327.**

As the author remarks, those who are well read in educational literature know that Foerster's work has been very influential. But it is also true that this work has met with almost opposite evaluations, and its merits are not well estimated outside rather narrow circles.

Foerster believed that education should not be considered only in a technical sense of techniques and procedures but also in a broad sense as a way of aiding growth toward a fully rounded Christian humanism. He therefore called on all the resources of Christian tradition, history, psychology, literature, science, and philosophy to provide the guiding principles and the content of "education." It was therefore almost natural that he should lean towards Platonism and the earlier Renaissance.

The author of this book tries to present a synthetic, or systematic, view of Foerster's doctrines. In the first part, he tries to characterize these doctrines in general: the art of development, everyday concerns, inductive methods. In the second part, he takes up the "development of a whole man," religion, morality, and community; the last three points are developed in considerable detail.

Die Philosophie im ersten Drittel des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts. **Part I. By Gerhard Lehmann. "Sammlung Göschen, Geschichte der Philosophie," X. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1957. Pp. 128. Paper, DM 2.40.**

The first part of the twentieth century is in many ways a continuation of the movements of the nineteenth. Lehmann considers three movements in this volume: neo-idealism (Eucken, Boutroux, Dilthey, Simmel, Richert, Natorp); neo-Hegelianism; and irrationalism and intuitionism (Nietzsche, Klages, Losskij, and Bergson). As usual in this series, the presentations are compressed, but clear, and keep in close touch with the

text. The bibliographies are selective, including only the basic works of the authors and the studies of more general interest rather than the more technical and specialized.

***Platon.* Vol. II: *Die Platonische Schriften, erste Periode.* By Paul Friedländer. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1957. Pp. 335. DM 32.**

In this second enlarged and corrected edition, the material of the second volume of the first edition has been distributed into two volumes. The present second volume contains four groups of writings: dialogues of definition (*Protagoras, Laches, Thrasymachos, Charmides, Euthyphron, Lysis, The Greater Hippias*); short early dialogues (*Hipparch, Ion, The Lesser Hippias, Theages*); the self-presentation of the philosopher (*Apology, Criton, Euthydemos, Cratylus, Menexenos*); and a group which the author designates by the phrase, "the logos comes to a standstill" (*The Greater Alcibiades, Gorgias, Menon*).

Friedländer is concerned to present the dialogues as works of art as well as of philosophy. Hence his analyses of the dialogues are rhetorical as well as logical. They should be of great help to students in their first acquaintance with Plato.

***Port Royal. Entre le miracle et l'obéissance.* By Jean Orcibal. Bruges: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1957. Pp. 195. Paper.**

This is a study of the conflicting ideas and personalities of Mother Angélique de St. Jean and Sister Flavie Passart. Those interested in the philosophical and theological implications of the Jansenist troubles will find this study very illuminating.

***Le problème de Dieu en philosophie de la religion.* By Henry Duméry. Bruges: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1957. Pp. 142. Paper, 63 fr.**

This book is concerned with pointing out the function of philosophy in the study of God and criticizing the idea of Him as the Absolute. The author differs both with those who would have philosophy construct the idea of God in isolation from the lived experience of men and with those who would allow only the theologian (in the narrow sense) to talk about God. In his view, the function of philosophy is to study the idea of God which he finds already in existence, to criticize it and render it fully conscious and coherent.

The author further argues that the notion of "reduction" has been wrongly conceived; to "reduce" is to show that something is relative, he tells us. Hence, he can say that "reduction" discovers the One. The way of finding God reflexively cannot be "objectivist," as if God were another thing among things; the problem of transcendence and immanence is solved by taking instead a "subjectivist" and "interior" way to God. Hence, also, God cannot simply be considered as transcendent; though God is the One, pure spontaneity, He is not properly to be considered as a being; and so He is, as the author says, "trans-ordinal" rather than transcendent. He argues, consequently, that the "negative theology" is not a negation of theology but the expression of the fact that the intelligible and the life of the spirit is a relation to God.

These reflections are very significant, and they take full account of contemporary interests and demands. But some at least will not be convinced that the Plotinian categories are basically better than others.

Der Rang des Geistes. Goethes Weltverständnis. **By Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1955. Pp. 436. Paper, DM 26.**

The author, a student of Goethe's writings for many years, has written this book to bring to modern man a better understanding of the place of spirit in the world. He is convinced that the pessimistic views of the world, many of them including the doctrine that nature is chaotic and opposed to anything spiritual, can be corrected with some of the insights of Goethe. Hence, he presents Goethe's views on existence and nature, man and God, life and spiritual meaning. In Goethe's view, these opposed polarities continue to stand in relationship. The lower forces in nature, though presenting an aspect of wild force, are yet subordinated to the higher forces of order and, in a way, even desire order, meaning, and good. Man is to be conceived as an image of God, even though he also stands in close relationship to nature, and in some sense the image of God in man is to be found in love. Love has many levels, from the natural desires to the spiritual love of man and God. In the third polarity, the author considers the romantic pathos and classical form as being not merely a matter of style but of a whole *Weltanschauung* and holds that the spiritual is allied in some essential way with form.

The author is well acquainted with Goethe and the Goethe literature, and his own philosophical personalism has many points of contact with the views he finds in Goethe. Therefore, he presents us with a warmly sympathetic view of Goethe and an inspiring picture of the spirit whose ideal of being at home in the world is at least partly fulfilled. On the other hand,

this same sympathy leads him to gloss over the unchristian and monistic tendencies in Goethe, to admit but to consider unimportant the necessitarian Plotinian view of the mutually necessary relations of God and the world, and to interpret Goethe's syncretism as moderation and a balanced view.

La Scepsi Etica di Giuseppe Rensi. **By Piero Nonis. Rome: Editrice Studium, 1957. Pp. x + 267. Paper, 1,500 lire.**

Guiseppe Rensi was regarded by his contemporaries of the first quarter of this century as a genius and a striking example of the spiritual crisis of the times. He was a militant socialist as well as a critical materialist; he opposed religion and all theistic philosophy; yet, in a paradoxical sense his friends considered him a religious person. The author of the present study begins the work with a life of Rensi. He then presents Rensi's thought under the headings of theoretical skepticism, irrationalism, the link between theoretical and ethical skepticism, critique of morality, the fundamental ethical absurdity which is man's highest nobility, morality as the supreme risk. There is a very detailed bibliography of Rensi's books, articles, and reviews and of writings about him (pp. 227-67).

Scholastic Bibliography in Japan. **Ed. Bernard R. Inagaki. Nagoya: Catholic Univ. of Nagoya, 1957. Pp. 24 + 25. Paper.**

This is a survey of books and articles written or translated by Japanese on patristic, medieval, and systematic Scholastic philosophy. There are five hundred and five titles, which are given in English translation in the first part of the book and in Japanese in the second part. In his introduction, the author mentions the Japanese organizations which are active in the support of Scholastic philosophy. Though the book is small, it represents a significant achievement in itself and reports an even greater one—which most English speaking philosophers would otherwise not even know existed. Somehow, communication with such a serious group of philosophers should be made more frequent and easy.

Vom Schönen und seiner Wahrheit. **By Richard and Gertrud Koebner. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1957. Pp. 126.**

This is a study of aesthetic experience. The authors say that they have not explicitly related their study to metaphysics, biology, or psychology but that nevertheless they think that such relating can be done. How-

ever, they do make explicit use of some philosophical ideas such as the Kantian conviction of the universal validity of the aesthetic judgment, the Husserlian methodology, and Cassirer's analysis of art. In addition, they also use some psychological theory, especially from Gestalt theory.

The authors' key notion is that of "aesthetic presence," which they consider as a transformation of "actual presence" of reality. They maintain that aesthetic experience is immediate and irreducible to any other form of experience, and must be studied as a self-expression. The elements examined are: aesthetic form (Gestalt), continuity of the object, characteristics of the object (line, rhythm, color, vitality). They next consider aesthetic value, beauty, which they consider as aesthetic perfection. This is followed by an analysis of aesthetic truth, in nature and in art. After some general considerations of artistic conditions of aesthetic truth, they consider architecture and sculpture, music and poetry.

La source des valeurs. **By Jean Pucelle. Lyons: Emmanuel Vitte, 1957. Pp. 220. Paper, 870 fr.**

Dedicating his book to Louis Lavelle and René Le Senne, the author shows the point of view he is taking in his study of values. First, he studies "degraded values" (such as prestige, economic credit) and asserts that they arise from liberty. Next, he looks at the recovery of values and maintains that the source of such restoration is intersubjectivity, the consensus of free men. Realizing, to some extent, that this might make value subjective, he looks for some objective grounding and finds this in structures, institutions, norms, and laws. But he combines this investigation with an attack on impersonality, anonymity, and objectivity. In his last study, he studies the relationship of values in an admittedly Plotinian frame of reference: procession and circulation. Finally he asserts that the ultimate grounding of values lies in the relationship between man and God.

Studi Pascaliani. **By Maria Simonetti. Rome: Fratelli Bocca, 1957. Pp. 169. Paper, 1,350 lire.**

The studies concern the text, the style, and the interpretation of Pascal. The first studies concern Pascal's method of writing, his care in expression, and the interpretation of variants. Then the author considers the text tradition and compares the several critical editions. The final consideration is a history of the various interpretations of Pascal's meaning. There is a bibliography, mostly of French and Italian titles.

Theorie des Vertrauens. **By Rudolf Schottlaender. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1957. Pp. 148. DM 18.**

The post-war age has often been characterized as one of a loss of confidence, a "failure of nerve." The author agrees with this general characterization, but considers that a more accurate probing of the problem is necessary. Hence he begins by contrasting the notion of "being at rest" with "restlessness." From this point he goes on to consider confidence in the world as a whole, confidence in others and mutual trust, and self-confidence. He next considers that one not only trusts another but entrusts something to him—one's own future, for example. He points out that this always involves a risk of some sort, as all love involves a risk. Contrariwise, he points out that fear is not only fear of some object, but for something or someone. He also points out the relevance of this consideration for the problem of authority and obedience, which he characterizes as a "one-way trust."

Next the author takes up the causes of the loss of confidence and gives these as some of the causes (but not necessarily all): the deification of labor (as in the Marxist view), the conflict of loyalties, the excessive desire for security, the forgetting of the reasons for trust, the preponderance of abstract knowledge and generalization, the fear of making judgments, and moral and psychological agnosticism.

These considerations are followed by treatments of the relation of the individual and the world, and of individuals among themselves. These treatments touch on education (broadly considered) and social philosophy, and provide many valuable insights.

The entire study is a valuable one. Worthy of special commendation is the distinction made by the author between trust and security. We are accustomed to hear psychiatrists speak of insecurity as one of the most basic and general causes of mental breakdowns, and at the same time to find the desire for security assailed by philosophers—individualists, relativists, agnostics, and existentialists—as the vice which leads to mediocrity, conformity, inauthenticity. Giving further clarification to the solution of this contemporary dilemma are the author's treatments of sympathy and objectivity.

Théorie du champ de la conscience. **By Aron Gurwitsch. Bruges: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1957. Pp. 347. Paper, 195 fr.**

This work attempts to develop a theory of the "field of consciousness," by which the author means the totality of what is given together. The author develops a theory according to which that field is divided into a

theme, a thematic field, and a margin. In developing this theory, he makes use first of Gestalt theory and draws out particularly the theory of Form as the Gestaltists understand it. Next he takes up the method of phenomenology, in a rather strictly Husserlian fashion. He tells us that "phenemenology can be defined as a systematic study and a theory of subjectivity, whose purpose is to arrive at a complete clarification of the objects of all possible categories" (p. 13). With considerable skill he builds up the various parts of his theory, coming at the end to some ontological questions about reality and its orders, existence and its modes.

Among other problems remaining, the notion of a pure given, an object in its total reality, is highly involved (instead of a simple notion), and its similarity to an analysis like that of Santayana is disconcerting.

CUNNINGHAM, FRANCIS A., S.J. A Theory on Abstraction in St. Thomas 249

ERMATINGER, CHARLES J. Richard Fishacre's *Commentarium in Librum I Sententiarum* (Dist. 2, Cap. 1), text and introduction 213

———. (*see* Sweeney, Leo, S.J.)

FISHACRE, RICHARD (*see* Ermatinger, Charles J.)

FLANIGAN, SISTER THOMAS MARGUERITE, C.S.J. The Use of Analogy in the *Summa contra Gentiles* 21

KLOCKER, HARRY A., S.J. Ockham and the Cognoscibility of God 77

MCINERNY, RALPH. Apropos of Art and Connaturality 173

MASIELLO, RALPH J. The Analogy of Proportion according to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas 91

RECK, ANDREW J. Substance, Language, and Symbolic Logic 155

ST. HILAIRE, GEORGE, S.J. The Vision at Ostia: Acquired or Infused? 117

STRASSER, STEPHAN. The Concept of Dread in the Philosophy of Heidegger 1

SWEENEY, LEO, S.J., and ERMATINGER, CHARLES J. Divine Infinity according to Richard Fishacre 191

WILLIAMS, MARTHA E. Gabriel Marcel's Notion of Personal Communication 107

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

Chronicle 61, 190, 286

BACHHUBER, ANDREW H. S.J. Sense-Lines: A Technique for Teaching the Text of St. Thomas 62

FITZGERALD, DESMOND J. American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Thirty-first Meeting 295

GLUTZ, MELVIN A., C.P. Being and Metaphysics 271

HENLE, ROBERT J., S.J. A Thomist on "An Experimentalist on Being" 133

HOUDE, ROLAND. A Nonexistent Corpus Articuli 124

JONSEN, ALBERT R., S.J. The Reality of Culture 52

MORRIS, VAN CLEVE. An Experimentalist on Being 125

NOONE, JOHN B., JR. The Logical Foundations of the Four Causes . . 287

REAGAN, JAMES. Tenth Annual Meeting of the Missouri State Philosophical Association 106

SIMMONS, EDWARD D. Marquette Workshop in the Teaching of Philosophy 60
SWEENEY, LEO, S.J. Divine Infinity: 1150-1250 38

BOOKS REVIEWED

AYER, A. J. *The Problem of Knowledge* (James Collins) 142
BERGMANN, GUSTAV. *Philosophy of Science* (James Collins) . . . 147
BOCHENSKI, I. M., O.P. *Contemporary European Philosophy* (James Collins) 65
BOULDING, KENNETH. *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society* (Carl J. Hemmer, S.J.) 68
BRUNNER, AUGUST, S.J. *Die Religion: Eine philosophische Untersuchung auf geschichtliche Grundlage* (James Collins) . . . 63
COPLESTON, FREDERICK, S.J. *Contemporary Philosophy* (James Collins) 65
COURNOT, ANTOINE AUGUSTIN. *An Essay on the Foundations of our Knowledge* (Carl J. Hemmer, S.J.) 68
DEFERRARI, ROY J., and BARRY, SISTER M. INVIOLATA, C.D.P. *A Complete Index of the* Summa Theologica *of St. Thomas Aquinas* (John P. Jelinek, S.J.) 145
FINANCE, JOSEPH DE, S.J. *Existence et liberté* (James Collins) . . . 63
GARDEIL, H. D., O.P. *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Vol. III, *Psychology* (Richard J. Blackwell) . . . 245
GEACH, PETER. *Mental Acts* (George P. Klubertanz, S.J.) . . . 303
GLUTZ, MELVIN A., C.P. *The Manner of Demonstrating in Natural Philosophy* (Joseph J. Sikora) 144
HAMLYN, D. W. *The Psychology of Perception* (George P. Klubertanz, S.J.) 303
HOSTIE, RAYMOND, S.J. *Religion and the Psychology of Jung* (George P. Klubertanz, S.J.) 151
LONERGAN, BERNARD J. F., S.J. *Insight* (James Albertson, S.J.) . . 236
MARCEL, GABRIEL. *Royce's Metaphysics* (Quentin Lauer, S.J.) . . 71
MARTIN, WILLIAM OLIVER. *The Order and Integration of Knowledge* (Maurice Holloway, S.J.) 299
MASCALL, E. L. *Christian Theology and Natural Science* (George P. Klubertanz, S.J.) 151
RUSSELL, BERTRAND. *Logic and Knowledge: Essays, 1901-1950* (James Collins) 142
SIMARD, EMILE. *La nature et la portée de la méthode scientifique* (Joseph J. Sikora) 144
SMETHURST, ARTHUR F. *Modern Science and Christian Beliefs* (George P. Klubertanz, S.J.) 151
WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG. *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (James Collins) 147

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

Supplement to THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN
XXXV (November, 1957)

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad se. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that olve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints e previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a ble difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
2. *Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
3. *Books received by* THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN *will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

ABELARDUS, PETRUS. Dialectica. First complete ed. of the Parisian manuscript by L. M. de Rijk. New York: Gregory Lounz, 1957. Pp. 693. $13.50.

CTON, H. G. The Illusion of the Epoch: Marxism-Leninism as a Philosophical Creed. Boston: Beacon Press; August, 1957. $6.00.

LER, MORTIMER JEROME. What Man Has Made of Man. Introd. by Dr. Frank Alexander. New York: F. Ungar, 1957. Pp. 265. $4.50.

BEE, ERNEST. A History of English Utilitarianism. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. xx + 427. $6.00.

The present work is an exact photo-reproduction of the edition first published in 1901, which has long been out of print. Albee's history is a classic in its field, and scholars and libraries will be happy to know that it is again available.

The work treats of Richard Cumberland, Shaftesbury, and Francis Hutcheson; George Berkeley, John Gay, and John Brown; Hume, Hartley, Abraham Tucker, William Paley, and Jeremy Bentham; John Stuart Mill, Spencer, and Sidgwick.

DRADE, E. N. DA C. An Approach to Modern Physics. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books; Sept., 1957. 95¢

BERRY, ARTHUR JOHN. Revelation and Reason in Islam. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. 122. $3.00.

ISTOTLE. Aristotle's Metaphysics. Ed. and trans. from the Greek by John Warrington. Introd. by Sir David Ross. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1957. Pp. 415. $1.85.

_____. Politica. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 282. $4.00.

© The Modern Schoolman, 1957

ARNETT, WILLARD EUGENE. Santayana and the Sense of Beauty. Foreword by Irwin Edman. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 267. Paper, $1.25.

ARNOLD, E. V. Roman Stoicism. New York: Humanities Press; June, 195 $6.00.

AUERBACH, ERICH. Mimesis. Trans. from the German by Willard Trask. New York: Doubleday, 1957. Pp. 498. Paper, $1.65.

AUGUSTINE, ST. The City of God against the Pagans. Vol. 1, Bks. 1-3; with an English trans. by George E. McCracken. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 489. $3.00.

AURELIUS, MARCUS. Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Trans. from the Latin by George Long. Mt. Vernon, N.Y.: Peter Pauper Press, 1957. Pp. 60. $1.00.

AUROBINDO, SRI. The Synthesis of Yoga. Westport, Conn.: Associated Booksellers, 1957. Pp. 1034. $5.00.

BACHHUBER, ANDREW H., S.J. Introduction to Logic. New York: Appleton Century-Crofts, 1957. Pp. xiv + 332. $3.50.

This introductory textbook aims at making the student able to think logically as well as informing him about the science of logic The order of presentation is different from that of most manuals; i begins with inference and only later takes up the more abstract top ics like the concept and definition. In the first part, the term and proposition are studied as prerequisites of inference, and the general notions of inference and validity are presented. Then come the parts on immediate and mediate inference. The fourth part take up concept and term. Finally, there is a section on the classifica tion of propositions, induction, and the definition of logic.

The author gives a large number of simple examples, both classi- cal and contemporary, and uses diagrams often to illustrate relatio Formal exercises are an integral part of the teaching method.

BAHADUR, SRI JAYA CHAMARAJENDRA WADIYAR. Dattātreya. Introd. by S. Radhakrishnan. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. 300. $4.75.

BARKER, ERNEST. Church, State and Education. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Sept., 1957.

BARKER, S. F. Induction and Hypothesis. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press; Sept., 1957. $2.75.

BECK, WILLIAM S. Modern Science and the Nature of Life. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1957. Pp. 319. $5.75.

BENTLEY, ERIC. A Century of Hero-Worship: A Study of the Idea of Hero ism in Carlyle and Nietzsche, with Notes on Wagner, Spengler, Stefa George, and D. H. Lawrence. Boston: Beacon Press; Sept., 1957. $3.95; paper, $1.60.

BIESTEK, FELIX P., S.J. The Casework Relationship. Chicago: Loyola Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. ix + 149.

This book could be a textbook or an extremely useful reference book for the social worker. The "casework relationship" involves both psychological and ethical elements; and the author points out that though a knowledge of the factors involved does not make a goo relationship, it will still be of some help in bringing it about an of greater help in judging the adequacy of a particular relationshi The analysis is clear and adequate; the style is simple and concret

BLYTH, JOHN WILLIAM. A Modern Introduction to Logic. Boston: Houghto Mifflin Co., 1957. Pp. 442. $5.50.

BOETHIUS. The Consolation of Philosophy. Ed. and abridged by James J Buchanan. Introd. by Whitney J. Oates. New York: Frederick Ungar Pub. Co., 1957. Pp. viii + 67. $2.00; paper, 95¢

This is a carefully revised translation which is easy to read an

understand. Though the work has been drastically abridged, all omissions have been indicated; and the selections that are given contain complete presentations of Boethius's more typical and important ideas. The volume could easily and profitably be used as assigned reading in courses in the history of philosophy or the history of ideas.

NARD, ANDRÉ. Greek Civilization. Trans. from the French by A. Lytton Sells. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. 199. $6.00.

MELD, THEODORE A. Cultural Dimensions of Education. New York: Harper & Bros.; Aug., 1957. $5.00.

NNAN, JOSEPH GERARD. A Handbook of Logic. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957.

RE, O., S.J. Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy; 1898-1950. Trans. Lawrence G. Thompson. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. 159. $4.75.

ON, LYMAN, and OTHERS (eds.). Aspects of Human Equality. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 439. $5.00.

ER, MARTIN. Eclipse of God. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 152. Paper, $1.15.

KE, KENNETH. Philosophy of Literary Form. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Sept., 1957. $1.25.

NET, J. Early Greek Philosophy. New York: Meridian Books; Aug., 1957. $1.95.

TT, EDWIN A. Man Seeks the Divine. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 561. $4.75.

LER, JOHN ALFRED VALENTINE. Science and Human Life. New York: Basic Books, 1957. Pp. 170. $3.95.

PBELL, C. A. On Selfhood and Godhood. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. xxxvi + 436. $6.00.

This is the Gifford Lectures for 1953-54 and 1954-55, revised and expanded. The two topics, selfhood and Godhood, are distinct, yet connected; and both of them are necessary if religion in the traditional sense is to be maintained. In the first part, the author examines the nature of knowledge in general, of self-knowledge and self-identity, of the self's relation to the body, of introspection and dispositions, and of self-activity, in the problem of freedom and of moral activity. In the course of this investigation, the author concludes that the self is "substantival." In the second part, the author examines the idea of religion in general and of theism in particular. He then takes up the problems of sin and suffering. In the light of these considerations he examines the "literal theology of rational theism" and concludes that it contains contradictions. As an alternative, he proposes a "suprarational" theism, which is based on symbolic knowledge, and in this sense his symbolism is not subjectivist or sentimental. He argues that such knowledge has some objective validity. He holds for a system of modified idealism, in which the influence of Bradley is very great.

MPS, FRANCIS EDWARD, and PURCHASE, WILLIAM BENTLEY. Practical Forensic Medicine. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. 559. $13.50.

NDLER, ALBERT RICHARD. The Clash of Political Ideals. 3rd ed. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957. Pp. 481. Paper, $1.65.

NEY, ELMER V. The Unity of Science, Theology and Doubt. New York: Exposition Press, 1957. Pp. 126. $3.00.

NG, CARSUN. The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought. New York: Bookman Associates, 1957. Pp. 354. $7.50.

RRY, COLIN. On Human Communication. New York: Wiley and Technology Press of M.I.T., 1957. Pp. 347. $6.75.

CHURCHMAN, CHARLES WEST, and OTHERS. Introduction to Operations Research. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957. Pp. 655. $12.00.

CLARK, GORDON HADDON. Thales to Dewey. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co 1957. Pp. 560. $5.00.

CLARK, JAMES M. (ed.). Meister Eckhart: An Introduction to the Stud His Works with an Anthology of His Sermons. New York: Thomas Nel & Sons; Aug., 1957. $6.25.

CLARK, JOHN MAURICE. Economic Institutions and Human Welfare. New York, Alfred A. Knopf. Pp. 307. $5.50.

COCHRANE, CHARLES NORRIS. Christianity and Classical Culture. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Sept., 1957. $2.95.

COFFIN, CHARLES M. John Donne and the New Philosophy. New York: Humanities Press; Aug., 1957. $5.00.

COLIE, ROSALIE L. Light and Enlightenment. New York: Cambridge Univ Press, 1957. Pp. 175. $3.75.

COMTE, AUGUSTE. A General View of Positivism. Trans. from the Fren by J. H. Bridges. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1957. Pp. 44 $5.00.

CONNOLLY, F. G. Science versus Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 90. $3.75.

This study of the relations between theology, philosophy, and science is Thomistic in orientation but does not fall into any of the traditional categories. In order to lay the ground for his cl sification of practical knowledge, the author goes into a discussi of the end of man. From this, his conclusion emerges: there are three kinds of practical knowledge--moral theology, moral philosop and moral science, in addition to some associated empiriological s ences. In the order of speculative knowledge, the author rearrang the so-called "degrees of abstraction" to come up with four degree prophysical, mathematical, physical, and metaphysical. On this basis he obtains four types of knowledge (mathematics itself is no really in this series, and in fact the author sets it apart, with analogous internal differentiation). The author pleads for a reco sideration of the theory of knowledge in the light of these sugges tions.

COPLESTON, FREDERICK C. Bergson on Morality. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957. Paper, 60¢

CORNFORD, FRANCIS M. Plato's Cosmology. New York: Liberal Arts Pres 1957. Pp. xiv + 376. Paper, $1.75.

_____. Plato and Parmenides. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. xvii + 251. Paper, $1.60.

_____. Plato's Theory of Knowledge. New York: Liberal Arts Press 1957. Pp. xii + 336. Paper, $1.75.

These volumes are too well known to need much description. The first (in the order of listing here) contains a translation of the Timaeus with a running commentary; the second, of Parmenides's Way Truth and Plato's Parmenides; the third, of the Theaetetus and Sop ist. When these translations and interpretations appeared twenty more years ago, there were many interpretations of Plato; but Corn ford's patient textual analyses have completely dissipated most of these imaginative constructions, and his sober historical scholars has set the pattern for most recent work on Plato.

To have these volumes available in the excellently printed volu with their sewn binding is a real benefit for the student and the scholar alike; and scholars can continue to be grateful to the Lib al Arts Press for making available works of this caliber, so neatl produced and at a price suited to a scholar's meagre purse.

LNSTON, MAURICE. John Locke. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. xvi + 496. $8.00.

This biography is the most completely documented one published and the first to make use of the Lovelace collection. It presents many new facets of Locke's life and personality and of his relations with the great and not-so-great men and women of his time. In addition, Locke's philosophy is discussed, sometimes in the form of historical exposition, sometimes critically. The author's own view of Locke's philosophy owes much to contemporary British analysis.

WSHAY-WILLIAMS, RUPERT. Methods and Criteria of Reasoning. New York: Humanities Press, 1957. Pp. viii + 296. $5.00.

This investigation explicitly concerns itself with reasoning and statements, especially those which are controverted. The author's thesis is that a statement is not a completely determinate one unless the entire context is known. "Context" includes, indeed often is mainly, the purpose of the assertor in making the statement. As a thesis in logic (in a more informal sense) and epistemology it is persuasively presented and will undoubtedly be useful. Whether it will remove all metaphysical statements from the category of usefully controvertible statements will depend upon the sort of metaphysics that is in question. A supposed a-priori deductive metaphysics vanishes under "contextual" analysis. Whether a phenomenologically and experientially grounded metaphysics vanishes is quite another question, and one that the author has not explicitly touched.

RY, WALTER CLYDE. Milton's Ontology, Cosmogony and Physics. Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1957. Pp. 226. $5.00.

NIELOU, JEAN. God and the Ways of Knowing. New York: Meridian Books; Sept., 1957. $3.75.

NIELS-ROPS, HENRY. Cathedral and Crusade. Trans. from the French by John Warrington. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1957. Pp. 655. $10.00.

ARCY, M. C. Meeting of Love and Knowledge: Perennial Wisdom. New York: Harper & Bros.; July, 1957. $3.00.

WIS, GEORGE W. Existentialism and Theology. New York: Philosophical Lib.; June, 1957. $3.75.

WSON, CHRISTOPHER. The Dynamics of World History. Ed. by John J. Mulloy. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1957. Pp. xiv + 489. $6.00.

The purpose of this collection of essays, chapters, and papers is to present in one place with its full scope the entire range of Dawson's thoughts on world history, or, perhaps better, "metahistory." The selections are divided into two parts: one on the sociology of history, and one on conceptions of history. The first part consists of three sections: first, the sociological foundations of history; second, the movements of world history; third, urbanism and the organic nature of culture. The second part has two sections: first, Christianity and the meaning of history; second, the vision of the historian.

There are, in addition, an essay on Dawson's thought by the editor (pp. 413-68), a detailed identification of all the selections, and a very good index. It is to be hoped that this volume will make Dawson's thought much more influential.

JOUVENEL, BERTRAND. Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good. Trans. J. F. Huntington. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, Aug. 1957. Pp. 310. $4.50.

ENISE, THEODORE C., and WILLIAMS, MILTON H. (eds.). Retrospect and Prospect on the Retirement of T. V. Smith. Chicago: Association of American Univ. Presses; Dec., 1957. Pp. 175. $4.00.

DeVANE, WILLIAM CLYDE. The American University in the Twentieth Cent
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. xi + 72. $2.
This series of lectures by the Dean of Yale College is a reflec
tive "examination of conscience" and discussion of the ideals of c
lege and university education. Almost all teachers will find some
stimulating points of view about their profession; and administra-
tors will find much to make them pause, reflect, and perhaps modif
the direction of their efforts.

DEWEY, JOHN. Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics. New York: Hil-
lary House, 1957. Pp. viii + 253. $5.00.
This is a photo-reprint of the edition of 1891. As is well kno
at this stage of his development Dewey was still strongly under the
influence of Kant and Bradley, though he was well acquainted with t
empiricists and evolutionary philosophers. Yet the germ of some o
his later ideas can be found here. Hence, the book is necessary fo
anyone who wishes to make a study of the philosophy of Dewey.

_____. Reconstruction in Philosophy. Boston: Beacon Press; Sept.,
1957. Paper, $1.45.

DILTHEY, WILHELM. Dilthey's Philosophy of Existence: Introduction to
Weltanschauungslehre. Trans. with introd. by William Kluback and
Martin Weinbaum. New York: Bookman Associates, 1957. Pp. 74. $3.0

DODDS, E. R. The Greeks and the Irrational. Boston: Beacon Press;
Sept., 1957. Paper, $1.75.

DRAKE, HENRY L. People's Plato. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Sept.,
1957. $7.50.

DRU, ALEXANDER. Péguy: His Prose and Poetry. New York: Harper & Bros
1957. Pp. 121. $2.50.
This study is concerned not only with the writing of Péguy, but
also to a limited extent with his life and more explicitly with his
philosophical and religious ideas and his theory of the nature of
poetry. Mr. Dru writes with sympathy and insight and produces a ba
anced evaluation. His principal insight is that Péguy is seen best
as a poet and that his theory of a point in experience where idea a
image are yet fused (with its implication of the unity of man) is t
key to understanding not only his poetry but also his life and infl
ence.

EBENSTEIN, WILLIAM. Political Thought in Perspective. New York: McGr
Hill. Pp. 602. $7.00.

ECKHART, MEISTER. An Introduction to the Study of His Works with an
Anthology of His Sermons. Selected, annotated and translated by
James M. Clark. New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1957. Pp. 268.
$6.25.

[_____.] Meister Eckhart. Trans. from the German by Raymond Bernard
Blakney. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 361. Paper, $1.45.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN. Freedom of the Will. Ed. Paul Ramsey. New Haven,
Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 506. $6.50.

EDWARDS, PAUL, and PAP, ARTHUR. Modern Introduction to Philosophy:
Readings from Classical and Contemporary Sources. Chicago: Free
Press; Aug., 1957. $6.50.

EWING, ALFRED CYRIL (ed.). The Idealist Tradition from Berkeley to
Blanshard. Glencoe: Free Press, 1957. Pp. 377. $5.50.

EYSENCK, HANS JURGEN. Sense and Nonsense in Psychology. Baltimore:
Penguin Books, 1957. Pp. 349. Paper, 85¢

FAIRCHILD, HOXIE NEALE. Religious Trends in English Poetry. Vol. IV:
1830-1880. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; May, 1957. Pp. 592.
$7.50.

RATER MORA, JOSÉ. Ortega y Gasset. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 69. $2.50.

This summary of Ortega's philosophy is in the main "biographical" in structure. Ortega began writing as an objectivist, as one interested in ideas rather than persons. He then became a "perspectivist," in whose view the point of view was perhaps more real than what was viewed. This stage led to his final and comprehensive view, which is called "ratio-vitalism." Ortega does not wish to embrace a rationalism; he insists on vital values. But for that matter he wishes to avoid any irrationalism. Hence, his combination of reason in life has many affinities with existentialist currents, except that it seems also to have contacts with utilitarian and pragmatic views.

There is a list of works in the complete Spanish edition, and also a list of English translations.

TINGER, LEON. Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston: Row, Peterson & Co.; Aug., 1957. $5.25.

MAN, PETER. Justice in Plato's Republic. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Sept., 1957. $2.00.

CH, JOHN ANDREWS. Social Responsibilities of Organized Labor. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 262. $3.50.

ICHER, RONALD. Instinct in Man. New York: International Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 348. $7.50.

NK, PHILIPP G. Philosophy of Science. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall. Pp. 416. $7.65.

ILEO. Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo. Trans. from the Italian by Stillman Drake. Garden City: Doubleday, 1957. Pp. 310. Paper, $1.25.

LAGHER, DONALD A. (ed.). Some Philosophers on Education. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. xiii + 95. Paper, $2.50.

This is a collection of five papers, the first four of which were given before summer session students at Marquette University. The papers are: "John Dewey in Context," by Beatrice H. Zedler; "Aristotle and Pagan Education," by Lottie H. Kendzierski; "St. Augustine and Christian Humanism," by Donald A. Gallagher; "St. Thomas Aquinas and Teaching," by Francis C. Wade, S.J.; and "The Role of Philosophy in Christian Education," by John A. Riedl. The papers are not directed toward philosophers (except to provide an example of one kind of work that philosophers should be doing) but rather to students of education and allied subjects, and for these the most valuable will be those on Dewey and St. Thomas.

UTIER, JEAN. A Priest and His Dog. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1957. $3.00.

ACH, PETER. Mental Acts. Their Content and Their Objects. New York: Humanities Press, 1957. Pp. x + 136. $2.50.

This work, along with that of Hamlyn (see below), is one of the first of a new series, called "Studies in Philosophical Psychology." The aim is to examine the concepts used in scientific psychology (and in Geach's work, also philosophical psychology).

Geach first argues that it is perfectly legitimate, and even incontrovertible, to talk about the occurrence of mental acts. He next examines a theory of the origin of concepts by "abstraction" (a process he describes as finding similarities between Humean sensations and then attending only to the similarities); he rejects this theory altogether. He shows that "abstractionism" cannot account for logical concepts, for number or relation, and not even for simple sensory concepts. He next examines Russell's theory of judgment and rejects the postulated logical entities. Geach holds that the intellectual

part of a judgment is always expressible in general terms and that judgments about particulars involve a conversio ad phantasmata. rehabilitates oratio recta against some contemporary objections. then examines some notions of an inner language and inner sense, t find them defective; but he does admit that sensations can be descr In an appendix, the author explains that St. Thomas Aquinas did no hold a theory of abstraction such as is rejected in the book.

George Berkeley. Lectures delivered before the Philosophical Union o the University of California in honor of the 200th anniversary of death of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (1685-1753). Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1957. Pp. 211. Paper, $4.00.

GHYKA, MATILA. The Geometry of Art and Life. New York: Sheed and Wa 1957. Pp. xvii + 174. $4.50.

This book, first published in 1946, is a summary of the author's earlier more detailed studies. In the first five chapters, the author gives his theory of proportion of geometrical shapes on plane surfaces and in three-dimensional space. The sixth chapter analyze a number of living forms (fish, shells, flowers, the human body and face). The last three chapters discuss the number-myths, the Kabbala, masons' marks and builds, the Greek and Gothic canons of proportion and the application of related theories in painting and mus

GIERKE, OTTO. Natural Law and the Theory of Society. 1500-1800. Bos ton: Beacon Press; Sept., 1957. Paper, $2.75.

GIFFIN, MARY. Studies on Chaucer and His Audience. Hull, Quebec: Le clerc Printers, Ltd., 1957. $4.75.

GINSBERG, MORRIS. On the Diversity of Morals. New York: Macmillan Co 1957. Pp. 343. $4.00.

GREENBERG, JOSEPH H. Essays in Linguistics. Chicago: Univ. of Chicag Press, 1957. Pp. vii + 108. $3.00.

These essays, as the author points out, "fall quite naturally in three groups, the first two being concerned with the methodology of language description, the third and fourth with historical linguist and the remaining four with the relation between language and cultu (p. v). In the first group, the author tries to handle language as sign system, making use of set theory. This part of the book will of the most interest to logicians. The other two parts will be of more interest to psychologists and ethicians.

GREENE, THEODORE MEYER. Liberalism. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1957. Pp. 229. $4.50.

GREENWOOD, DAVID. Saint Augustine. Foreword by Cardinal Griffin. Ne York: Vantage Press, 1957. Pp. 155. $2.75.

_____. Truth and Meaning. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp xii + 114. $3.75.

This is a book of essays in logic, semantics, and epistemology. The first essay concerns the meaning of "truth" in a metalanguage. The second concerns the nature of "meaning" in a natural language, which the author considers some of the attempts of contemporary logicians to reduce meaning to some one simple function such as that of naming. In his discussion of the completeness of the sentential calculus and of mathematical definition, he takes issue with recent attempts to reduce mathematics to merely formal rules. Finally, he discusses the pragmatic definition of truth, refining Dewey's definition somewhat, but in the main upholding and defending it against recent objections, especially those of modern logicians.

GROTIUS, HUGO. Prolegomena to the Law of War and Peace. Trans. Franc W. Kelsey. New York: Liberal Arts Press; June, 1957. 50¢

YN, D. W. The Psychology of Perception. New York: Humanities Press, 957. Pp. vii + 120. $2.50.

The author conducts his investigation of theories of perception artly from the viewpoint known as philosophical analysis. That is, e distinguishes sharply between empirical and conceptual questions-- oo sharply, perhaps. But he does succeed in showing that Gestalt eory, in claiming to be a generalized theoretical explanation of nowledge as truthful as well as of the mechanisms of particular ex- eriences (such as illusions), does not explain anything but rather alls into a muddle. He then studies other and similar modes of in- estigation, those of the phenomenologists, of Michotte, and Gibson, nd of the functionalists, especially of the "transactionalists"; he inds that these derivative theories suffer from the same confusion.

ID, ROY FORBES. Foundations of Inductive Logic. New York: Harcourt, race & Co., 1957. Pp. 307. $7.00.

, KARL. Christian Faith and Natural Science. New York: Harper & ros.; May, 1957. $1.25.

ER, H. (ed.). The Neurohypophysis. New York: Academic Press, 1956. p. 290. $9.50.

IL, CHARLES W. (ed.). The Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern World. ew York: Liberal Arts Press; June, 1957. Pp. 128. $2.75.

Y, A. M., O.P. (ed.). Man and His Happiness. "Theology Library," ol. III. Chicago: Fides Pubns., 1957. Pp. xxxix + 420. $6.50.

This third volume of the series is again a collection of essays, nd in this case of somewhat uneven character. The preface by M. D. henu, O.P., and the introduction by J. Tonneau, O.P., contrast St. homas's view of morality with the modern view of obligation, natu- ally in favor of the former. But there are problems in the very asic view of moral acitivity which cannot be disposed of with hasty nd sweeping generalizations. The chapter on human acts by J. Dubois, .P., and the one on habits and virtues by A. L. Mennessier, O.P., re very well done and deserve close study. However, in the study of he voluntary act a great many problems are touched on (the facts of sychopathology and the theories of dynamic psychology, the problem f the divine motion of the will, theories of conscience) with insuf- icient development and hasty conclusions, for which the reasons are ot given by the author.

The translation of this volume is awkward and sometimes difficult o understand.

_____. Virtues and States of Life, The. "Theology Library," Vol. IV. hicago: Fides Pubns., 1957. Pp. xii + 778. $8.75.

This fourth volume of the "Theology Library" covers the ground of t. Thomas's Secunda Secundae. Of particular philosophical interest re the chapters dealing with the various moral virtues: prudence, by . Raulin, O.P.; justice, by A. Girard, J. Tonneau, and L. Lachance, .P.; religion, by A. I. Mennessier, O.P.; the social virtues, by M. . Gerlaud, O.P.; fortitude, by A. Gauthier, O.P.; temperance, by P. afêteur, O.P. In all of these chapters there can be found excellent iscussions of the nature of the virtue, its development, and the ike. But in most of them there is a tension between "natural" and supernatural" virtue, and the authors, in their capacity as theo- ogians, seem to apologize for using philosophy (though they often se it excellently). These localized difficulties point to an un- clved general problem which cannot be exorcised by lauding the uni- ary view of St. Thomas.

The translation of this volume is good.

HENRY, CARL F. H. Christian Personal Ethics. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1957. $6.95.

HICK, JOHN. Faith and Knowledge: A Modern Introduction to the Proble of Religious Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 2 $3.50.

HILDEBRAND, DIETRICH VON, and JOURDAIN, ALICE M. Graven Images. New York: David McKay Co., 1957. Pp. 211. $3.50.

History of the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 316. $4.50.

HODGSON, LEONARD, D.D. For Faith and Freedom. New York: Chas. Scrib ner's Sons, 1957. Pp. 248. $4.00.

HOSTIE, RAYMOND, S.J. Religion and the Psychology of Jung. Trans. G R. Lamb. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1957. Pp. vi + 249. $3.50.

Though this seems to be a theological work--and is, from the vi point of the author's goal--it is a work of great philosophical si ficance. It is important, first, because it provides a concrete i stance of an intelligent and profound philosophy of science; and secondly, because the transposition to "philosophical psychology a the psychology of Jung" is almost made by the author himself.

The first part of the book is a systematic presentation of Jung psychology, made necessary, as the author says, because there exis no such presentation by Jung himself. This presentation is charac terized by sympathy, sobriety, and objectivity. The analysis of t significance of the results is equally sober and valuable not only the theologian or philosopher but also to directors of souls.

HUME, DAVID. Natural History of Religion. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press; Aug., 1957. $1.75.

HUTTEN, ERNEST H. The Language of Modern Physics. New York: Macmill Co., 1956. Pp. 278. $3.75.

JASPERS, KARL. Man in the Modern Age. Trans. from the German by Ede and Cedar Paul. Rev. ed. Garden City: Doubleday, 1957. Pp. 238. Paper, 95¢

JEFFREYS, SIR HAROLD. Scientific Inference. 2nd ed. New York: Cam- bridge Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 244. $4.75.

JOACHIM, HAROLD HENRY. Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Min Ed. Errol E. Harris. Foreword by Sir David Ross. New York: Macmi lan Co., 1957. Pp. 122. $2.50.

KANT, IMMANUEL. Perpetual Peace. Trans. with introd. by Lewis White Beck. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. xviii + 59. Paper 50¢

The translation presented here is a revision of the one made ea by the same editor; it is of the complete text. In his introducti the editor analyzes the argument of Kant in a simple and straight- forward manner. He then gives a very brief sketch of Kant's life a short, well selected bibliography. The translation is excellent The edition is well printed and convenient to use as well as easy buy.

KAUFMANN, FELIX. Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York: Huma ties Press; June, 1957. $5.00.

KAUFMANN, FRITZ. Thomas Mann. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. Pp. 336. $6.00.

KELSEN, HANS. What Is Justice? Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1957. Pp. 397. $7.50.

KOHN, JACOB. The Moral Life of Man. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1956. Pp. 262. $3.75.

KONVITZ, MILTON R. Fundamental Liberties of a Free People: Religion, Speech, Press, Assembly. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press; Aug., 1957

KEN, DON L. Ethics in Police Service. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1957. Pp. 72. $3.00.

NER, STEPHAN. Conceptual Thinking. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1955. Pp. viii + 301. $5.50.

This is a logical inquiry into concepts, the relation between concepts and their "bases," or what the concepts are about, and finally, in the relation between concepts, bases and thinkers. In the first part, the author makes an extensive study of "ostensive" concepts (those whose content is ultimately indicated by pointing) and various other concepts which are derived in various ways from ostensive concepts. In the second part, the discussion concerns the difference between description and interpretation, the meaning of existential statements, and the various definitions of truth. In the third part, the author takes up various uses of concepts and propositions, especially in ethics and metaphysics. In general, the book is a worthwhile study of the aspects of logic that it treats.

, ALEXANDRE. From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957. Pp. 332. $5.00.

N, THOMAS S. Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; June, 1957. $5.50.

JITE, PAUL. The Person in Psychology: Reality or Abstraction. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 243. $6.00.

STNER, M. L. W. Intellectual Heritage of the Early Middle Ages. Ed. Chester G. Starr. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press; June, 1957. $5.00.

GER, SUSANNE K. Philosophy in a New Key. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 333. $4.75.

_____. Problems of Art. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957. Pp. vii + 184. $3.50.

This book is a collection of ten addresses and an essay reprinted as an appendix. Together they make up an informal and concrete presentation of the author's basic ideas about art: image, expression, form, truth, reality, apparition, and artistic creation. There is in addition the advantage that these essays embody the later improvements of terminology and some refinement of examples.

SLEIT, PETER. Philosophy, Politics and Society. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. $3.00.

, F. A. The Tragic Philosopher. A Study of Friedrich Nietzsche. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 354. $6.00.

This study of Nietzsche is not a biography but a study of the development of his thought integrated with the most important biographical facts. According to the author, this thought had three main movements: romanticism, the conquest of nihilism, and the transvaluation of all values. Each of these movements is treated as comprising four stages, and throughout the modernity of the ideas is stressed. Copious quotations are given, though very often they are brief.

The author intends to give an exposition with criticism kept to the minimum. But there is a great deal of implicit evaluation, most of which is favorable.

TEVER, ERNEST. Ethics and United States Foreign Policy. New York: Meridian Books; Sept., 1957. $1.25.

T, GORDON. Bradwardine and the Pelagians. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. xi + 282. $6.00.

This is Volume V of the "Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought." It is a study of Bradwardine's De Causa Dei and of the opponents probably envisaged in that work. The author contends that Bradwardine was a pure theologian, in that he denied the relevance of

philosophy in dealing with any problems about God and that he was
extremist in holding the subordination of the creature to God in b
being and action, especially in the questions of freedom, grace, a
the knowledge of future contingents. The "Pelagians" are Durandus,
Ockham, Pierre Aureole, Robert Holcot, Thomas Buckingham, and Adam
Woodham.

Though many unpublished or rare works are cited and quoted, and
though the interpretation is stimulating at certain points, there a
also some elements which cause dissatisfaction. The author's inter
pretation of Ockham resembles that of Baudry and Harris (who is not
cited), though he is aware of works that place Ockham in a more mod
ate position. His grounds for saying that Bradwardine denies (or a
least minimizes to a dangerous degree) the distinct reality of crea
tures are not altogether convincing. The author's notion of Thomis
is somewhat rigid and rationalistic.

LEIBNIZ, GOTTFRIED WILHELM VON, and CLARKE, SAMUEL. The Leibniz-Clark Correspondence. Ed. H. G. Alexander. New York: Philosophical Lib. 1957. Pp. 256. $4.75.

LEONARD, HENRY S. An Introduction to Principles of Right Reason. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1957. Pp. 640. $5.50.

LEVI, ALBERT WILLIAM. Varieties of Experience. An Introduction to Ph losophy. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1957. Pp. ix + 525. $5.75.

The author understands philosophy to be reflection upon experien He so understands this definition as not to prejudice his choice of what he will call philosophy but so as to denote the writings of th men most thinkers would agree to call philosophers. Secondly, he takes experience in a pluralistic sense; he does not think that ex- perience is all of one kind or piece; hence he speaks by preference of varieties of experience and considers the broad classes of that experience to be the experience of nature, of the human, and of the divine. Thirdly, he considers the function of an introduction to b to introduce; that is, acquaint the student with the major areas of philosophical thinking. He considers that a generous sampling of i portant texts from great thinkers is the best way to do this; his c introductions are a model of modesty and open-mindedness.

With all this one could hardly quarrel, and the over-all functic of an introduction is certainly well conceived. But an Aristotelia is astounded to find nothing that he could recognize as belonging t what Aristotle called "first philosophy," except what appears in th guise of "philosophy of religion." The philosophy of human nature pears mainly as the body-mind problem. Philosophical demonstration does not appear in the readings devoted to the theory of knowledge. So what appears to be an excellently conceived volume has its defi- nite limitations.

LEWIS, CECIL DAY. The Poet's Way of Knowledge. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 32. $1.00.

LEWIS, WYNDHAM. Time and Western Man. Boston: Beacon Press; Sept., 1957. Paper, $1.95.

LOEHRICH, ROLF R. Modus Operandi. McHenry, Ill.: The Compass Press, 1957.

LOEWENSTEIN, KARL. Political Power and the Governmental Process. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Oct., 1957. Pp. 442. $6.00.

LONERGAN, BERNARD J. F., S.J. Insight. A Study of Human Understandi New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. xv + 785. $10.00.

"Insight" is understood by the author to be the most basic act o human understanding and to be most clearly exemplified in mathemati and empirical science. Though he disclaims mastery of these fields

he moves with sufficient ease to make the book difficult reading; yet the effort is rewarding. The author moves through a series of discussions of mathematics and science to common sense, all of which are kinds of insight. In the second part, the author considers insight as knowledge. From the general structure of insight there emerges the notion of being as well as the method, nature, and content of metaphysics. This is followed by a brilliant chapter on ethics and two chapters on what might be called natural theology.

Since the order of presentation in this book is admittedly pedagogical, a reader may be tempted to ask whether the conception of metaphysics really emerges from a study of insight as organizing intelligence or whether such a view of understanding is a consequence of metaphysics conceived as a study of the conditions of knowing in general.

ASIEWICZ, JAN. Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 222. $4.80.

EIJ, J. L. J. The Methods of Psychology and Psychiatry. New York: Gregory Lounz, 1957. Pp. 243. $6.00.

E, CECIL ALEX (ed.). British Philosophy in the Midcentury. A Cambridge symposium. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. 396. $5.25.

DI, MUHSIN. Ibn Khaldûn's Philosophy of History. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. 325. $5.00.

ITAIN, JACQUES. On the Philosophy of History. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; Oct., 1957. Pp. 192. $3.75.

_____. St. Thomas Aquinas. New rev. ed. New York: Meridian Books; Sept., 1957. $1.35.

_____. Truth and Human Fellowship. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 32.

SCIA, CARMIN, and EDWARDS, THOMAS. A History of Philosophy. Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press. Pp. 518. $5.00.

YER, FREDERICK. Philosophy and the Good Life. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press; Aug., 1957. $3.25.

uley Lectures, 1956. West Hartford, Conn.: St. Joseph College, 1956. Pp. 192. Paper, $1.00.

The 1956 lectures are sub-titled "Advances in Science through Culture." The first lecture, "Science for What?" by H. Austin Taylor, is a discussion of the place of science in our culture, of the best method of teaching science, and of the importance of a philosophy of science. All teachers of science and all interested in the philosophy of science can profit from reading this paper. The remaining papers are on specialized topics (biological adaptation and polar research) that are very interesting but not philosophically significant.

ISEL, JAMES H. The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the Elite. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Jan., 1958. Pp. 438. $7.50.

RILL, R. Platonism and French Renaissance Poetry. New York: New York Univ. Press, 1957. $4.50.

YER, AGNES E. Education for a New Morality. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. 91. $2.50.

MANOVICH, CLEMENT S., McNAMARA, ROBERT J., S.J., and TOME, WILLIAM N., S.J. Glossary of Sociological Terms. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1957. Pp. iv + 36. Paper, 85¢

This is an attempt to furnish clear-cut, acceptable terms for the concepts used in sociology and especially of some of the philosophical terms presupposed for discussions of sociological theory. A great deal of work has gone into the preparation of this book. Un-

fortunately, the basic framework of arrangement of concepts and the way in which the definitions were settled on are not indicated; and so the usefulness of this project is considerably restricted.

MILL, JOHN STUART. Theism. Ed. with an introd. by Richard Taylor. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. xx + 98. Paper, 75¢

This edition is reprinted from Mill's Three Essays on Religion and includes in addition, as an appendix, a chapter, "The Moral Attributes of God," taken from the third edition of An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. The introduction by the editor shows what Mill was trying to do in this essay; namely, to consider the bases of a natural theology. In addition, Mill rejected miracles and all claims made for revelation, the former on grounds similar to those of Hume, the latter on the ground of the incomprehensibility admitted by Christian theologians. The editor goes on to assert that the Thomistic doctrine of analogy is a theory that holds that any expression applied to God does not have "any meaning which the human intellect can really comprehend, and this view, in some version or other, is at least implicit in the thought of most orthodox theologians since then" (p. xvi).

MINKIN, JACOB S. World of Moses Maimonides. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, Sept., 1957. $6.00.

MORA, JOSE FERRATER. Ortega y Gasset. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 69. $2.50.

MOULYN, ADRIAN C. Structure, Function and Purpose. Foreword by Yervant H. Krikorian. New York: Liberal Arts Press; June, 1957. Pp. 250. $4.00.

MOUNIER, EMMANUEL. The Character of Man. Trans. by Cynthia Rowland. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. x + 341. $6.00.

This study of human character in the line of phenomenological psychology has been abridged by the translator. The principles of the abridgment have been accepted by Mounier's literary executors. The chapters on physiological psychology have been omitted as being readily available elsewhere; the number of case studies has been reduced, passages bearing on French art, literature, and culture have been omitted; and detailed treatment of Heymans's typology has likewise been dropped. All omissions have been indicated in the text, and the content of the omitted passages indicated in a footnote. The translation is smooth and readily intelligible; the notes have been kept, though sometimes they have been abridged.

Phenomenological psychology is well described by the author (pp. 1-8), and he indicates its relations to laboratory psychology on the one hand and to "metapsychology" on the other. The work has a number of profound insights on man, especially in the area of moral and religious development. (The difference between Mounier's descriptions of situational ethics is not clearly marked.)

MUNITZ, MILTON K. Moral Philosophy of Santayana. New York: Humanities Press; July, 1957. $3.50.

_____. Space, Time and Creation. Glencoe: Free Press and Falcon's Wing Press, 1957. Pp. 192. $3.75.

_____ (ed.). Theories of the Universe. Glencoe: Free Press and Falcon's Wing Press, 1957. Pp. 447. $6.50.

NAGEL, ERNEST. Logic without Metaphysics, and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Glencoe: Free Press, 1956. Pp. 451. $6.00.

NELSON, BENJAMIN (ed.). Freud and the Twentieth Century. New York: Meridian Books, 1957. Pp. 314. Paper, $1.45.

This collection of essays and papers was especially gathered for the centenary of Freud's birth and consists partly of original papers

written for this volume, partly of excerpts and articles previously published. The sixteen contributors are psychiatrists, scientists, philosophers, and theologians in their own right; and their views on Freud range from almost complete acceptance to free criticism. The essays are grouped into six parts: contemporary perspectives on Freud; Freud and his times; the sciences of mind and medicine; society and politics; literature and the arts; philosophy and religion. There are ten pages of selected references, usefully classified for the general reader as well as for the specialist.

ON, WILLIAM T., S.J. Joyce and Aquinas. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. xii + 167. $3.75.

This study of Joyce's aesthetic theory asks two questions: What is the extent of the influence St. Thomas had upon this theory in the various stages of its development (seeing that Joyce claims to be following St. Thomas in many points)? and, secondly, How accurate is Joyce's understanding of his alleged source? In the course of this careful and detailed investigation, the author raises some very penetrating observations about the meaning of often-quoted Thomistic texts and makes some sharp criticisms of commentators' methods in developing a theory of art from Thomistic sources. The book deserves careful study both by literary theoreticians and by philosophers interested in aesthetics and the metaphysics of beauty.

ES, WHITNEY JENNINGS. The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers. New York: Modern Lib., 1957. Pp. 653. $2.95.

HAM, WILLIAM. Philosophical Writings. Ed. and trans. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1957. Pp. lix + 147 + 154.

This book comprises an introduction, a short bibliography, a selection of representative texts with translation on facing pages, and an index. The introduction contains a brief biographical note and an exposition of the philosophy of Ockham. The late Father Boehner was an authority on this philosophy, though it is also well known that his interpretation was more "realist" than that of other authorities. The selections are grouped according to the following headings: the notion of science, epistemological problems, logical problems, supposition, truth, inference, being, essence and existence, the possibility of a natural theology, the proof of God's existence, God's causality and foreknowledge, and physics and ethics. The translation is adequate and clear. The index is brief, but this is perhaps because only a small number of points are taken up in the selections.

CONNOR, D. J. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. vii + 148. $3.75.

First published in Great Britain, this little book presents the views of an analytic philosopher. Most of the book is an explanation and exemplification of analysis, and it should serve well as a brief, nontechnical introduction to this mode of philosophizing. In its application to the more specific area of the "philosophy of education," the author indicates that the study of philosophy as he understands it can only help the student of educational theory and practice to realize that some of his basic terms (like "value," "ends," "purposes") are necessarily ambiguous and that "religion" is not "factual" or even "true." In regard to this last point, the author seems to belong to the more left-wing party of analytical philosophers.

STERLE, JOHN A. Ethics: The Introduction to Moral Science. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1957. $4.00.

This introductory textbook in "general ethics" generally follows the order of Aristotle's Ethics. After an introductory chapter on the

science and method of ethics, the author discusses the ultimate end happiness, virtue in general, the voluntary and the free act, and t goodness or evil of actions. Then he takes up the virtues in parti lar: fortitude and temperance, justice and its related virtues, and the intellectual virtues. After this come chapters on law, contine and incontinence, friendship, and the end of human life.

The author argues that ethics as a science of natural reason is possible, useful, and necessary, though not all-sufficient. His ex positions are clear and concise, his illustrations interesting, his procedure pedagogically sound. Each chapter contains suggestions f further study.

OSBORN, E. F. The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria. New York: Cam bridge Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 216. $5.50.

OWENS, JOSEPH, C.SS.R. St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics. "Th Aquinas Lecture," 1957. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1957. P 97. $2.00.

The author examines the meaning of "metaphysics" and considers w general reasons might be given for pursuing such a study. Then he asks how and in what sense Thomistic metaphysics satisfies the re- quirements. He concludes by considering the tasks still open befor the student of metaphysics: purifying the tradition; bringing out a presenting in rigorous scientific form the principles and procedure which in St. Thomas are sometimes implicit, sometimes mentioned onl obliquely and in passing; and, finally, illuminating the relations which metaphysics bears to the problems of the special sciences.

The lecture is required reading for all metaphysicians and stude of St. Thomas and can be read with profit even by undergraduates.

PEARS, D. F. (ed.). The Nature of Metaphysics. New York: St. Martin' Press, 1957. Pp. 169. $2.50.

PEGIS, ANTON C. (ed.). Gilson Reader. New York: Doubleday; Sept., 19 $3.00.

PEIRCE, CHARLES S. Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Ed. with an trod. by Vincent Tomas. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. x + 271. Paper, $1.00.

This collection of fourteen essays and papers has its unity in i subject-matter; that is, in all of them Peirce is discussing partic lar problems of the "logic of science." It includes discussions of belief, clear ideas, chance, induction, deduction, necessity, the history of science, and the nature of mathematics.

The introduction gives some general ideas of Peirce's, then devo most of its attention to belief and the problems concerning inducti There is a selected bibliography. The edition is well built and sturdily bound.

PIEPER, JOSEF. The Silence of St. Thomas. Trans. John Murray, S.J., Daniel O'Connor. New York: Pantheon Books, 1957. Pp. 122. $2.75.

That Dr. Pieper is a profound student of St. Thomas is admitted all; and when he chooses to show us that St. Thomas was aware of my tery and of the limitations of the human mind in the face of being, he has a theme apparently close to his own outlook. The "negative element" in the philosophy of St. Thomas is an important one, not o when he asserts that our knowledge of God is thus limited but also his distinctions concerning our knowledge of creatures themselves.

But there are a number of obscurities in Pieper's exposition, es pecially in his reasoning about the relation between faith and reas

PIRONE, FRANK J. Science and the Love of God. New York: Philosophica Lib., 1957. Pp. xi + 233. $4.25.

This book is an attempt to explain the meaning and purpose of hu

Life, and to defend Thomistic philosophy and religion. The author is a practicing psychiatrist and writes as a devoutly religious person. But, lacking a theory of knowledge, he bridges science and metaphysics with a "metascience" that seems fanciful and makes the metaphysics seem more imaginative still. This is not to criticize his purpose but his achievement.

[TO]. Plato and the Christians. Trans. with an introd. by Adam Fox. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 205. $6.00.

This book consists of a hundred and forty passages translated specially for this edition by the editor. At the head of each passage he has put some Christian sentence or phrase, usually from the Bible. The passages are arranged according to four heads: God and creation, man and his destiny, morality, and religion. The introduction (pp. 11-26) is a simple and properly cautious explanation of the purpose of this volume and some simple background notions about Plato, directed to students who have no formal training in ancient philosophy.

_____. Statesman. Trans. J. B. Skemp. Ed. Martin Ostwald. New York: Liberal Arts Press; July, 1957. Paper, 75¢

TINUS. The Enneads. Trans. from the Greek by Stephen MacKenna. 2nd ed. Rev. by B. S. Page. Foreword by E. R. Dodds. Introd. by Paul Henry. New York: Pantheon Books, 1957. Pp. 686. $12.50.

PER, KARL R. The Poverty of Historicism. Boston: Beacon Press; Nov., 1957. $4.00.

gress in Philosophical Studies in Honor of Rev. Doctor Charles A. Hart. ed. James A. McWilliams, S.J. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1955. Pp. 216. $5.00.

The American Catholic Philosophical Association published this collection of essays to honor Father Hart for his twenty-five years of service as secretary of the Association. Part I contains an appreciation of the work of Father Hart and an essay on the work of the Association by the editor. Part II contains articles on metaphysics by Jacques Maritain, Elizabeth G. Salmon, W. Norris Clarke, S.J., and Francis X. Meehan. Part III contains articles on the philosophy of nature by Vincent Edward Smith, Leo A. Foley, S.M., Ignatius Brady, O.F.M., and Anton C. Pegis. Part IV contains articles on ethics by Gerald B. Phelan and Ignatius Smith, O.P. Because these essays represent important topics and touch on the work of contemporary American Thomists, the volume should be in every library that wishes to offer materials on American Thomism.

HAKRISHNAN, SIR SARVEPALLI, and MOORE, CHARLES ALEXANDER (eds.). A Source Book in Indian Philosophy. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press. Pp. 712. $5.00.

DALL, JOHN HERMAN, JR. Nature and Historical Experience. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Dec., 1957. Pp. 352. $5.50.

D, JOHN COWIE. The Mind and Art of Coventry Patmore. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. 366. $7.00.

MARD OF SAINT-VICTOR. Selected Writings on Contemplation. Trans. from the Latin with an introd. and notes by Clare Kirchberger. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 269. $3.75.

BERTS, DAVID EVERETT. Existentialism and Religious Belief. Ed. Roger Hazelton. New York, Oxford Univ. Press. Pp. 352. $2.00.

ES, DAGOBERT D. A Book of Contemplation. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 149. $3.00.

This book is a collection of aphorisms, or epigrams, about philosophical, ethical, and religious topics. Often the author's words are stimulating and thought-provoking; sometimes his language shows the enriching influence of the Old Testament and of Spinoza. At other

times the remarks are banal; sometimes prejudice (against Christian
ity, for example) is palpable.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND. Mysticism and Logic. Garden City: Doubleday, 1957
Pp. 232. Paper, 95¢

SANTAYANA, GEORGE. Winds of Doctrine and Platonism and the Spiritual
Life. New York: Harper & Bros.; Sept., 1957. $1.45.

SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL. Existentialism and Human Emotions. Trans. from th
French. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 96. Paper, 95¢

SCHNÜRER, GUSTAV. Church and Culture in the Middle Ages. Vol. I, 350-
814. Trans. George J. Undreiner. Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guil
Press, 1956. Pp. xvi + 574. $7.50.

This is a general cultural history of the West, stressing in par
ticular the influence of the Church in the formation and direction
civilization. The translation has been made from the third German
edition (1936) with some changes sanctioned by the author and with
supplementary references added by the translator. The translation
good, and so the work will be valuable for anyone who wishes to gra
the general cultural background of any medieval thinker.

SELSAM, HOWARD. Philosophy in Revolution. New York: International Pu
lishers, 1957. Pp. 160. $3.00.

SIMON, HERBERT ALEXANDER. Models of Man. New York: John Wiley & Sons
1957. Pp. 301. $5.00.

SINGER, IRVING. Santayana's Aesthetics: A Critical Introduction. Cam
bridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Sept., 1957.

SLATER, NOEL B. The Development and Meaning of Eddington's Fundamenta
Theory. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 309. $7.50.

SMITH, T. V., and GRENE, MARJORIE. Philosophers Speak for Themselves:
Berkley, Hume, and Kant. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; May, 195
$1.75.

_____. Philosophers Speak for Themselves: From Descartes to Locke.
Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; May, 1957. $1.75.

SMITH, VINCENT EDWARD. The Elements of Logic. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub.
Co., 1957. Pp. xii + 298. $3.50.

This introductory textbook makes its subject concrete and intere
ing to the student by presenting its principles and laws concretely
the words of great authors, and then explaining and showing their r
vancy. The order of treatment is the following: the first act of t
mind (the concept and its properties, definition); the second act (
proposition and its relations); the third act (the syllogism, espec
ly the categorial and hypothetical); the kinds of argument (demonst
tive, dialectical, literary, historical, with a chapter on the divi
sion and order of the sciences); special questions (experimental me
od, theory, analogy, induction, statistics, truth functions); and t
fallacies.

In addition to the case histories, the author also makes much us
of examples from science and other contemporary writing to illustra
and give further examples. Each chapter also presents a number of
problems for the student, including again some from classical autho
in all fields.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM. Social and Cultural Dynamics. Boston: Porter Sarge
1957. Pp. 736. $7.50.

SPINOZA, BARUCH. The Road to Inner Freedom. The Ethics. Ed. with in
trod. by Dagobert D. Runes. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957.
215. $3.00.

This work is a selection (the exact passages given are listed on
pages 213-15) from the Ethics, in the translation of R. H. M. Elwes
in which the present editor has made some changes. In his introduc

tion (pp. 9-18), the editor gives a very brief account of Spinoza's life and an account of Spinoza's doctrine. In general, the editor is concerned to show that this doctrine is Jewish in inspiration, though it is said to retain the essentials of that spirit and not the accidental accretions of commandments, ritual, and interpretation. The editor also claims that Spinoza was principally concerned with freedom and that his devotion to his philosophy was a consequence of that concern.

NOZA, BENEDICT DE. On the Improvement of the Understanding. Trans. Joseph Katz. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Sept., 1957. Paper, 50¢

NLIS, PETER. Edmund Burke and the Natural Law. Preface by Russell Kirk. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Jan., 1958. Pp. 240. $3.75.

NTON, STEPHEN BERRIEN. The Essential Life. Rindge, N.H.: Richard R. Smith, 1956. Pp. 249. $2.50.

RE, DOUGLAS V. Work and Contemplation. New York: Harper & Bros.; June, 1957. $2.50.

DT, JOHN JOSEPH. Sunrise to Eternity: A Study in Jacob Boehme's Life and Thought. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press; June, 1957. $5.00.

LMAN, DANIEL J. An Introduction to Philosophy. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1957. Pp. xiii + 288. $3.75.

This book is conceived to be both a text for a course in the introduction to philosophy and as an introduction or summary for a general reader. It is viewed as introductory in much the same way as survey courses in history or the sciences are considered introductory.

After a preliminary chapter on the meaning of the word "philosophy," the author gives a history of Greek philosophy to Aristotle in six chapters (pp. 9-54). Then come nine chapters on man's nature, six chapters on ethics, two on cosmology, four on metaphysics and natural theology. The conclusion expounds the notion of the distinction between philosophy and science, and between philosophy and faith, the notion of Christian philosophy, and of perennial philosophy. The author thinks that this method of introducing the student to philosophy will arouse interest and wonder (p. viii).

PPES, PATRICK. Introduction to Logic. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co.; May, 1957. $6.00.

SZ, THOMAS S. Pain and Pleasure: A Study of Bodily Feelings. New York: Basic Books Pub. Co.; July, 1957. $5.50.

LOR, RICHARD W. (ed.). Life, Language, Law. Yellow Springs: Antioch Press, 1957. Pp. 235. $4.50.

LLY, FRANK, and WOOD, LEDGER. A History of Philosophy. 3d ed. New York: Henry Holt & Co., Mar., 1957. Pp. 704 (approx.).

OMAS AQUINAS, ST. De Ente et Essentia. Arranged in sense-lines by Andrew M. Bachhuber, S.J. Saint Louis: THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, 1957. Pp. iv + 31. Mimeographed. Paper, single copies, $1.00; five or more copies, 80¢ each.

OMAS, J. HEYWOOD. Subjectivity and Paradox. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. 182. $3.75.

omist Reader: Texts and Studies, 1957. Washington, D.C.: Thomist Press, 1957. Pp. 239. Paper, $2.50.

This is the first number of an annual publication published by the Thomist Press. The purpose of this publication is to print some texts and studies which, because of their length, or character, or informality, could not be published in the regular numbers of the Thomist.

This first number contains four theological articles and one philosophical study, "Some Demonstrations in the Science of Nature," by

William A. Wallace, O.P. (pp. 90-118). Father Wallace maintains t present-day manuals in cosmology and psychology have lost the Aris telian demonstrations and that without the Aristotelian notion of ence the breach between science and philosophy cannot be healed. Hence, he sets down briefly the Aristotelian theory of demonstrati then gives a number of demonstrations (75 in all), ranging from the fundamental science of nature to the special sciences of local mot alteration, chemistry, biology, and psychology. To one who thinks that it is good to achieve such unity this effort will most likely pleasing. To one who reads history to say that the distinction of sciences was at the least a condition of their growth, such demonst tions as the one that concludes that gravitational motion is "natur (p. 104), that there is "natural place" (ibid.), that the atoms hav distinctive weights, and so on, seem to reinforce the lesson of his ry.

THOMPSON, JAMES WESTFALL. The Medieval Library. Reprinted with a sup by Blanche B. Boyer. New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1957. Pp. 710. $12.50.

THORNDIKE, LYNN. History of Magic and Experimental Science. Vols. 7 8, The Seventeenth Century. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Sept., 1957. Each, $10.00.

THUT, I. N. The Story of Education. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957. Pp 420. $5.95.

TRUEBLOOD, DAVID ELTON. Philosophy of Religion. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 339. $5.00.

UNDERWOOD, BENTON J. Psychological Research. New York: Appleton-Cent Crofts, 1957. Pp. 305. $4.00.

VANDERVELDT, JAMES H., O.F.M., and ODENWALD, ROBERT P. Psychiatry and Catholicism. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill; Sept., 1957. $6.00.

VINCENT, CLARK E. (ed.). Readings in Marriage Counseling. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1957. Pp. xii + 500. $4.50.

This collection of fifty-two articles is divided into the follo areas: marriage counseling as a profession; premarital counseling; definitions, methods, and principles; counseling with individuals, couples, and groups; theories of personality structure and change; research; questions about the profession. Perhaps the most import point made by the editor and many of the contributors is that marr counseling is an interdisciplinary profession and not the exclusiv province of some one discipline, theory, or type of training.

Most of the papers are sound and able presentations, though--as almost inevitable in so broad a field--some are rather notably def cient. This is particularly the case because of the hostility dis played by several of the contributors to moral codes and religious positions. There is some obsession with sex (though other papers that interpersonal relationships are more basic); and a number of papers employ only the older Freudian theory and vocabulary, negle ing more recent psychology. Yet a discerning counselor or student can gain much from this book, provided he has the basis for making independent judgment.

VON GRUENINGEN, JOHN PAUL (ed.). Toward a Christian Philosophy of Hi Education. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957. Pp. 191. $3.5

VON WRIGHT, G. H. The Logical Problem of Induction. 2d ed. New Yor Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. xii + 249. $4.00.

This book, the first edition of which was first published in 19 is recognized as one of the classical treatments of induction. Th present edition has been corrected throughout, and bibliographies references have been brought up to date. In addition, a number of

sections (each running several pages) have been rewritten; and the whole of Chapter VI, "The Formal Analysis of Inductive Probability," is new.

NER, SAMUEL J. The Urge to Mass Destruction. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1957. Pp. xii + 188. $3.50.

The title of this book indicates what the author, a practicing clinical psychologist, considers to be a serious and present threat to civilization. He studies the nature of this tendency in three areas of evidence: the literary treatment of Satan through the ages, case studies of "defeating" patients, and an analysis of the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. His argument is a complicated one. Men have two ways of protecting security, through love and co-operation ("mutualism") or through power; if love is frustrated, a person sometimes merely retreats, but sometimes goes through a crisis that leads to mental illness and emerges with a hatred, desire for revenge, and what the author calls "self-and-other defeat"; Nietzsche went through experiences of frustration, mental illness, and a complete hatred of life, expressed in his philosophy.

This is not the first time that Nietzsche has been declared to have been insane, but the author does not make the simple mistake of thinking that such a judgment makes it unnecessary to pay any attention to him. He seems at times to consider that the genetic account (supposing it to be true and adequate) sufficiently explains the philosophy, and for the rest we need only to protect others against a similar fall. Nor is it adequate to show that love is good on the ground that it is a successful adaptation.

TINDER, HOWARD. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 246. $6.75.

.SS, PAUL. Modes of Being. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press; Oct., 1957. Pp. 750.

KOEHLER, W. H. An Introduction to Critical Thinking. Lincoln, Nebr.: Johnsen Pub. Co., 1957. Pp. 688. $5.50.

ITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH. Science and Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1948. Pp. 316. Paper, $1.65.

LEY, BASIL. More Nineteenth Century Studies. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Dec., 1956. Pp. 304. $4.00.

WIMSATT, WILLIAM K., JR., and BROOKS, CLEANTH. Literary Criticism: A Short History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1957. Pp. xviii + 755 + xxii.

Though literary criticism is not necessarily philosophy or directly philosophical, it cannot be simply dissociated from philosophy. The authors have maintained both the distinction and the relation of these two fields.

As the authors themselves put it, this is an "argumentative" history. It is filled with scholarly detail, yet the details are never trivial or meaningless. There is at the same time a brilliant exposition of major trends, movements, and ideas, ranging from the scattered remarks of Homer to works published in the 1950's. And by way of comment and critical evaluation, it is itself a major work of the theory of literary criticism.

TTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Ed. G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe; tran. G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan Co., 1956. Pp. xix + xix^e + 204 + 196^e. $5.75.

This volume contains the posthumously published German original text with the translation on facing pages. The introduction and table of contents are also given in both English and German; the index is in

English alone. The material has been gathered from five different manuscript sources, and this accounts for the distribution into five parts. This brings about some repetition; but the editors did not wish to make any radical rearrangements or to put the work in the form of a logical arrangement of their own devising. The word "remarks" in the title indicates the scattered and fragmentary charact of the work.

In general, the translation is good. But, considering the natur of the work, there seem to be definite advantages in having the ori inal German text alongside.

WOOD, H. G. Thought, Life and Time as Reflected in Science and Poetry New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 57. Paper, 90¢

WUELLNER, BERNARD, S.J. Summary of Scholastic Principles. Chicago: Loyola Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. viii + 164. $2.00.

This work is intended as a supplement to ordinary textbooks. It purpose is to state the principles in an exact form and thus to mak both examination and learning of the principle easier. The principles (some 569 of them) are arranged according to groups (for instance, the first set concerns act and potency) arranged alphabetic ly. There are references for each group and exercises for their application. In addition, there are four supplements—of the "Twenty-Four Thomistic Theses," of the principles on priority, a suggested list of basic principles, and of principles disputed among the Scholastics. This is followed by the answers to the exercises and an i dex.

YOLTON, JOHN W. John Locke and the Way of Ideas. New York: Oxford Un Press, 1956. Pp. 235. $4.00.

ZIMMER, HEINRICH ROBERT. Philosophies of India. Ed. by Joseph Campbe New York: Meridian Books, 1956. Pp. 704. Paper, $1.95.

Entered as second-class matter December 1, 1923, at the post office
Saint Louis, Missouri, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for
iling at special rate of postage provided for in section 1103, Act of
tober 3, 1917, authorized on January 15, 1929.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

Supplement to The Modern Schoolman
XXXV (May, 1958)

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
2. *Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
3. *Books received by* The Modern Schoolman *will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

Acton, Harry Burrows. *The Illusion of the Epoch.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. Pp. 286. $6.00.

Adler, Mortimer J. *Dialectic of Morals.* New York: Frederick Ungar; Dec., 1957. $3.75.

Adler, Mortimer J., and Mayer, Milton. *The Revolution in Education.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Apr., 1958. Pp. 225. $3.75.

Albertus Magnus. *Libellus de Alchimia.* Trans. Sister Virginia Heines. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press; Dec., 1957. $3.50.

Alexander, Ian W. *Bergson.* "Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought." New York: Hillary House, 1958. Pp. 109. $2.00.
This a straightforward introductory exposition of Bergson. The author stresses Bergson's point of departure in the experience of self. He brings out clearly the Bergsonian identification of reality and activity, the nature of transcendence, the doctrine of meaning and the analysis of consciousness as intentional, and the importance of a theory of expression for these views. The author tries to bring out those aspects and ideas of Bergson which are still active in other philosophies, especially in existentialism. But there is no critical evaluation.

Angelet-Hustache, Jeanne. *Master Eckhart and the Rhineland Mystics.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 192. $1.35.

Angell, Robert Cooley. *Free Society and Moral Crisis.* Foreword by Reinhold Niebuhr. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Apr., 1958. Pp. 260. $6.00.

Anscombe, G. E. M. *Intention.* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 102. Paper, $1.50.

Anshen, Ruth Nanda (ed.). *Language: An Enquiry into Its Meaning and Function.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 384. $6.00.

© *The Modern Schoolman,* 1958

ANTON, JOHN PETER. *Aristotle's Theory of Contrariety.* New York: Humanities Press, 1957. Pp. xi + 253. $5.00.

This is the first comprehensive study of the theory of contraries. The author begins by setting the problem and examining pre-Aristotelian doctrines. He studies Aristotle's way of grounding contrariety in the doctrine of substance and shows how the theory works in metaphysics. He indicates that Aristotle found this theory in Greek cosmology and transformed it into an ontological doctrine. Then he looks at a series of uses of contrariety: in the metaphysics of process; in the analysis of language and the principle of noncontradiction; in psychology; in the analysis of knowledge, especially sensation and the categories; and, finally, in ethics.

The juxtaposing of all these various texts is very illuminating; and the author makes a number of important, highly original points, especially in the analysis of Aristotle's psychology, doctrine of sensation, and the empirical basis of the categories. At the same time—and particularly in the last instance—his suggestions are not completely satisfying.

ARENDT, HANNAH. *The Human Condition.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; May, 1958. Pp. 300. $4.75.

ARGYLE, MICHAEL. *The Scientific Study of Social Behaviour.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. viii + 239. $6.00.

This book is an attempt to show that social psychology is a distinct kind of science, and to show in what way it is a science. The book has two parts: the first is a discussion of the methodology of science and of social psychology in particular; the second tries to put down the certain generalizations and explanatory theories that have been established.

In his description of the nature of science, the author follows the lead of the philosophical analysts (even to the disparaging of "metaphysical" knowledge). By and large, it is clear and well-presented account. Exception might well be taken to his pushing methodological behaviorism as far as he does; and his strictures on the phenomenological approach show that he has, apparently on principle, failed to understand what the writers he quotes are trying to do. In his presentation of the place of theory in science, his case is somewhat weakened by his argument that theory affords some scientists a psychological satisfaction.

[ARISTOTLE.] *The Pocket Aristotle.* Selections from *Physics*, *On the Soul*, *Metaphysics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Politics* and *Poetics*. With notes and commentaries by Justin D. Kaplan. From the Oxford translation under the editorship of W. D. Ross. New York, Pocket Books. 50¢

ARISTOTLE. *Aristotle's Poetics.* Ed. Gerald F. Else. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Feb., 1958. $11.00.

———. *Aristotle's Politics and Poetics.* Trans. from the Greek by Benjamin Jowett and Thomas Twining. Introd. by Lincoln Diamant. New York: Viking Press, 1957. Pp. 279. Paper, $1.25.

———. *Metaphysica.* Ed. W. Jaeger. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 312. $4.00.

[AUGUSTINE, ST.] *Augustine Synthesis.* Ed. Erich Przywara, S.J. New York: Harper & Bros.; Apr., 1958. $1.95.

AUGUSTINE, ST. *City of God.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Feb., 1958. $1.45.

———. *Confessions of St. Augustine.* Trans. Edward B. Pusey, D.D. Introd. by Harold C. Gardiner, S.J. New York, Pocket Books. 35¢

———. *On the Two Cities.* Selections from the *City of God.* Ed. F. W. Strothmann. New York: Frederick Ungar; Nov., 1957. $2.25, paper, 95¢

———. *St. Augustine.* Ed. Martin C. D'Arcy, S.J. New York: Meridian Books, 1957. Pp. 367. Paper, $1.35.

Baier, Kurt. *Moral Point of View.* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press; Mar., 1958. $4.00.

Baldwin, James M. (ed.). *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.* Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1957. Vols. 1 and 2. Pp. 644, 892. $15.00 each.

Balint, Michael. *Problems of Human Pleasure and Behavior.* New York: Liveright, 1957. Pp. 300. $5.95.

Bark, William Carroll. *Origins of the Medieval World.* Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press; Jan., 1958. Pp. ix + 162. $3.75.

Barker, Ernest (ed.). *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium, from Justinian I to Last Palaeologus.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 239. $4.80.

Barker, S. F. *Induction and Hypothesis.* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 219. $2.75.

Barzun, Jacques. *Darwin, Marx, Wagner: Critique of a Heritage.* Garden City, Doubleday & Co. $1.25.

Beardslee, David C., and Wertheimer, Michael. *Readings in Perception.* Princeton: Van Nostrand Co.; Mar., 1958. $8.50.

Beckwith, Burnham P. *Religion, Philosophy, and Science. An Introduction to Logical Positivism.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 241. $3.75.

This introduction is written for persons who have had no training in philosophy, and so there may be some justification for its failure to attempt a rigorous presentation of the correctness of its world view. What the author calls "logical positivism" seems to be much more along the lines of anti-Aristotelian general semantics. He holds that religion, philosophy, and the theoretical parts of science are nonsense; along the way he takes side blows at art, literature, and aesthetics. He urges his readers to abandon all these pursuits and devote themselves to science.

The author holds that ethics also is nonsense but that this does not mean that honesty, truthfulness, and so on, should not be practiced. His reason is that these acts are more successful than their opposites.

Bereday, G. Z., and Lauwerys, J. A. *Education and Philosophy.* "The Year Book of Education," 1957. Yonkers: World Book Co., 1957. Pp. xii + 578. $8.50.

Berkeley, George. *Essay toward a New Theory of Vision and the Theory of Vision Vindicated.* Ed. Colin M. Turbayne. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Jan., 1958. 80¢

Berkson, Isaac Baer. *The Ideal and the Community: A Philosophy of Education.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 314. $4.50.

Berns, Walter. *Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ.; Oct., 1957. $4.00.

Birro, Cela. *The Ways of Enjoyment. A Dialogue Concerning Social Science.* New York: Exposition Press, 1957. Pp. 114. $3.00.

The publisher states that "Cela Birro is the pseudonym of an American savant who prefers to remain anonymous because of the unorthodox philosophical conclusions reached in his book." The personages of the dialogue are Bergson, Frazer, Freud, James, and Whitehead; the "argument" consists of interpreting the Freudian metapsychology by Whiteheadean categories and illustrating the

"conclusions" with sundry anecdotes from Frazer. This reader found "social science" only in the subtitle and considers that the conclusions are "philosophical" only in an equivocal sense.

[Brandeis, Louis Dembitz.] *The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis.* Introd. by Paul A. Freund. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 299. $6.00.

Brennan, Sister M. Rose Emmanuella. *The Intellectual Virtues according to the Philosophy of St. Thomas.* Palo Alto, Calif.: Pacific Books, 1941. Pp. 200. $4.25, paper, $2.75.

Brightman, Edgar Sheffield. *Person and Reality. An Introduction to Metaphysics.* Ed. Peter Anthony Bertocci with Jeannette Elthina Newhall and Robert Sheffield Brightman. New York: Ronald Press, 1958. Pp. x + 379. $6.50.

The author had completed most of this book before his death—the first thirteen chapters and half of chapter fifteen; chapter fourteen, sixteen, seventeen, and half of fifteen were assembled by the editors from other written materials. The last chapter is an interpretative summary by the editor.

Brightman was for many years, as is well known, one of the leading exponents of personalistic idealism. Though he wrote a great deal, there was no single comprehensive and fundamental expression of his thought. This book fills the lack and provides a contemporary evidence for the vitality of idealism.

Bronowski, J. *Science and Human Values.* New York: Messner Co.; Mar., 1958. $3.00.

Bruner, Jerome, S., and others. *Contemporary Approaches to Cognition.* A symposium held at the University of Colorado. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Oct., 1957. $4.00.

Brusher, Edward William. *Logic.* San Francisco: Fearon Publishers, 1957. Pp. 159. Paper, $2.00.

Buber, Martin. *Pointing the Way: Collected Essays.* Trans. from the German and ed. Maurice Friedman. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 249. $4.50.

Bullough, Edward. *Aesthetics. Lectures and Essays.* Ed. with an introd. by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. xliii + 158. $4.50.

According to the editor in her introduction, one of Bullough's principles, that of "psychical distance," has become part of the very subject matter of the science of aesthetics. Yet the article in which this principle was enuntiated is not readily available and has perhaps never been read by many who discuss it. She points out that other writings of the author deserve equal attention, particularly the second article here reprinted. The third writing of Bullough in this volume is his course of lectures on aesthetics.

The full introduction points out the important contributions of Bullough to the subject and shows how his psychological aesthetics is not the sort that has recently been rejected on good grounds.

Bultmann, Rudolf. *The Presence of Eternity. History and Eschatology.* "Gifford Lectures," 1955. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. xi + 171. $3.00.

This volume of "Gifford Lectures" is published in Great Britain by the Edinburgh University Press under the title *History and Eschatology.* These in fact are the two themes with which the work deals. The author begins with the problem of history and the meaning of the historicity of man. After examining the idea of history in pre-Christian times, he turns to eschatology, studying it in its various forms through the Old and New Testaments and the early Christian writers. In this treatment there are a number

of profound intuitions but also a number of controversial interpretations based more on the author's own philosophy than on the meaning of texts. Next, the author turns to the modification and secularization of the idea of history in post-Christian times and finally gives his own idea of history as well as of the historicity of man. Here, too, combined with deep insights we find philosophical views of more dubious ancestry such as actualism, the subjectivity (in the existentialist sense) of all true history, the idea that freedom and responsibility are total and cannot spring from a past.

BURKE, KENNETH. *The Philosophy of Literary Form.* New York: Vintage Books, 1957. Pp. 350. Paper, $1.25.

BUTLER, JAMES DONALD. *Four Philosophies and Their Practice in Education and Religion.* [Rev. ed.] New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 635. $6.00.

BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT. *The Origins of Modern Science 1300-1800.* [Rev. ed.] New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. 252. $3.00.

Byzantine and Early Medieval Civilization. "Dumbarton Oaks Papers," No. 11. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 333. $7.50.

CARNELL, EDWARD JOHN. *Christian Commitment.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. 314. $5.00.

CARTER, GEORGE STUART. *A Hundred Years of Evolution.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. 216. $3.75.

CASSIRER, ERNST. *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.* Vol. 3, *The Phenomenology of Knowledge.* Trans. from the German by Ralph Manheim. Introd. by Charles W. Hendel. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 518. $8.50.

CATTELL, RAYMOND B. *Personality and Motivation, Structure and Measurement.* Yonkers, New York: World Book Co., 1957. Pp. 976. $9.25.

CHAMBERLIN, EDWARD H. *Towards a More General Theory of Value.* New York, Oxford Univ. Press. $5.00.

CHISHOLM, RODERICK M. *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 214. $2.75.

COCHRANE, CHARLES NORRIS. *Christianity and Classical Culture.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 530. Paper, $2.95.

COHEN, ARTHUR. *Martin Buber.* "Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought." New York: Hillary House, 1958. Pp. 110. $2.00.

This relatively brief study of Buber's thought is an adequate introduction, though in its brevity it hardens the already violent antitheses which are Buber's instruments of reasoning. Buber of course claims that he is not a philosopher, but for all that he is not a theologian either; he is a religious thinker, elaborating his thought at the level of humanistic-personal insight. Though he shares the existentialist disdain of objectivity, his religious attitude and his notion of dialogue differentiate him from the existentialists.

COLEBURT, RUSSELL. *An Introduction to Western Philosophy.* New York: Sheed & Ward; Oct., 1957. Pp. 256. $4.00.

CONANT, JAMES BRYANT, and NASH, LEONARD K. (eds.). *Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science.* Vols. 1 and 2. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 337, 332. $10.00.

CONE, CARL B. *Burke and the Nature of Politics.* Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press; Nov., 1957. $10.00.

Contemporary Approaches to Cognition. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 216. $4.00.

CORNFORD, FRANCES MACDONALD. *From Religion to Philosophy.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 285. Paper, $1.35.

CORNU, AUGUSTE. *The Origins of Marxian Thought.* Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1957. Pp. viii + 128. $3.75.

This study of the backgrounds of Marx's thought stresses, as the author himself remarks, the influence of ideas upon Marx. Strangely enough, in his analysis and development, these ideas are constantly shown to be reflections of social and economic factors. It seems, then, that the author has been more deeply impressed by Marxian philosophy than he himself realizes.

The work begins with a study of rationalism, especially in Rousseau and Kant, and is followed by a study of romanticism. The longest chapter is devoted to an analysis of Hegel (in which social and economic factors are given a very great emphasis). A transitional chapter deals with the Hegelian left wing. The last chapter takes up the development of Marx's philosophy from liberalism to dialectical materialism.

CROWTHER, GEOFFREY. *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations.* Foreword by Homer D. Crotty. Claremont: Claremont College Press. Pp. 48. $2.75.

CUSHMAN, ROBERT E. *Therapeia: Plato's Conception of Philosophy.* Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press; May, 1958. $6.00.

DANIELOU, JEAN, S.J. *God and the Ways of Knowing.* Trans. Walter Roberts. New York: Meridian Books, 1957. Pp. 249. $3.75.

This is a translation of *Dieu et nous*; though for the most part the translation is smooth, there are some passages where the French idiom has confused the translator into putting down the exact opposite of what the author wrote.

The work is strictly theological, though in a broad and inclusive sense. But when a good theologian like Father Danielou talks about philosophical problems, philosophers are happy to listen.

The first chapter treats the profoundly important problem of the nature and meaning of religious symbolism. The day of the rationalist rejection of metaphor and symbol is over, though unfortunately many Thomist philosophers have not yet realized this. Hence it is so important to have a theologian who is also acquainted with the phenomenology of religion state unequivocally that symbol and myth *are* ways of *knowing*. The author clearly shows both the advantages and the dangers of this mode of knowing, and illustrates them with pertinent examples.

The second chapter deals with the nature of philosophical knowledge of God. The author does not intend to prove God's existence but rather to determine accurately what we can know about God. As he expresses it, God is a "limit-problem" for philosophy; man can know that God exists and at the same time that what He is is naturally unknowable for man. If philosophy can be content with this affirmation and confession of its own limitation, it can remain man's greatest natural intellectual achievement and still be open to religion. But this delicate balance of affirmation and negation seems impossible to maintain without the support of revelation; without it, the God of philosophers becomes an idol (in pantheism, acosmism, or "finite-god" theories), or He is denied. This chapter clearly shows that philosophical reflection on natural knowledge and even on revealed knowledge is a necessity for man and at the same time shows even more clearly that it is not self-sufficient. In the course of his analysis of divine personality as a limit-problem, Father Danielou successfully interweaves existentialist themes of personality with the fundamental notions of St. Thomas.

The remaining chapters deal with the God of faith, of Jesus Christ, of the Church, and of the mystics. These analyses enrich and complement the first two (though they are the major ones in the author's intention).

This is an important book, and the translator and publishers are to be thanked for having made it available to English readers.

D'ARCY, MARTIN C., S.J. *Communism and Christianity.* New York: Devin-Adair; Sept., 1957. $4.00.

———. *The Meeting of Love and Knowledge: Perennial Wisdom.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 186. $3.00.

DAVIDSON, EDWARD HUTCHINS. *Poe.* Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 306. $4.75.

DESCARTES, RENÉ. *Discourse on Method and Meditations.* Trans. Laurence J. Lafleur. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Dec., 1957. 90¢

DEUSSEN, PAUL. *The Philosophy of the Vedanta and the Vedantasara of Sadananda Yogendra.* Trans. with annotations by G. A. Jacob. [In English and Sanskrit.] S. Pasadena, Calif.: Perkins & Hutchins, 1957. Pp. 88. $3.00.

DE VRIES, JOHN. *Essentials of Physical Science.* Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. 375. $6.95.

Many scientists realize that the educated nonscientist should know some basic things about science and that this aim is not achieved by subjecting the prospective student to introductory courses geared for the formation of research scientists. For this reason, special textbooks such as the present one are being written. This book has three special characteristics: (1) a special selection of topics; (2) a special approach; and (3) explicit correlations to Christian beliefs.

The topics treated are: the concept of force, matter and its general characteristics, atomic and molecular structure, nuclear chemistry and physics, and the crust of the earth (this section was written by Donald C. Boardman). This selection seems quite reasonable. The special approach is the stress on the historical origin and development of the concepts and theories, and this seems often to be used effectively. But this third special characteristic is not so satisfactory. For one thing, the philosophy of science (narrowly so called) is not at all clear (the notions of law, hypothesis, and theory are confused), and does not show much awareness of recent work (for example, about the constructural and indirect nature of some of the concepts employed). Secondly, some of the current positivistic objections to classical philosophical views are uncritically accepted (pp. 19-29); the author holds the special epistemological view (common to many Episcopalians) that religious faith is a precondition of scientific thinking.

DEWEY, JOHN. *Reconstruction in Philosophy.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. Pp. 271. Paper, $1.45.

DICKEY, FRANKLIN M. *Not Wisely but Too Well.* San Marino, Calif.: Huntington Lib. Pp. 214. $5.00.

DOBRIANSKY, LEV E. *Veblenism. A New Critique.* Introd. by James Burnham. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957. Pp. xii + 409. $6.00.

This is a systematic presentation and criticism of Veblen's institutional economics. The book begins with a biographical chapter whose purpose is to show the influences that bore upon Veblen. Then the author brings out the philosophical background of his own criticism and of Veblen's doctrines in a group of philosophical chapters, one devoted to medieval thought (from which the author criticizes his subject), another to modern thought, and a third to the philosophy of science. The next four chapters treat Veblen's thought under four heads: evolutionary economic science, his cultural analysis, institutional economic analysis, and managerialism. The final chapter is a brief evaluation of Veblen's importance.

What this book attempts to do is a very important task. The author makes it clear that much of Veblen's writing was more a social philosophy than social science but that unfortunately Veblen did not realize this. The author's stand on the positions of what he calls perennial philosophy enables him to make trenchant criticisms and to isolate the permanent contributions. The book is extremely difficult reading because of a cumbersome style and of the way in which presentation and critique are intermingled.

DRAY, WILLIAM. *Laws and Explanation in History.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 174. $3.40.

DUBAY, THOMAS. *A Philosophical Study of the State's Function in Education.* Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press. Pp. 37. Paper, 50¢

DUNAYEVSKAYA, RAYA. *Marxism and Freedom.* New York: Bookman Associates; Feb., 1958. $6.00.

DURANT, WILL. *Pleasures of Philosophy.* New York: Simon & Schuster; Jan., 1958. $1.75.

———. *The Story of Philosophy.* New York, Pocket Books. 50¢

EDWARDS, PAUL, and PAP, ARTHUR (eds.). *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957. Pp. 657. $6.50.

EMMETT, DOROTHY. *Functions, Purpose, and Powers: New Concepts in the Study of Individuals and Societies.* New York: St. Martin's Press; Mar., 1958. $6.50.

ENGLISH, HORACE B., and ENGLISH, AVA C. *Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychological and Psychoanalytical Terms.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; Nov., 1957. $10.00.

Essays in Philosophy. Ed. with commentaries by Houston Peterson, assisted by James Bayley. New York, Pocket Books. 50¢

Ethics and Other Knowledge. "Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association," Vol. XXXI. Washington, D.C.: American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1957. Pp. 236. Paper, $3.50.

This volume of the *Proceedings* represents the meeting on April 23 and 24, 1957, at Chicago. The theme was ethics in relation to other knowledge. The presidential address, by the Reverend George P. Klubertanz, S.J., considered the charge of rationalism leveled against Thomistic ethics and urged a return to the experiential bases of ethics as proposed by St. Thomas himself. On Tuesday morning, the Reverend Ignatius T. Eschmann, O.P., showed that the idea of good and of man's moral freedom are the points of departure for St. Thomas (commentator: George C. Reilly, O.P.), and the Reverend James J. Doyle, S.J., showed how it was possible to conceive a Thomistic general ethics which is both strictly philosophical and Christian (commentator: Luke Burke, O.F.M.). On Wednesday morning, Dr. Elizabeth G. Salmon showed that ethics receives a particular character from the metaphysics and theory of knowledge to which it is related (commentator: William O'Meara), and Dr. John O. Riedl showed that an Aristotelian ethics, without being complete, can profit from the consideration that there can be a kind of friendship between man and God (commentator: Bernard J. Boelen).

The afternoon discussions were as usual divided according to various broad headings. In the section on logic and method, Monsignor Charles A. Hart presented a paper on formal logic (commentator: James A. McWilliams, S.J.), and the Reverend John T. Bonee, O.P., read a paper on formal logic which was not presented for publication (commentator: Brother S. Robert, F.S.C.). In the section on moral and political philosophy, the Reverend Luke J. Lindon studied the meaning of the term *virtus naturalis* (com-

mentator: Richard J. Westley), and Dr. John V. Quaranta discussed the relation between scientific psychology and ethics (commentator: J. Roland E. Ramirez). In the section on history of philosophy, the Reverend Gerald B. Phelan read a paper on the being of creatures (commentators: William Carlo and W. Norris Clarke, S.J.). In the section on philosophy of nature, Dr. John J. Fitzgerald discussed the contemporary status of natural philosophy (commentator: Edward A. Maziarz, C.PP.S.), and Dr. Alden L. Fisher that of psychology (commentator: Joseph Donceel, S.J.). In the section on metaphysics, Richard C. Hinners discussed being and God in Heidegger (commentator: Quentin Lauer, S.J.). In the section on philosophical problems, the Reverend Gerard Esser, S.V.D., discussed intuition in moral philosophy (commentator: Sister Rose Emmanuella), and the Reverend Joseph Lanigan discussed the knowledges of person in the Thomistic doctrine on love (commentator: Bernard A. Gendreau).

At a joint session with the National Catholic Educational Association in Milwaukee, the Reverend Gerald B. Phelan read a paper on the problem of communication between Catholic and non-Catholic philosophers and educators.

The volume also contains minutes of the meetings and various reports.

FAIRBANK, JOHN KING (ed.). *Chinese Thought and Institutions.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1957. Pp. 451. $8.50.

FEIGL, HERBERT, and OTHERS (eds.). *Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body-Problem.* Vol. 2. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press; Mar., 1958. $7.00.

FEUER, LEWIS SAMUEL. *Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism.* Boston: Beacon Press; June, 1958. $7.50.

FIREMAN, PETER. *Justice in Plato's Republic.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 52. $2.00.

This is an attempt to select from the *Republic* the matter relevant to the idea of justice and to deduce some consequences therefrom. What is pertinent to the notion of justice is conceived in a narrow way; the author says in his preface that it "can be treated without metaphysics, philosophy or religion" (p. 2). The author also makes some general remarks about ethics, sociology, and culture.

FIRTH, RAYMOND (ed.). *Man and Culture: An evaluation of the Work of Bronislaw Malinowski.* New York: Humanities Press; Oct., 1957. $6.00.

FISCHER, GEORGE. *Russian Liberalism before the Revolution: From Gentry to Intelligentsia.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Jan., 1958.

FORD, JOHN C., S.J., and KELLY, GERALD, S.J. *Questions in Fundamental Moral.* Vol. 1: *Contemporary Moral Problems.* Westminster: Newman Press; Apr., 1958. $4.50.

FOWLIE, WALLACE. *Claudel.* "Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought." New York: Hillary House, 1958. Pp. 111. $2.00.

The ultimate significance of Claudel as artist and thinker has been assessed in almost contradictory terms. The present informed and sympathetic study will be of great help to understand Claudel's position and the reason for the disagreements about him. Without entering into formal expositions, the author shows forcibly and intelligibly the function of religious faith and philosophical (Thomistic) principles in the poetry as well as the aesthetic theory of the French poet.

FREUD, SIGMUND. *Civilization and Its Discontents.* Garden City, Doubleday & Co. 95¢

FRIEDLANDER, PAUL. *Plato: An Introduction.* New York: Pantheon Books; Apr., 1958. $5.00.

Friedrich, Carl Joachim (ed.). *Authority*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Feb., 1958. $6.00.

Frost, George Edwin. *Cosmology and Continuity of Life*. New York: Exposition Press, 1957. Pp. 168. $3.00.

Gannon, Edward. *The Honor of Being a Man*. Chicago: Loyola Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 254. $4.00.

Gardeil, H. D., o.p. *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Vol. 2, *Cosmology*. Trans. John A. Otto. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co.; Jan., 1958.

Gatland, Kenneth W., and Dempster, Derek D. *The Inhabited Universe*. New York: David McKay Co.; Feb., 1958. $3.95.

Geoghegan, William D. *Platonism in Recent Religious Thought*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Feb., 1958. Pp. 209. $4.50.

Gierke, Otto. *Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500-1800*. Trans. from the German with an introd. by Ernest Barker. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. Pp. 514. Paper, $2.75.

Gilby, Thomas, o.p. *The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Mar., 1958. Pp. 300. $4.75.

[Gilson, Etienne.] *A Gilson Reader. Selections from the Writings of Etienne Gilson*. Ed. with an introd. and notes by Anton C. Pegis. Garden City, N.Y.: Hanover House, 1957. Pp. 358. $3.50; paper, 95¢

This selection from M. Gilson's writings is organized around six themes, which are the titles of the six parts: the signature of the man, the historian of Christian philosophy, the disciple of Christian philosophy, the student of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Christian teacher, and a summary. All the selections except one ("What is Christian Philosophy?") have been previously published or at least read as lectures; three of them have been specially translated for this volume by the editor.

The introduction gives a brief account of Gilson's life and interests, and attempts an evaluation of his work as a historian, and as a Christian philosopher in his own right. The book concludes with an incomplete bibliography of Professor Gilson's writings and an index.

This is a valuable selection, which the friends and admirers of Professor Gilson will wish to have for their own and students of St. Thomas will find invaluable.

Gilson, Etienne. *Painting and Reality*. "A W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts," 1955. New York: Pantheon Books, 1957. Pp. 391. $6.50.

Glutz, Melvin A., c.p. *The Manner of Demonstrating in Natural Philosophy*. Des Moines: St. Gabriel Monastery, 1956. Pp. xii + 184. Paper, $3.00.

Grabowski, Stanislaus J. *The Church: An Introduction to the Theology of St. Augustine*. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co.; Oct., 1957. $9.50.

Grant, Robert M. *Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought*. New York: Humanities Press; Jan., 1958. $6.00.

Greene, Theodore Meyer. *Moral, Aesthetic, and Religious Insight*. New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press; Jan., 1958. $2.75.

Greenwood, David C. *Nature of Science*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; May, 1958. $3.75.

Grene, Marjorie. *Heidegger*. "Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought." New York: Hillary House, 1958. Pp. 128. $2.00.

The author of this brief study is well known as a serious and competent student of existentialist philosophy. The present volume, more critical than expository, will undoubtedly irritate Heideggerians, and perhaps it does not give due credit to all of the German

thinker's achievements. Yet it is a comprehensive and reasoned introduction.

The author begins by examining Heidegger's first major work, studying the great themes of dread, conscience, and destiny. She singles out as one great contribution of Heidegger his analysis of human existence and another as his life-long pursuit of the meaning of Being. For the latter she particularly examines Heidegger's own study of Kant. After this she examines the later works.

The author's criticism of Heidegger is partly a matter of what he says, partly of the method. In regard to what he says, she discusses his notion of man as being-unto-death, of freedom and authenticity as ethical ideals, and his betrayal of his own pursuit of Being. In regard to the manner of argument, she instances especially the peculiar use of philosophical texts, which in common with many critics she considers as simply unscholarly. Perhaps it might be suggested that the Heideggerian method of "argument" is neither as perverse nor as new as it seems. The medieval oratorical and rhetorical technique of *dilatatio* by means of synonyms, common roots, verbal forms, and even merely similar-sounding words was already the same process, except that it did not present itself as a rational investigation. Heidegger has not only followed Kierkegaard in his rejection of rationalism; he has gone on to subject reasoning to rhetoric and poetry, to a kind of "magic" incantation of reality.

Gresock, Clement J. *The Influence of Interpersonal Conflict upon Visual Perception.* Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press. Pp. 31. Paper, 50¢

Grotius, Hugo. *Prolegomena to* The Law of War and Peace. Trans. Francis W. Kelsey. Introd. by Edward Dumbauld. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. xx + 43. Paper, 50¢

The translation of the introduction to Grotius's well known *Law of War and Peace* is that of the complete edition published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1925. The editor's introduction gives a brief account of Grotius's life and lists the main points made in the published passage. In his estimate of the value and significance of Grotius's work, he follows the lead of Roscoe Pound, who interprets Grotius as a rationalist and naturalist —an interpretation without historical foundation. There is a useful bibliography; editorial notes identify quotations and give helpful references; a glossary of historical personages mentioned in the text is an added convenience for the student.

Grube, G. M. A. *Plato's Thought.* Boston: Beacon Press; Feb., 1958. $1.60.

Gruber, Frederick C. (ed.). *Emergence of the Modern Mind.* Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press; Mar., 1958. $2.50.

Guthrie, William Keith Chambers. *In the Beginning.* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 151. $2.50.

Hackett, C. A. *Rimbaud.* "Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought." New York: Hillary House, 1958. Pp. 109. $2.00.

This is an excellent critical evaluation of Rimbaud's work and theory; it remains, however, almost entirely on the level of literary criticism.

Haezrahi, Pepita. *The Contemplative Activity: A Study in Aesthetics.* New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1957. Pp. 139. $3.00.

This study of aesthetics begins by pinning down the subject-matter; namely, a particular kind of experience. In doing this, the author distinguishes sharply between aesthetics, philosophy of art, and philosophy of beauty. Next she takes up the nature of

aesthetic experience and the various interpretations of the content of that experience. Next she investigates the problem of taste, the nature of a work of art, and the problem of content and form. She concludes with a description of ideal aesthetic responses and some moral reflections.

Perhaps the most important contribution the author makes is the distinction between the aesthetic experience and the aesthetic judgment.

HALEY, ANDREW G. *New Dimensions of Law and Space.* Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press; Apr., 1958. $3.75.

HALL, JEROME. *Essays in Jurisprudence and Social Theory.* New York: Oceana Pubns.; Mar., 1958. $6.00.

HANNA, THOMAS. *The Thought and Art of Albert Camus.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; Apr., 1958. Pp. 192. $4.50.

HARTFORD, ELLIS F. *Moral Values in Public Education: Lessons from the Kentucky Experience.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Mar., 1958. $4.00.

HASKINS, CHARLES HOMER. *Renaissance of the Twelfth Century.* New York: Meridian Books; Sept., 1957. $4.00; paper, $1.45.

———. *Studies in Medieval Culture.* New York: Frederick Ungar; Nov., 1957. $4.50.

HAVELOCK, ERIC ALFRED. *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 443. $6.00.

HAWKINS, DENIS JOHN BERNARD. *Crucial Problems of Modern Philosophy.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958. Pp. 150. $3.00.

Father Hawkins says quite rightly that the student of philosophy today must ask certain questions which no pre-Cartesian philosopher ever asked. The first part of this book is a consideration of how these questions came to be asked, and what they mean; the raising of the question by Descartes, the function of British empiricism, and the view of Kant. In the second part, five contemporary movements are examined: Moore, Russell and sense-data; Wittgenstein and linguistic analysis; logical positivism and the problem of verification; existentialism; and communism as a philosophy. In the third part, the author lays the basis for a reconstruction. He begins by examining the relation between philosophy and common sense, in which he not only gives a workable definition of that widely abused term, but also carefully sets down its limits. He then shows that experience is much broader than the British empiricists viewed it to be. Next he tries to show in general the possibility of metaphysics. He does this by explaining first the nature of metaphysical method (which he calls ontological analysis); then he asserts the necessity for at least some synthetic a-priori propositions; his third point is the legitimacy of analogical thinking; and his fourth, the function of the judgment of existence. In his last chapter, he suggests that there is in some sense a perennial philosophy and prophesies its revival.

HEATH, SPENCER. *Citadel, Market and Altar. Emerging Society.* Foreword by John Chamberlain. Elkridge, Md.: Science of Society Foundation, 1957. Pp. xxiv + 259. $6.00.

This volume is the outline of a proposed new science of society, to be called "socionomy." The author views the organization of men and maintains as his basic law that successful organizations are based on spontaneous reciprocal relationships among their constituent units. Though he views man's life as extending into three areas (political life; economic production and exchange; and religion, art, and recreation), he considers that free ownership and exchange are at the basis of all productive organization. He pro-

poses, then, that the free contractual relationship first developed in the free enterprise system be extended also into the area of public services, so that ultimately the present functions of government would be replaced, with a great gain in efficiency, by free contracts.

HEINEMANN, FREDERICK HENRY. *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament*. 2nd ed. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 248. Paper, $1.25.

HEISENBERG, WERNER. *Atomic Science and Our Social Revolution*. New York: Harper & Bros.; May, 1958. $4.00.

HENLE, PAUL (ed.). *Language, Thought, and Culture*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Apr., 1958. $4.95.

HERBERG, WILL. *Four Existentialist Theologians*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; May, 1958. $3.50.

HOCH, PAUL, and ZUBIN, JOSEPH. *Psychopathology of Communications*. New York: Grune & Stratton; Nov., 1957.

HOCKING, WILLIAM ERNEST. *The Meaning of Immortality in Human Experience*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 281. $3.50.

HOOK, SIDNEY (ed.). *Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science*. New York: New York Univ. Press; Apr., 1958. $5.00.

HUME, DAVID. *Literary Essays*. Ed. John William Lenz. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Jan., 1957. 90¢

HUSIC, ISAAC. *History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy*. New York: Meridian Books; Mar., 1958. $1.95.

JACOB PHILIP E. *Changing Values in College: An Exploratory Study of the Impact of College Teaching*. New York: Harper & Bros.; Nov., 1957. $4.50.

JAEGER, WERNER. *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*. Trans. Gilbert Highet. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Mar., 1958. $12.50.

JAMES, WILLIAM. *Varieties of Religious Experience*. New York: New American Lib.; Apr., 1958. 50¢

JASPERS, KARL, and BULTMANN, RUDOLPH. *Myth and Christianity: An Inquiry into the Possibility of Religion without Myth*. New York: Noonday Press; Apr., 1958. Paper, $1.25.

JENKINS, IREDELL. *Art and Human Enterprise*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Apr., 1958. $4.75.

JOHNSON, A. H. *Whitehead's Philosophy of Civilization*. Boston: Beacon Press; Mar., 1958. $5.00.

JONES, HOWARD MUMFORD. *American Humanism: Its Meaning for World Survival*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 124. $3.00.

JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE. *Sovereignty*. Trans. J. F. Huntington. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1957. Pp. 332. $4.50.

KANTOROWICZ, ERNST H. *King's Two Bodies: A Study in Political Theology*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Sept., 1957. $10.00.

KANTOROWICZ, HERMANN. *Definition of Law*. Ed. A. H. Campbell. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Apr., 1958. $3.00.

KARRER, OTTO. *Meister Eckehart Speaks*. Trans. Elizabeth Strakosch. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 72. $2.75.

In a twenty-five page introduction the story of Eckhart is briefly recounted; and the relation between mysticism, theology, and preaching is well treated. Eckhart's own speculative system is interpreted in an unusually favorable light, though the obscurity of many of his expressions lends itself to many different views.

The rest of the book is made up of selections from Eckhart's writings and sermons, dealing with God, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the soul, sin, justification, grace, prayer, and the like. These are the areas in which Eckhart's genius was most manifest and his influence most far-reaching.

KAUFMANN, WALTER. *Critique of Religion and Philosophy.* New York: Harper & Bros.; May, 1958. $5.00.

KESSLER, JOHN J. *The House that Jack Built and Some Other Semantic Poems.* "Semantika," II, No. 3. Saint Louis: J. J. Kessler, 1956. Pp. 38. Paper, $1.00.

The author says simply and directly what some other authors take many pages to say, and without any loss of precision.

KIERKEGAARD, SØREN. *Edifying Discourses: A Selection.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Apr., 1958. Paper, $1.45.

———. *Johannes Climacus.* Trans. and ed. T. H. Croxall, D.D. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press; May, 1958. Pp. 200. $3.00.

KIRK, G. S., and RAVEN, J. E. *The Presocratic Philosophers.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 497. $9.50.

KITTO, H. D. F. *Sophocles: Dramatist and Philosopher.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Jan., 1958. $1.20.

KLEIN, CAROL. *Philosophy of Maimonides.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Dec., 1957. $3.75.

KNELLER, GEORGE F. *Existentialism and Education.* New York: Philosophical Lib., Mar., 1958. $3.75.

KNIGHT, EVERETT. *Literature Considered as Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan Co.; Mar., 1958. $5.00.

KNOX, GEORGE. *Critical Moments.* Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press. Pp. 154. $3.50.

KOCH, ADRIENNE. *The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson.* Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1957. Pp. 208. $3.50.

KOESTLER, ARTHUR. *Reflections on Hanging.* New York: Macmillan Co.; 1957. $4.50.

KOLESNIK, WALTER B. *Mental Discipline in Modern Education.* Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press; Mar., 1958. $3.50.

KONVITZ, MILTON RIDVAS. *Fundamental Liberties of a Free People.* New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 433. $5.00.

KOREN HENRY J., C.SS.SP. *Readings in the Philosophy of Nature.* Westminster: Newman Press; Nov., 1957. $2.25.

KOYRÉ, ALEXANDRE. *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Jan., 1958. Paper, $1.60.

KRIEGER, LEONARD. *The German Idea of Freedom.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. Pp. 552. $7.50.

LAWSON, CHESTER A. *Language, Thought, and the Human Mind.* East Lansing: Michigan State Univ. Press; May, 1958. $5.95.

LECLERQ, JACQUES. *Marriage: A Great Sacrament.* New York: Macmillan Co.; Oct., 1957. $1.95.

LEWIS, WYNDHAM. *Time and Western Man.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. Pp. 484. Paper, $1.95.

LINDSAY, JANVIER W. *Ph.D., The Philosophy of a Doctor.* New York: Pageant Press, 1957. Pp. 83. $2.50.

LOCKE, JOHN. *The Reasonableness of Christianity.* Ed. and abridged by I. T. Ramsey. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press; May, 1958. Pp. 140. $2.50.

———. *The Second Treatise of Government* and *A letter Concerning Toleration.* Ed. with an introd. by J. W. Gough. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. xli + 167. $2.50.

This edition was first printed in 1946 and was reprinted with a revised introduction in 1948; the present edition has been corrected and revised.

The lengthy introduction begins with a life of Locke, including some of the results of the most recent scholarship. Then a considerable space is devoted to an account of his political theories and their influence upon other theorists and actual governments.

The editor makes the point that in Locke's theory of the "original state of nature" men were not at war with each other but also that there was no authority other than the law of nature and the right of every man to carry out this law, to judge, and to punish violators of it. Hence, Locke's contract theory has each man *giving up* some of his rights, though he maintains that the function of government is to promote the individual and public good, and to protect other rights, among them the right to private property. The editor also studies Locke's theory of toleration and its influence.

LONGABAUGH, THEODORE. *General Semantics.* New York: Vantage Press, 1957. Pp. 206. $3.75.

LONGINUS. *On Great Writing.* Trans. with an introd. by G. M. A. Grube. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. 88. 60¢

LUCRETIUS [TITUS LUCRETIUS CARUS]. *Of the Nature of Things.* Trans. from the Latin by William Ellery Leonard. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1957. Pp. 316. Paper, 95¢

LYND, HELEN MERREL. *On Shame and the Search for Identity.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.; Mar., 1958. $6.00.

Man and Time: Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks. Vol. 3. New York, Pantheon Books. $5.00.

MAQUET, ALBERT. *Albert Camus: The Invincible Summer.* Trans. from the French by Herman Briffault New York, George Braziller. Pp. 224. $3.75.

MARCUSE, HERBERT. *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Mar., 1958. Pp. 228. $4.50.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *On the Philosophy of History.* Ed. Joseph W. Evans. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1957. Pp. xi + 180. $3.50.

The text of this book is a transcription of a series of lectures, revised, amplified, and annotated by M. Maritain himself. Thus the book has a liveliness, concreteness, and the conversational tone of a lecture with the carefulness of a written presentation.

The chapters deal with the philosophy of history in general and its nature; the most general laws expressed by that philosophy (called by the author axiomatic formulas or functional laws); some more particular laws (typological formulas or vectorial laws); God and the world—the purpose of man and history, man and the soul, the world and the Church; and final reflections on the relation between philosophy, history, and the data of revelation.

M. Maritain views the philosophy of history as a kind of application of moral philosophy adequately taken to the development of human events. It is therefore a kind of practical science, not a purely speculative one.

———. *Reflections on America.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. 205. $3.50.

This book is an outgrowth of three seminar discussions, and M. Maritain has been careful to keep the informal tone in spite of the changes made in the material. The book is divided into three parts, which, as the author himself suggests, are three successively deeper treatments of the American mind and spirit. In the first part, there are such things as "American materialism," activity, hospitality; in the second, the American heritage as refuge, as pioneering, and the difficulties arising from the lack of an explicit philosophy; in the third, the nature and role of American thought, democracy, and socio-economic structure.

These reflections are philosophical in M. Maritain's own inimitable way, and one would wish to see this book widely spread in other countries and made into required reading for all the workers in the United States Information Agency.

MARROU, HENRI. *Augustine and His Influence through the Ages.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Feb., 1958. $1.35.

MARTIN, R. M. *Truth and Denotation.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; June, 1958. Pp. 288. $7.50.

MASCALL, E. L. *Christian Theology and Natural Science.* New York: Ronald Press, 1957. Pp. 328.

———. *Words and Images.* New York: Ronald Press, 1957. Pp. 143. $3.50.

MAY, ROLLO, and OTHERS. *Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology.* New York: Basic Books; May, 1958. $7.50.

MAYER, FREDERICK. *Education and the Good Life.* Introd. by Richard Neutra. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957. Pp. 128. $2.50.

MCGOVERN, WILLIAM, and COLLIER, DAVID. *Radicals and Conservatives.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; Dec., 1957. $4.00.

MCKELLAR, PETER. *Imagination and Thinking.* New York: Basic Books; Jan., 1958. $4.25.

MCLAUGHLIN, PATRICK J. *The Church and Modern Science.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 374. $7.50.

This book is an attempt to remove tensions and improve communication in the border field of science, philosophy, and religion. There are three parts: views of science; the Catholic Church's pronouncements on science and scientific problems; an appendix on miracles, a list of sources for the addresses quoted, a bibliography, and an index.

The first part is an attempt to explain science to nonscientists and philosophy to nonphilosophers. Such a task is indeed a necessity. Yet there seem to be some real difficulties. The author does not seem to have one consistent notion of science. It is variously described as dealing with secondary causes, or resting on induction, or being dialectical in nature, or being hypothetico-constructural. As a result, the relation between science and philosophy or religion is also treated in various ways. Professional philosophers are likely to be irritated, and it is not clear that a work aimed at a nonprofessional audience should permit itself such a manner of exposition.

The collection of documents is very convenient, and for this most readers will be grateful. The author adds introductions and connecting remarks as well as some commentaries. The publishers might have helped the reader by indicating more clearly what is quoted and what is introduction or commentary.

MEINECKE, FRIEDRICH. *Machiavellism.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 484. $8.50.

MEISEL, JAMES HANS. *The Myth of the Ruling Class.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 438. $7.50.

MEYER, ARTHUR E. *Mind, Matter, and Morals.* New York: American Press. Pp. 192. $3.50.

MILL, JOHN STUART. *Considerations on Representative Government.* Ed. with introd. by Currin V. Shields. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xliv + 275. Paper, 90¢

The long introduction first gives a good, clear summary of the argument of the present work (the editor refers to editions of other works of Mill for summaries of the more general background and principles). Then the editor gives an evaluation of the purpose and the strength of the argument. It is, he holds, an argument against democracy given by a liberal who wished to maintain that the people are the original holders of sovereignty and that an aristocracy of merit should rule. The editor finds two weaknesses

in the argument. The first is that Mill has no way to justify his acceptance of ends. This is a telling point against a utilitarian view, but it is not quite as effective as he thinks. Secondly, against Mill's view that some people know better than others what should be done, the editor holds the anachronistic view that the fact that men desire definite ends is an ultimate fact, beyond need or possibility of justification. Mill's view, again, is not well grounded; but the editor's counter argument seems equally baseless. For the most part, however, the introduction is helpful; biographical and bibliographical data are well chosen; the edition is excellently produced as well as low-priced.

———. *Nature and Utility of Religion.* New York: Liberal Arts Press; Dec., 1957. 75¢

MILLER, JAMES WILKINSON. *Logic Workbook.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Dec., 1957. $2.00.

MILLER, PERRY (ed.). *American Transcendentalists: Their Prose and Poetry.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1957. $1.25.

MINKIN, JACOB SAMUEL. *The World of Moses Maimonides.* New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1957. Pp. 448. $6.00.

MITCHELL, BASILE GEORGE (ed). *Faith and Logic.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. Pp. 227. $6.50.

Modern Education and Human Values. "Pitcairn-Crabbe Foundation Lecture Series," 1954-1957. Vol. VI. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1957. Pp. 128. $3.00.

The lectures contained in this volume are concerned with education in both a broad and a strict sense. The first, "Arsenal of Democracy," by Milton Edward Lord, discusses the place of the public library in the growth of democracy. The second, "Professional Education and the American Tradition," by Robert Eldon Mathews, argues that the professions have a double responsibility: that of high standards in the exercise of their professional activities and that of putting their professional qualifications at the service of their community. This is a challenging and at the same time positive and hopeful paper that should be read widely. Edwin Prince Booth, in "Moral Values and the Study of Biography," asserts that religious and classical moral doctrines are antiquated; he proposes a biological-evolutionary norm exemplified in a quotation, "Life triumphs over logic." Filmer S. C. Northrop, in a paper called "The Union of the Sciences and the Humanities," again proposes his doctrine of a unitary way of knowing. His thesis seems to be that nothing is true unless it can be justified by physics. He argues that we can now admit universal knowledge and freedom since the discovery of neural retentive systems and negative feedback. Admittedly there are many clever arguments in this paper and a skilled use of recent theories; yet the preoccupation with the elimination of distinctions seems exaggerated. In the final paper of this volume, the Honorable Margaret Chase Smith ("The World We Live In") urges a realistic appraisal of world problems and the position of the United States in their solution.

MOULYN, ADRIAN C. *Structure, Function and Purpose.* Foreword by Yervant H. Krikorian. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. ix + 198. $4.00.

This philosophical investigation compares and contrasts some basic biological concepts. The author begins by distinguishing and defining structure, function, and purpose. He then looks at the nervous system and movement as instance of structure and function, finds that they are causally (mechanically) connected, and are lacking purpose. In his study of embryology he comes to similar

conclusions, at the same time criticizing severely the biological theory called "vitalism" (with good ground, it might be added). He then compares "objective" or physical time with what he calls "subjective" time—the latter forms a whole, including past and future. He then argues that purpose necessarily presupposes subjective time. He distinguishes sharply between a teleological whole and a causal unity.

In the course of his argument, he concludes that there are three kinds of sensible things in our experience: nonliving things and plants (and some lower animals, perhaps) which are causal unities of structure and function but do not have subjective time and do not integrate subjective with objective time; next, the higher vertebrates, which are causal unities in subjective time but show no clear evidence that they integrate the two kinds of time; and then man, who is a causal unity displaying purposive behavior in subjective time integrated with objective time (table, p. 188).

This book should be studied seriously not only by philosophers but also by biologists and other students of man.

MUDRY, JOSEPH. *Philosophy of Atomic Physics.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Feb., 1958. $3.75.

MURRAY, A. R. M. *Philosophy of Hegel.* New York: British Book Centre; Jan., 1958. $5.00.

MURRAY, GILBERT. *Classical Tradition in Poetry.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Sept., 1957. 95¢

NEF, JOHN U. *Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Jan., 1958. $3.75.

NELSON, JOHN CHARLES. *Renaissance Theory of Love: The Context of Giordano Bruno's* Eroici Furori. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; May, 1958. Pp. 348. $6.00.

NELSON, RALPH WALDO. *Free Minds: A Venture in the Philosophy of Democracy.* Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press; Oct., 1957. $3.75.

NEUGEBAUER, OTTO. *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity.* 2nd ed. Providence, R.I.: Brown Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 270. $6.00.

New Frontiers of Knowledge. Ed. M. B. Schnapper. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957. Pp. x + 125. $2.75.

This symposium was first given over the "Voice of America" and the papers are the text of the talks given, with some modifications. There are thirty-six contributions on as many topics, ranging from the role of philosophy (by Sidney Hook) to predictions about the coming material prosperity and technological advances (by David Sarnoff, William Zeckendorf). In the space of a thousand words not much can be said to a completely heterogeneous audience, and general statements tend to be overstatements—a general rule that is all too often verified in the present book.

NEWMAN, JAMES. *What Is Science?* New York: Simon & Schuster; Feb., 1958. $1.95.

NIETZCHE, FRIEDRICH WILHELM. *The Use and Abuse of History.* Trans. from the German by Adrian Collins. Introd. by Julius Kraft. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. 83. Paper, 50¢

NOONAN, JOHN, T., JR. *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 444. $9.00.

NOWELL-SMITH, H. *Ethics.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; May, 1958. $7.50.

O'NEIL, W. M. *An Introduction to Method in Psychology.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 164. $4.50.

ORTEGA Y GASSET. *On Love: Aspects of a Single Theme.* Trans. Toby Talbot. New York: Meridian Books, 1957. Pp. 204. $3.50.

This is an excellent translation of *Estudios sobre el Amor*. The importance of this work lies partly in the many-faceted approach to the subject (typical of Ortega) and partly in the clarity with which the author distinguishes between love and other similar but quite different states (as desire). His criticism is directed most sharply at various literary presentations of love (especially that of Stendhal), but he also attacks psychoanalytic and philosophical analyses (which he sometimes misunderstands).

Osgood, Charles E.; Suci, George J.; Tannenbaum, Percy H. *The Measurement of Meaning*. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1958. Pp. 342. $7.50.

Oxenhandler, Neal. *Scandal and Parade*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press. Pp. 284. $5.00.

Pannell, H. Burnell. *The Religious Faith of John Fiske*. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press. $5.00.

Pap, Arthur. *Semantics and Necessary Truth*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; Dec., 1957. $6.75.

Pascal, Blaise. *Pascal's* Pensées. Trans. W. F. Trotter. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; Mar., 1958. $1.15.

Passmore, John. *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. 523. $5.25.

Paul, Leslie. *English Philosophers*. New York: Hillary House; Sept., 1957. $5.00.

Pearson, Karl. *Grammar of Science*. New York: Meridian Books; Sept., 1957. $1.95.

[Peirce, Charles Sanders]. *Values in a Universe of Chance. Selected Writings*. Ed. with introd. and notes by Philip P. Wiener. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xxvi + 446. $3.95. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1958. Pp. xxvi + 446. Paper, $1.25.

The editor of this collection of writings assures us that some of them have never been published before and will not be included in any other collection now being published. He has grouped his selections around five themes: (1) science, materialism, and idealism; (2) pragmaticism: a philosophy of science; (3) lessons from the history of scientific thought; (4) science and education; (5) science and religion. The selections are well chosen to show the range of Peirce's work and interests.

The editor's introductions are usually good, informative, and well-balanced, though he tends to miss the significance of some of Peirce's deficiencies in the history of thought. Peirce was one of the first of modern thinkers to realize the importance of a knowledge of the history of thought for a philosopher; it is unfortunate that his knowledge was so sketchy. Peirce himself cannot be neatly tabbed; his own thought was much more inclusive, broad, and many-sided than the narrow empiricism and relativism of many of his professed followers.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. Vol. 7, *Science and Philosophy*. Vol. 8, *Reviews, Correspondence, and Bibliography*. Ed. Arthur W. Burks. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; April-May, 1958. $7.50 each.

Pepper, Stephen C. *Sources of Value*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press; May, 1958. $8.50.

Percheron, Maurice. *Buddha and Buddhism*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 192. $1.35.

The Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern World. Ed. Charles W. Hendel. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. vii + 132. $2.75.

The text of this book consists of four commemorative lectures given at Yale University in March, 1955, by four members of the

faculty. John E. Smith spoke on "The Question of Man"; George Schrader on "The Philosophy of Existence"; René Wellek on "Aesthetics and Criticism"; and Charles W. Hendel on "Freedom, Democracy, and Peace." There is no index, but there is a selected bibliography.

The emphasis of all four papers is on the relevance of Kant's thought for the understanding and solution of contemporary problems.

The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers. Ed. Paul A. Schilpp. New York: Tudor Pub. Co., 1957. Pp. 918. $10.75.

PIAGET, JEAN. *Logic and Psychology.* Introd. on Piaget's logic by W. Mays. New York: Basic Books, 1957. Pp. 67. $1.50.

PIAGET, JEAN, and INHELDER, BARBEL. *Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence.* New York: Basic Books; Nov., 1957. $6.75.

PIEPER, JOSEF. *Happiness and Contemplation.* New York: Pantheon Books; May, 1958. $2.75.

[PLATO.] *Dialogues of Plato.* Selected and with prefatory notes by J. D. Kaplan. New York, Pocket Books. 35¢

[———.] *Selections.* Ed. Raphael Demos. New York: Chas. Scribner, 1955. Pp. 486. Paper, $1.00.

PLATO. *Plato's Statesman.* Trans. J. B. Skemp. Ed. with an introd. by Martin Ostwald. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. xxxvi + 100. Paper, 75¢

The text used here is reprinted with very few changes; the translator's notes have been partly retained, partly changed or omitted. The editor's introduction begins with a short biography. He then takes up a general discussion of Plato's political theory, emphasizing the point that the *Statesman* is not only chronologically but also in content intermediate between the *Republic* and the *Laws*. Finally, he gives a useful summary of the work. This is an excellent student edition.

———. *The Republic.* New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; Sept., 1957. $1.25.

———. *Theaetetus.* Trans. Francis M. Cornford. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Apr., 1958. 80¢

———. *Timaeus.* Trans. Francis M. Cornford. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Apr., 1958. 80¢

POLANYI, KARL. *Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time.* Boston: Beacon Press; Sept., 1957. $1.45.

POPPER, KARL RAIMUND. *The Poverty of Historicism.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. Pp. 180. $4.00.

RABINOWITZ, W. GERSON. *Aristotle's* Protrepticus *and the Sources of Its Reconstruction, I.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1957. Pp. 95. Paper, $2.00.

RADIN, PAUL. *Primitive Man as Philosopher.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1957. Pp. xl + 456. Paper, $2.00.

This work is considered one of the modern classics of anthropology. In reaction to Lévy-Bruhl's a-priori notion of prelogical mentality and Spencerian evolutionism, the author shows from direct, uninterpreted sources that primitive men are capable of logical thought and even of profound philosophical analysis, and that ideas such as those of monotheism are not evolutionary developments. On the other hand, there are some a-priori theories that still remain: some relativism and idealism, and an odd idea that—apart from the author and a few of his friends—all Western thinkers believe that words have magic power.

As is usual with Dover reprints, this book is well printed, on good quality paper, with a sturdy binding. Both student and

scholar can afford to own their own copies of the classics in their field, at Dover's reasonable prices.

———. *Primitive Religion: Its Nature and Origin.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1957. Pp. x + 322. Paper, $1.85.

This work was first published in 1937, and the present reprint has a short new preface. The author's thesis is that economic factors are the most important ones in determining the form and the myths of religion. Though he has collected a great number of facts, his a-priori thesis is his constant rule of interpretation. At times, he attacks Freudian interpretations of myth and ritual.

RHINE, J. B., and PRATT, J. G. *Parapsychology.* Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1957. Pp. 232. $4.75.

RIESMAN, DAVID. *Constraint and Variety in American Education.* Garden City, Doubleday & Co.; 95¢

ROMANELL, PATRICK. *Toward a Critical Naturalism.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. xv + 88. $3.25.

There are six somewhat loosely connected essays in this book. The author is a well-known advocate of nonreductionist naturalism —"nonreductionist" in that he wishes not to deny the observed differences between things and the corresponding differences in the subject matter and methods of science; but still "naturalism," in that man is to be considered a part of nature; "nature is all there is", and there is a continuity of methods between all the different kinds of knowledge. The author's respect for differences and proper methods leads him to make some sharp and intelligent criticisms of Deweyite and biological ethics (the fourth and fifth papers in the book).

But there still is a lot to do before all the ambiguities of naturalism are resolved. Thinking and willing are indeed natural activities, but does it follow that they are the activities of a substance which is purely material? To say that "nature is all there is" may be a very broad definition of nature open to include all there is, or it may be a prescriptive rule admitting to the status of being only those beings which conform to the naturalist's definition of nature—and the naturalists seem to want both meanings at various times as they see their advantage in argument.

ROSENTHAL, E. I. J. *Political Thought in Medieval Islam.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Apr., 1958. $6.00.

ROWLAND, JOHN. *Mysteries of Sciences.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 223. $6.00.

ROYCE, JOSIAH. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy: A Critique of the Bases of Conduct and of Faith.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 507. Paper, $1.75.

SABATIER, AUGUSTE. *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion.* New York: Harper & Bros; Sept., 1957. $1.45.

SAMUEL, VISCOUNT. *In Search of Reality.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Mar., 1958. $6.00.

SANTAYANA, G. *Winds of Doctrine, and Platonism and the Spiritual Life.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 317. Paper, $1.45.

SCHEFFLER, ISRAEL. *Philosophy and Education.* Boston: Allyn & Bacon; Mar., 1958. $5.75.

SCHELER, MAX. *Philosophical Perspectives.* Trans. Oscar A. Haac. Boston: Beacon Press; June, 1958. $5.00.

SCHILLER, CLAIRE H. (ed.). *Instinctive Behavior.* Introd. by Karl S. Lashley. New York: International Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 347. $7.50.

SCHNEIDER, HERBERT W. *Sources of Contemporary Philosophical Realism in America.* New York: Liberal Arts Press; Feb., 1958. 60¢

Schopenhauer, Arthur. *World as Will and Representation.* Trans. E. F. J. Payne. Indian Hills, Col.: Falcon's Wing Press; Oct., 1957. $17.50.

Schramm, Wilbur Lang. *Responsibility in Mass Communication.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. 414. $4.50.

Schreir, Fred T. *Human Motivation: Probability and Meaning.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957. Pp. 277. $5.00.

Sesonske, Alexander. *Value and Obligation.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1957. Pp. 124. Paper, $2.50.

Shapley, Harlow. *Of Stars and Men.* Boston: Beacon Press; May, 1958. $3.50.

Shklar, Judith N. *After Utopia. The Decline of Political Faith.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. x + 309. $5.00.

This study of the state of contemporary political theory attempts to understand its decline in terms of its history. The author begins with the Enlightenment as a type of hopeful and inclusive political theory. She studies its gradual decline through the progressively increasing despair of the romantic movement to the existentialist view that the modern situation is one of entire self-alienation. Next comes a study of Christian fatalism, according to which modern culture, having lost its supernatural faith, is doomed to destruction and is incapable of redemption. Perceptively, the author remarks, "Social theology begins by making culture the creature of religion; it ends by making religion dependent on culture" (p. 216). Finally, she looks briefly at the present status of both liberalism and conservatism, and sees them also as highly pessimistic. The final conclusion is that the followers of the political theorists of the past have all become pessimists and fatalists; that in the present it seems impossible to develop a new theory which would offer a challenging alternative; and that skepticism, though not a final position, is at least better than despair.

The documentation is rich, though the interpretation seems sometimes to be forced into a preconceived pattern; there is a valuable bibliography.

Shorey, Paul. *What Plato Said.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Sept., 1957. $10.00.

Singer, Irving. *Santayana's Aesthetics: A Critical Introduction.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 244. $4.75.

Siu, R. G. H. *The Tao of Science. An Essay on Western Knowledge and Eastern Wisdom.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958. Pp. 180. $4.25.

Snellgrove, David. *Buddhist Himālaya.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. xii + 324, with a map and 40 plates. $10.00.

This book on the origin and natures of Tibetan religion consists of accounts of the places the author has visited and studies of the history and nature of this religion. The account is sympathetic; though it is not professedly a philosophical study, it is better balanced than some other recent formally philosophical studies of Buddhism.

Some Aspects of History. "The McAuley Lectures," 1957. West Hartford, Conn.: St Joseph College, 1957. Pp. 193-253. Paper, $1.00.

There are three lectures in this volume. The first, by George B. Cooper, has the title, "History: Its Limitations and its Promise," and is a reflection on the nature of history as an objective science. The second, by Ross J. Hoffman, is on "Catholic Philosophy of History." Professor Hoffman begins by disclaiming any intention of talking what he calls a "metaphysics of history"—a science of the reason things happen the way they do. This, he holds, is impos-

sible for man. Instead, when history is written as accurately as possible, it provides evidence about man in the past, and the conclusions drawn from this evidence make up the philosophy of history.

The third lecture, by Friedrich Engel-Janosi, deals with Toynbee and the tradition of universal history. The author briefly traces the idea of a "universal history"—an all-inclusive history of man (which some authors also considered to be an explanation of what man is or ought to be), in all the various ways of approach: attempted empirical, a-priori, conjectural, empathetic, and so on. He considers that Toynbee's attempt has enlarged the scope (a total of twenty-one civilizations), employed more sources than anyone before him, and reached into the very construction of myth to explain origins, causes, and the like. There is a seven-page appendix on Mr. Nehru's world history as another type.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM. *Crisis of Our Age.* New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; Sept., 1957. $1.45.

———. *Social and Cultural Dynamics.* Boston, Porter Sargent. Pp. 736. $7.50.

SPINOZA, BENEDICT DE. *Political Works.* Ed. A. G. Wernham. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Apr., 1958. $10.10.

STERN, MILTON R. *The Fine Hammered Steel of Herman Melville.* Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. Pp. 297. $5.75.

STRASSER, STEPHAN. *The Philosophy of Behavior.* Trans. Henry J. Koren, C.S.SP. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1957. Pp. 229-249. Paper, 50¢

This booklet is a separate reprint of the appendix from *The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology* and could well be used as a text for a preliminary lecture in many classes in psychology.

———. *The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology.* Trans. Henry J. Koren, C.S.SP. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1957. Pp. x + 275. $5.00; paper, $4.25.

The French translation of this work was reviewed in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXXII (1955), 277. The present translation is careful and adequate, though at times it is not smooth. The author has made many small changes and has added two new sections, one on the connection between the philosophical analysis of nature and hylomorphism, the other on the foundations of the psychology of behavior. In addition, the translator has added an index, which considerably enhances the value of the work.

The general problem is that of the relation between a philosophical account of man and the science(s) of psychology. The author has restricted his investigation to one point, the treatment of "soul" in the two ways. In examining the question, he makes very considerable use of phenomenological analyses of sensation, of the ego as subject, of the corporeal ego. He also goes into detailed examination of many philosophical positions, such as those of Descartes, Kant, Scheler, and shows that they are not borne out by phenomenological reflection and give no ground for the possibility of experimental psychology. He arrives at his own conclusion by means of both of these methods of examination. The analysis of the science(s) of psychology is quite adequate; the theory of "metaphysical psychology" is not as satisfactory because it is complicated with an obscure relation to metaphysics itself.

Studies in Ethics. "Tulane Studies in Philosophy," Vol. VI. New Orleans: Tulane Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 127. Paper, $2.00.

This issue contains six papers: "Plato's Movement from an Ethics of the Individual to a Science of Particulars," by Edward G. Ballard; "The Special Significance of the History of Moral Philosophy," by

Richard L. Barber; "Ethical Variations on a Theme by Rosmini-Servati," by James K. Feibleman; "Fromm's 'Scientific' Ethics of Human Nature," by Carl H. Hamburg; "What Are So-called Moral Judgments About?" by Harold N. Lee; "Value as Comparison—A Critique," by Louise Nisbet Roberts; and "Does the Neo-Intuitionist Theory of Obligation Rest on a Mistake?" by Robert C. Whittemore.

The contents of these papers are quite clear from the titles. The short paper of Professor Barber might be singled out for special mention: he shows that the history of moral philosophy is part of the datum with which the moral philosopher works.

SURTZ, EDWARD. *The Praise of Pleasure.* Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 253. $4.75.

TATON, R. *Reason and Chance in Scientific Discovery.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Dec., 1957. $10.00.

TELLER, EDWARD, and LATTER, ALBERT L. *Our Nuclear Future.* New York: Criterion Books; Mar., 1958. $3.50.

TERMAN, SIBYL, and WALCUTT, CHARLES. *Right to Read.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.; May, 1958. $3.95.

THOMPSON, LAURANCE C. *Ta T'ung Shu: The One World Philosophy of K'ang Yu-Mei.* New York: Macmillan Co.; Jan., 1958. $6.75.

THORPE, LOUIS P., and SCHMULLER, ALLEN M. *Personality: An Interdisciplinary Approach.* Princeton: Van Nostrand Co.; Apr., 1958. $5.00.

THURSTONE, LOUIS L. *Primary Mental Abilities.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Nov., 1957. $3.00.

TITUS, HAROLD HOPPER. *Ethics for Today.* 3rd ed. New York: American Book Co., 1957. Pp. 573. $5.50.

TOMKINS, SILVAN S. *Consciousness, Imagery, and Affect: A Model of the Human Being as an Intercommunication System.* New York: Springer Pub. Co.; May, 1958. $7.50.

TORROJA, EDUARDO. *Philosophy of Structures.* Trans. J. J. Polivka. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press; May, 1958. $12.50.

TOULMIN, STEPHEN. *Uses of Argument.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Mar., 1958. $4.50.

ULLMANN, STEPHEN. *Principles of Semantics.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Mar., 1958. $10.00.

USHENKO, ANDREW PAUL. *The Field Theory of Meaning.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Apr., 1958. Pp. 224. $4.75.

VEBLEN, THORSTEIN. *Theory of Business Enterprise.* New York: New American Lib.; Mar., 1958. 50¢

VOEGELIN, ERIC. *Plato and Aristotle.* "Order and History," Vol. 3. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ.; Feb., 1958. $6.00.

———. *World of the Polis.* "Order and History," Vol. 2. Baton Rouge: Louisiana States Univ. Press; Feb., 1958. $6.00.

VOGEL, ARTHUR ANTON. *Reality, Reason and Religion.* New York: Morehouse-Gorham Co., 1957. Pp. xi + 208. $3.00.

This relatively brief presentation of a modified Aristotelianism is comprehensive in that it views nature, man, and God. In addition, the author is vividly aware of the attitude of many modern philosophers to Aristotelian thought and critically considers their views in two detailed chapters. Only after he has thus cleared away positivistic objections does he undertake a positive presentation (chap. IV, pp. 67-99), covering briefly the basic Aristotelian positions of essence and existence, matter and form. In the next chapter there is a detailed discussion of causation, beginning with Hume's criticisms and progressing to a criticism of the Aristotelian categories of action and passion. The sixth chapter is a brief review of what such an Aristotelian philosophy can say about God, examining at

the same time existentialist criticisms and what might be called the sentimentalist approach to God. The next chapter, on God and free will, is a detailed development of one point in the natural theology, which is largely concerned with showing that the so-called "Thomistic" (or Bañezian) doctrine of physical premotion is essentialistic. The last chapter studies the objection of Tillich and others that the God of the philosophers is not the living God of religion.

VON HILDEBRAND, DIETRICH. *Graven Images.* New York: David McKay Co.; 1957. Pp. 208. $3.50.

VON MISES, LUDWIG. *Theory and History.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; Oct., 1957. $6.00.

VON NEUMANN, JOHN. *Computer and the Brain.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; Apr., 1958. $3.00.

VON WRIGHT, GEORG HENRIK. *Logical Studies.* New York: Humanities Press; 1957. Pp. iv + 195. $5.00.

The first five of the eight essays in this volume have been printed before but have been changed somewhat or been given additions. Together with the three new essays, they make up a unified theme, and each essay adds to the preceding. The first group deals with form and content, the idea of logical truth, quantification, the logic of normative propositions, and the interpretations of modal logic.

In the second group of new essays, the author presents a new system of modal logic. As he says, not much work has been done in this field of logic, and usually all types of modalities have been considered as belonging to the same order. The author maintains that there is a distinction between logical and natural possibility, and that with his system of modal logic the formal difference of these two can be shown. He also shows that some of the difficulties of other modal logics do not occur in his system and that it allows for a conversion into a logic of probability. Next, the author investigates conditionals. Here he interprets the conditional as a mode of asserting, not as a special kind of proposition, a distinction which he shows to have fruitful consequences. Finally, he discusses the concept of entailment. Often, entailment is identified with the so-called implications (material or strict), but this leads to rather strange paradoxes. He then attempts to give to entailment a strict logical status; that is, it is said to hold if the "passage" can be made by means of logic alone. In so doing, he recognizes that a passage from one truth to another need not be made by the means of logic alone, or, as he puts it, that inference ought to be distinguished from entailment.

VOSSLER, KARL. *Medieval Culture.* New York: Frederick Ungar; Mar., 1958. $9.00.

WARNER, REX. *Greek Philosophers.* New York: New American Lib.; May, 1958. 50¢

WARNOCK, G. J. *English Philosophy since 1900.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Apr., 1958. $1.20.

WATSON, JOHN B. *Behaviorism.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Feb., 1958. Pp. 320. Paper, $1.50.

WEISS, PAUL. *Modes of Being.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press; 1958. Pp. xi + 617. $10.00.

The basic thesis of this book is that there are four modes of being (actuality, ideality, existence, God), and that all four are equally real, independent of each other, and necessarily interrelated. Under the heading of actuality, we find activity, causality, man, knowledge, thought, meaning, inference, and ethics. Under that of

ideality, there are possibility, the good, right, law, politics. Under that of existence there is a treatment of its nature, the past, history, and the relation of existence to the other modes. Under the heading of God, there are teleology, relations with the world, proofs for the existence of God, religion.

The book is built up in three parts. In the first part, positive presentations are given; in the second, opposed views are presented as contraries; in the third, the modes are considered in their interrelations in terms of being, understanding, and the cosmos.

The author has written this book in the form of topical assertions, schematically numbered after the fashion of modern logic. Each assertion is then briefly explained or proved. It is the author's contention that by means of these carefully-worked-out propositions, differences between philosophers can be more easily seen and agreement reached.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH. *Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect.* Reissue. New York: Macmillan Co.; Mar., 1958. $2.75.

WIENER, PHILIP PAUL, and NOLAND, AARON (eds.). *Roots of Scientific Thought.* New York: Basic Books, 1957. Pp. 687. $8.00.

WILCOX, FRANCIS O. *The United Nations in an Interdependent World.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957. Pp. 20. Paper, 10¢

WILKINS, GEORGE ALFRED. *Justice of the Universe.* Boston: Christopher Pub. Co.; 1957. Pp. 317. $3.00.

This book, written as a dialogue between a philosopher and a (remarkably credulous, fundamentalist Christian) young man, claims it is a philosophy in accord with science. Its chief tenets are two: that free will is an illusion and that the universe is completely perfect. The means for arriving at the second position is that everyone (even animals) experiences exactly as much happiness as pain. "Authorities" are quoted profusely and indiscriminately (in the original, strong sense of that word).

WIMSATT, W. K., and BEARDSLEY, MONROE C. *Verbal Icon.* New York: Noonday Press; Mar., 1958. $1.65.

WINDELBAND, WILHEM. *History of Philosophy.* Part I, *Greek, Roman, and Medieval;* Part II, *Enlightenment and Modern.* New York: Harper & Bros.; May, 1958. $1.75 each.

WOLFF, HANS M. *Plato; der Kampf ums Sein.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1957. Pp. 312. Paper, $4.50.

WOOD, ALAN. *Bertrand Russell.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1958. Pp. 249. $3.50.

WUELLNER, BERNARD, S.J. *A Christian Philosophy of Life.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1957. Pp. ix + 278. $4.25.

This synthesis of Thomistic philosophy is centered around the problems of human life. The chapters deal with life, human life, and the soul; the special activities of man: thought, desire, and choice; the source and goal of human life; the purpose of human life on earth; the dignity and growth of human life; man's place in nature; man and religion; social and political life; the place of suffering, and the contribution of Christian revelation to a theory of human life.

The author, in thus disposing a great number of problems around the central theme of human life, is enabled to highlight some problems which are ordinarily omitted in the textbook and classroom type of division. Chapters like those on the dignity of human life, the intellectual life, and man's place in nature are refreshing reorganizations of basic ideas that are touched on in regular courses only in a scattered way. The work can thus serve a very important

function of unifying and ordering the senior student's piecemeal knowledge of philosophy. Moreover, the book can be put into the hands of an educated person who wishes to have a knowledge of Catholic philosophy but for whom a formal textbook would prove to be both frustrating and boring. Yet the book also manages to avoid the patronizing tone that characterizes some surveys of philosophy.

Printed in Belgium

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ALEXANDER, IAN W. *Bergson.* "Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought." New York: Hillary House, 1958. Pp. 104. $2.00.

BIRRO, CELA. *The Ways of Enjoyment. A Dialogue Concerning Social Science.* New York: Exposition Press, 1957. Pp. 114. $3.00.

BRIGHTMAN, EDGAR SHEFFIELD. *Person and Reality. An Introduction to Metaphysics.* Ed. Peter Anthony Bertocci with Jeannette Elthina Newhall and Robert Sheffield Brightman. New York: Ronald Press, 1958. Pp. x + 379. $6.50.

BULTMANN, RUDOLF. *The Presence of Eternity. History and Eschatology.* "Gifford Lectures," 1955. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. iv + 171. $3.00.

CALVIN, JOHN. *On the Christian Faith.* Ed. with introd. by John T. McNeill. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xxxiii + 219.

CHARLESWORTH, M. J. *Aristotle on Art and Nature.* Bulletin No. 50, Philosophy Series No. 2. Auckland Univ. College. Auckland, New Zealand: Pilgrim Press, 1957. Pp. 40.

COHEN, ARTHUR. *Martin Buber.* "Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought." New York: Hillary House, 1958. Pp. 110. $2.00.

DE VRIES, JOHN. *Essentials of Physical Science.* Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. 375. $6.95.

DOBRIANSKY, LEV E. *Veblenism. A New Critique.* Introd. by James Burnham. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957. Pp. xii + 409. $6.00.

FOWLIE, WALLACE. *Claudel.* "Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought." New York: Hillary House, 1958. Pp. 111. $2.00.

GREENE, MARJORIE. *Heidegger.* "Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought." New York: Hillary House, 1958. Pp. 128. $2.00.

HACKETT, C. A. *Rimbaud.* "Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought." New York: Hillary House, 1958. Pp. 109. $2.00.

HAYEN, ANDRÉ, S.J. *La communication de l'être d'après Saint Thomas d'Aquin. I: La métaphysique d'un théologien.* Paris-Louvain: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1957. Pp. 189. Paper, 120 f. belges.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *On the Philosophy of History.* Ed. Joseph W. Evans. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1957. Pp. xi + 180. $3.50.

———. *Reflections on America.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. 205. $3.50.

MICHELE, SCHIAVONE. *Problemi Filosofici in Marsilio Ficino.* Milano: Marzorati Editore, 1957. Pp. 327.

MILL, JOHN STUART. *Considerations on Representative Government.* Ed. with introd. by Currin V. Shields. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xiv + 275. Paper, 90¢

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MOULYN, ADRIAN C. *Structure, Function and Purpose.* Foreword by Yervant H. Krikorian. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. ix + 198. $4.00.

MUELLER-DEHAM, ALBERT. *Human Relations and Power.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 410. $3.75.

New Frontiers of Knowledge. Ed. M. B. Schnapper. Introd. by Reed Harris. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957. Pp. x + 125. $2.75.

[PEIRCE, CHARLES S.] *Values in a Universe of Chance. Selected Writings.* Ed. with introd. and notes by Philip P. Wiener. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xxvi + 446. $3.95.

Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern World. Ed. Charles W. Hendel. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. vii + 132. $2.75.

RADIN, PAUL. *Primitive Man as Philosopher.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1957. Pp. xl + 456. Paper, $2.00.

ROMAN, MELVIN. *Reaching Delinquents through Reading.* Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas, 1957. Pp. xiii + 126. $4.50.

ROMANELL, PATRICK. *Toward a Critical Naturalism.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. xv + 88. $3.25.

SNELLGROVE, DAVID. *Buddhist Himālaya.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. xii + 324, with map and 40 plates. $10.00.

Some Aspects of History. "The McAuley Lectures," 1957. West Hartford, Conn.: St. Joseph College, 1957. Pp. 193-253. Paper, $1.00.

STRASSER, STEPHAN. *The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology.* Trans. Henry J. Koren, C.S.SP. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1957. Pp. x + 275. $5.00; paper, $4.25.

Studies in Ethics. "Tulane Studies in Philosophy," Vol. VI. New Orleans: Tulane Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 127. Paper, $2.00.

THÉMISTIUS. *Commentaire sur le traité de l'âme d'Aristote.* Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. Ed. G. Verbeke, with a study on the use of the *Commentary* in the work of St. Thomas. Louvain: Publications Universitaires; Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1957. Pp. xcvii + 320. Paper, 450 f. belges.

TROCHU, FRANCIS. *A Lourdes, les apparitions de Massabielle.* Lyon: Vitte, Editeur, 1957. Pp. xiv + 138. Paper, 360 F.

VOGEL, ARTHUR ANTON. *Reality, Reason and Religion.* New York: Morehouse-Gorham Co., 1957. Pp. xi + 208. $3.00.

WEINLAND, JAMES. *How to Improve Your Memory.* New York: Barnes & Noble, 1957. Pp. vi + 148. $1.00.

WEISS, PAUL. *Modes of Being.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xi + 617. $10.00.

WHITNEY, FRANK P. *School and I.* Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1958. Pp. 173. $3.00.

WILKINS, GEORGE ALFRED. *Justice of the Universe.* Boston: Christopher Pub. Co., 1957. Pp. 317. $3.00.

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